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THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED
NATIONS, AND MICRONESIA:
QUESTIONS OF PROCEDURE,
SUBSTANCE,, AND FAITH
Harry G. Prince*
In undertaking to place under trusteeship a territory of such strategic
importance to the United States as these islands, the United States is
expressing its faith in the United Nations.'
INTRODUCTION
On November 3, 1986, President Ronald Reagan proclaimed that
the United States had satisfied its obligations under the trusteeship
agreement for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or Microne-
sia.2 The Proclamation verified that the Trust Territory had evolved
into four new entities with new relationships to the United States: the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands under the sover-
eignty of the United States and the Federated States of Micronesia,
and the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Republic of Palau as
states in free association with the United States. 3 While it is true that
* Professor of Law, Hastings College of Law. The author wishes to express appreciation to
Professor Roger S. Clark for his insightful comments on an earlier draft, and to Rachel A. Van
Cleave, Hastings Class of 1989, and Brad Kane, Hastings Class of 1990, for their invaluable
research assistance. The author is also indebted to the staff of the Hastings Law Library for
exceptional assistance in locating resource materials.
I. Statement of Warren Austin, United States Representative to the United Nations Security
Council, upon presentation of draft Trusteeship Agreement for the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands. 2 U.N. SCOR (113th mtg.) at 410 (1947) [hereinafter "Statement of Warren Austin"].
2. See Proclamation No. 5564 (Nov. 3, 1986), 51 Fed. Reg. 40,399-400 (1986) (relating to
Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18, 1947, 61 Stat. 3301,
T.I.A.S. No. 1665, 8 U.N.T.S. 189). Micronesia includes more than 2000 islands in three groups,
the Marshalls, the Carolines, and the Marianas. The Trust Territory includes all of Micronesia
except Guam, Nauru and Kiribati. The islands are spread over three million square miles but
have a combined land area of only 700 square miles. The population of the Trust Territory was
estimated to be 164,304 in 1986. 1986 Report of the Government of the United States of America
on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 54 U.N. TCOR, U.N. Doc. T/
1909 (1987).
3. More specifically, the Trusteeship Agreement was declared to be no longer in effect with
respect to the Northern Marinas, the Federated States, and the Marshall Islands. Because Palau
had not completed its internal process for approving new relations with the United States, see
infra notes 226-258 and accompanying text, the Trusteeship Agreement remained provisionally
applicable solely to Palau. The four political communities are described in more detail below, see
infra notes 141-144, and will be referred to in this article as "states" or "emerging states" with-
out prejudice to the question of whether they qualify for statehood under international law.
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the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations had previously con-
cluded that the United States had satisfied its obligations under the
Trusteeship Agreement, 4 the United States did not obtain the approval
of the Security Council, the body which is generally viewed as holding
ultimate responsibility under the United Nations Charter for ensuring
that a strategic trust obligation has been properly fulfilled.5
This recent action by the United States Government has raised
questions of both substance and procedure. Has the United States
lived up to its obligations under the Trusteeship Agreement to foster
the educational, social, political and economic development of the
Trust Territory to a point where self-government and termination of
the trust is appropriate? Are the proposed arrangements for post-trust
relations between the emerging states and the United States consistent
with United Nations principles of self-determination? Can the Trus-
teeship Agreement be validly terminated without the approval of the
Security Council? Arguments can be made on both sides of all three
questions. Substantively, the United States has built schools and hos-
pitals, spurred the formation of constitutional governments, and pro-
vided large amounts of financial assistance. Still, the emerging states
continue to be without much hope of future economic self-sufficiency,
the infrastructure of roads and government facilities is often charged
as being inadequate, and the traditional culture has given way to the
advent of violent crimes, increasing suicide rates, and other social mal-
adies generally attributed to Western influence on the territory. Most
significantly, there are charges that nuclear weapons are being forced
onto the territory of one state, and that there has been a lack of ade-
quate compensation for injuries caused by nuclear testing in another
state.
4. T.C. Res. 2183 (LIII), 53 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No. 3) at 14-15, U.N. Doc. T/1901 (1986).
For text of resolution see appendix B, infra. The resolution was adopted by a vote of three in
favor (France, United Kingdom, and the United States) and one against (the Soviet Union).
China, as had been its practice prior to 1989, did not take part in the proceedings. See 23 U.N.
Chronicle 67 (1986). In 1987 and 1988 the Trusteeship Council, by similar votes of three to one,
reaffirmed its position in the 1986 resolution that termination of the Trusteeship Agreement is
appropriate. See 55 U.N. TCOR (1657th mtg.) at 18, U.N. Doc. T/PV. 1657 (1988), (adopting
draft resolution found in U.N. Doc. T/S.1266 (1988); 54 U.N. TCOR (1640th mtg.) at 8, U.N.
Doc. T/PV. 1640 (1987) (adopting draft resolution found in U.N. Doc. T/L. 1260 (1987)). China
participated in Trusteeship Council proceedings for the first time in 1989. See 56 U.N. TCOR
(1671st mtg.) at 26, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1661 (1989), and joined the majority in voting 4 to I
essentially to reaffirm the 1986 resolution. See 56 U.N. TCOR (1671st mtg.) at 31, U.N. Doc. T/
PV.1671 (1989) (adopting resolution found in U.N. Doc. T/L.1270 (1989)). Further Trusteeship
Council acquiescence in the United States' unilateral efforts at termination is found in its dis-
patch of a visiting mission which visited only Palau, as the sole remaining portion of the Trust
Territory. See Report of the United Notions Visiting Mission to Palau, Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, 1989, 56 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No. 1), U.N. Doc. T/1935 (1989).
5. See infra notes 51-108 and accompanying text.
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The proposed post-trust relations between the United States and
the emerging states also are subject to mixed review. The new statuses
seem certainly to reflect, as a general matter, the free choices of the
majority of the people in the Trust Territory. But when measured
against United Nations norms for self-determination, as defined by the
Charter, General Assembly resolutions and past practice, the post-
trust arrangements arguably concede too much to the United States
for the new entities to be deemed to have achieved the proper level of
self-government. Charges of neo-colonialism, in fact, have been made
with regard to the commonwealth relationship with the Northern Ma-
riana Islands.
Procedurally, the overwhelming weight of opinion is that Security
Council approval is essential to the legal termination of the Trustee-
ship Agreement. Neither the Trusteeship Agreement nor the United
Nations Charter, however, explicitly requires such a step. And quite
notably, the United States Government is well on the path to terminat-
ing the Trusteeship Agreement, effectively and probably irreversibly,
whether such action is procedurally correct or not.6
6. While this article focuses on issues relating to de jure termination of the Trusteeship
Agreement, the prospect of de facto termination of trusteeship status looms large in present
considerations of the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands.
These two emerging states present an increasingly plausible claim for statehood. Both the Mar-
shall Islands and the Federated States can allege satisfaction of the four basic requirements for
statehood: a permanent population, a defined territory, internal government, and the capacity to
enter into relations with other states. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 74-75 (3d. ed 1979). The element most likely to be challenged is that of capacity to
engage in foreign relations because the United States has substantial rights relating to security
and defense of the emerging states. See infra notes 200-212 and accompanying text. The grant of
a right to intervene in a state's territory for defense purposes, however, should not be deemed to
spoil the otherwise independent nature of the grantor state. See I. BROWNLIE, supra, at 76-79.
The example of Syria and Lebanon offers some precedent for de facto termination, the man-
date for those two states having been terminated without formal action by the League of Nations,
which was in the process of dissolution, or United Nations but resting instead on gradual recog-
nition and ultimately admission to the United Nations. See H.D. HALL, MANDATES, DEPEN-
DENCIES AND TRUSTEESHIP 265-66 (1948). Since the declaration by President Reagan of the
termination of the trusteeship, the Marshall Islands and Federated States have been recognized
by and established diplomatic relations with a number of states. The Federated States has been
recognized not only by United States and the Marshall Islands, but also by Nauru, Japan, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Israel, Kiribati, the Philippines, Tonga and China.
See Memorandum: Federated States of Micronesia: Perceptions of Sovereignty and Statehood 6
(Aug. 22, 1989) (provided by courtesy of Stovall & Spradlin, Washington, D.C., legal counsel to
the Federated States of Micronesia. Copy on file with Michigan Journal of International Law).
The Marshall Islands has been similarly recognized, except that the Marshall Islands declined to
establish full diplomatic relations with China because of concerns about human rights abuses.
Telephone interview with Frank Solomon, Office of the Representative of the Republic of the
Marshall Islands (Sept. 12, 1989); see also Marshall Islands Defers Diplomatic Relations with
China, Reuters, Sept. 6, 1989 [Nexis].
The United States in recent months upgraded its diplomatic relations with the Federated
States and the Marshall Islands to the ambassadorial level. See Act of July 26, 1989, Pub. L.
101-62, 103 Stat. 162. The primary reason for this move was to strengthen the claim to state-
hood and to encourage other states to recognize the Federated States and the Marshall Islands.
See 135 CONG. REC. S7955 (daily ed. July 13, 1989) (statement of Sen. Johnston); 135 CONG.
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The rather obvious reason for the United States circumvention of
the Security Council in the termination process is the prospect that the
Soviet Union or some other country might use that forum to take the
United States to task over the competency of its forty year long admin-
istration of the Trust Territory. 7 Also, the Soviet Union might use its
veto power to prevent Security Council approval of the proposed ter-
mination of the Trusteeship Agreement. 8 The threat that some coun-
Rec. H3222 (daily ed. June 27, 1989) (letter of Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Secretary, Depart-
ment of State to Rep. Jim Wright, dated May 23, 1989, stating that the establishment full diplo-
matic relations "will promote better international understanding of the sovereign and self-
governing status of the Freely Associated States.")
If the United States succeeds in influencing other states to recognize the sovereignty of the
emerging states by establishing diplomatic relations, then it becomes difficult to assert that the
Federated States and the Marshall Islands are still subject to the general limitations on capacity
that attach to non-self-governing trust territories. Cf Marston, Termination of Trusteeship, 18
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 1, 5-6 (1969) (asserting that attainment of independence necessarily means
that trusteeship status has ended but that attainment of limited self-government might not have
that effect). While the precise role of recognition in the criteria of statehood remains subject to
debate, see J. DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 7-12 (1987), the fact of rec-
ognition affords the ability to act as a state in fact. The significant number of recognitions re-
corded to date would seem to preclude any possibility of prescriptive, collective non-recognition
as has occurred with South African bantustans or "homeland-states." See id. at 99-107.
Despite the prospect of defacto termination of trusteeship status for the Marshall Islands and
the Federated States, the United States would still be confronted with the continuation of trustee-
ship status for Palau and the Northern Mariana Islands as well as the lack of termination of the
Trusteeship Agreement and any pertinent obligations thereunder. Palau might eventually follow
the projected path of the Federated States and the Marshall Islands. The United States undoubt-
edly would argue that the termination in fact would also extend to the Northern Mariana Islands
on the grounds that the Northern Mariana Islands has engaged in an act of self-determination by
electing commonwealth status. Since the Northern Marianas will not be seeking the recognition
as a sovereign state, the opportunity for external validation of the new status will not be
presented. Thus, the Trusteeship Agreement and the residual United States obligations thereun-
der might linger indefinitely. Cf. Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.N.), 1963 I.C.J. 15, 34
(Preliminary Objections: Dec. 2, 1963) (Noting that upon valid termination of trusteeship agree-
ment the rights and duties of trustee cease to exist).
7. See Juda v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 667, 682 (1987) (U.S. attorneys asserting during trial
that the executive branch has determined that the Soviet Union will frustrate post-trust agree-
ments). Indeed, the Soviet Union has built a record of criticism of United States administration
of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands through its record in the Trusteeship Council. See,
e.g., 55 U.N. TCOR (1658th mtg.) at 10-14, U.N. Doc. T/PV. 1658 (1988) (Soviet Representa-
tive accusing the United States of annexationist policy in the proposed termination of the Trus-
teeship Agreement); 54 U.N. TCOR, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1647 (1987) (Soviet Representative
protesting the report of the mission sent to observe a plebiscite in Palau on grounds that the
Trusteeship Council's goals were "to lend some legitimacy to the process of splitting up the
United Trust Territory" and "covering up the annexationist actions" of the United States); Trus-
teeship Council calls termination of Micronesia Agreement 'appropriate, 23 U.N. CHRONICLE 67
(1986) (Soviet Representative to the Trusteeship Council voting against approval of termination
of the Trusteeship Agreement on grounds that the U.S. had not fulfilled its obligations under the
Trusteeship Agreement, the United Nations Charter and the General Assembly Declaration on
Decolonization); 53 U.N. TCOR U.N. Doc. T/1884 (1986) (Letter from the Soviet Union Repre-
sentative accusing the United States of "neo-colonialist action in moving toward free association
with Trust Territory states).
8. The presumption being taken is that the vote for approval of termination of the Trustee-
ship Agreement would be a substantive matter and therefore subject to veto by the permanent
members of the Security Council under article 27(3) of the United Nations Charter. While the
argument can be made that such a vote might be deemed procedural under article 27(2) and
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tries might politicize the question, however, is not sufficient grounds to
warrant a breach of the duty to follow proper procedure under the
Charter of the United Nations. Avoiding the Security Council on this
issue of trust termination is evidence of a demise of the faith in the
United Nations system that lead to the creation of the Trust Territory
some forty years ago. In a decade that has witnessed recurrent
breaches of faith in the United Nations by the United States,9 the ar-
gument can be made that the United Nations system should be tested
anew with regard to Micronesia. If the United States and the newly
emerging states of the Trust Territory can arrive at a genuine agree-
ment for new arrangements that comport with United Nations Char-
ter obligations, then the Security Council cannot properly withhold
approval. The United States has a solid foundation for approval of
trust termination based upon the free exercise of the right of self-deter-
mination by the peoples of the Trust Territory in deciding the forms of
post-trust relations. 10 The United States, however, must continue
with efforts to address remaining problems within the structures of
those new relations, necessarily including the making of some conces-
sions to the demands of the new states and to relevant United Nations
principles. Legitimate termination of the trust must be predicated
upon the proper provision for the well-being of the Micronesian peo-
ples, not the protection of United States security interests.
If Security Council approval is improperly withheld, then resort
should be made to the International Court of Justice for an advisory
opinion." I Even if there is some concern that the matter might not be
therefore not subject to permanent member veto, since the essence of the determination will be a
decision on the proper exercise of the right of the people of Micronesia to self-determination and
achievement of self-government, such an argument must be considered specious. See Macdon-
ald, Termination of the Strategic Trusteeship: Free Association, the United Nations and Interna-
tional Law, 7 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 235, 263-66 (1981); Marston, Termination of Trusteeship,
18 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 1, 13 (1969).
9. The United States' purported unilateral termination of the trust adds to other evidence of
its lack of confidence in the United Nations system. Recent years have seen the United States
attempt to close an accredited mission to the United Nations and deny entry into the United
States of an official visitor to the United Nations in blatant disregard of obligations under the
Headquarters Agreement. The United States has restricted payment of funds due to the United
Nations in breach of article 17 of the Charter. In 1983, the Department of State gave notice of
United States withdrawal from UNESCO as a result of a dispute over the agenda of the organiza-
tion and its budget. Most significantly, the United States withdrew from the case Nicaragua
brought against it before the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) and subsequently rescinded its
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. under article 36 of the Statute of the I.C.J.
because of alleged politicization of the court. The improper termination of the trusteeship agree-
ment may be characterized as only the latest in a series of conduct which denigrates the United
Nations.
10. See infra notes 136-47 and accompanying text.
11. While the ability to request an advisory opinion is limited by the Charter to certain or-
gans of the United Nations, the United States would have three possible avenues. Article 96 (1)
of the Charter provides that either the General Assembly or Security Council may request an
Fall 1989]
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impartially considered in the I.C.J., 12 the noble path for the United
States to take would be to give the United Nations system a try rather
than presuming that it will not work. Bearing in mind that its risks
are limited because of its veto power in the Security Council, the
United States Government should exercise some faith in the United
Nations by giving it a chance to work for Micronesia.
This study first considers the procedural requirements for proper
termination and concludes that Security Council approval is required.
Second, this writing identifies the major issues that should be consid-
ered if the proposed termination of the Trusteeship Agreement for Mi-
cronesia is subjected to Security Council review. Two basic concerns
should be the propriety of the division of the Trust Territory into four
separate entities and the legitimacy of the agreements between the new
governments and the United States for continuing relations as either
commonwealth or freely associated states. The history of and practice
under the trusteeship system indicate that the particular arrangements
for commonwealth and free association statuses do not fit neatly into
recognized categories of self-governance. Nonetheless, as a general
matter, the arrangements are within the broader realm of acceptable
relations because they reflect the free choices of the Micronesian
peoples.
Other substantive issues which this paper discusses in evaluating
whether the United States has satisfied its obligation under the Trus-
teeship System include: the need for clarification of the nature of the
United States' relationship With the Northern Mariana Islands, the re-
peated attempts to get the Palauan people to countermand their new
advisory opinion. Under the provisions of article 96 (2) of the Charter, the General Assembly
also has authorized the Trusteeship Council to seek advisory opinions. See D. PRATAP, THE
ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 60-67 (1972). The International
Court has previously found a basis for jurisdiction in cases involving trust, mandate, or non-self-
governing territories. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Advisory Opinion of Oct. 16); Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Nambia (South-West Af-
rica) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (Advisory Opinion of
June 21); Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J. 15 (Preliminary Objections:
Dec. 2) (the court clearly acknowledged possible grounds for jurisdiction while declining to hear
case on the merits on grounds that any judgment would be capable of effective application).
From the perspective of the United States, the essential questions to be put before the Interna-
tional Court would be the proposition that upon the valid exercise of the right of self-determina-
tion through United Nations supervised plebiscites the emerging states are entitled to release
from the restraints of trusteeship status through termination of the Trusteeship Agreement.
12. The I.C.J. has been accused of having become politicized due to the nature of its compo-
sition, which reflects the geo-political diversity of the General Assembly, the manner of selection
of judges, and the bias perceived by some in certain decisions of the court. See Leigh & Ramsey,
Confidence in the Court. It Need Not be a "Hollow Chamber", in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 106-10 (L. Damrosch ed. 1987); T. FRANCK, JUDGING THE
WORLD COURT 35-38 (1987). The allegations of bias have been answered with some contradic-
tory data and analysis. See Damrosch, supra, at 123-33; T. FRANCK, supra, at 37-38.
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constitution by permitting the United States to bring nuclear powered
or capable vessels into their territory, the reparations made for injury
resulting from nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands, the conse-
quences of the United States' acquisition of land for missile testing
done on the Kwajalein atoll, and the general economic development
and social welfare of the Trust Territory. The United States' check-
ered record on these issues indicates that Security Council approval of
the termination should be conditioned upon modification of post-trust
arrangements to ensure that the Micronesian people are treated fairly.
PART I - THE PROPER PROCESS FOR TERMINATION
In preparing this draft trusteeship agreement, the Government of the
United States bore constantly in mind article 73 of the [United Nations]
Charter: "Members of the United Nations which have or assume re-
sponsibilities for the administration of territories whose people have not
yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle
that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount,
and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost,
within the system of international peace and security established by the
present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants."'
3
A. The Mandate System
Although the Trusteeship System evolved directly from the man-
date system of the League of Nations,' 4 the history of the law of de-
pendent territories and the Trusteeship System actually begins in the
period of colonization prior to World War I. During the early period
of competitive expansionism by the European powers, there was little
doubt that colonies existed for the benefit of the colonizing states.' 5
During the late nineteenth century, as the increasing importance of the
colonies' natural wealth lead to a recognition of the need for interna-
tional cooperation and accountability, attention was also drawn to the
unfair treatment of the indigenous people. 16 The colonial powers took
on limited obligations to promote the well being of the inhabitants of
the territories, standing as "trustees of civilization."' 7 This movement
13. Statement of Warren Austin, supra note 1, at 411-12.
14. See Sayre, Legal Problems Arising from the United Nations Trusteeship System, 42 AM. J.
INT'L L. 263, 265 (1948) ("The trusteeship system of the United Nations is historically, though
not legally, the successor of the mandates system of the League.")
15. See R. CHOWDHURI, INTERNATIONAL MANDATES AND TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEMS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 15-16 (1955); Sayre, supra note 14, at 263.
16. See R. CHOWDHURI, supra note 15, at 20-22 (describing the Berlin Conference of 1884-
1885 and the General Act of Brussels of 1890 as introducing rights of indigenous people of
Central Africa); C. TOUSSAINT, THE TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM OF THE UNITED NATIONS 4-5, 1 1-
14 (Library of World Affairs No. 33, 1956).
17. Some difference of opinion exists over the precise origin of the philosophical principles
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included efforts to promote the abolition of the slave trade. 18
During the First World War, diplomats and thinkers began to es-
calate the call for radical reform in colonial governments to make the
welfare of the natives the paramount guide in their government. 19 At
the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919, however, less noble factors
were at play. These factors included an unwillingness to apply the
principles of self-determination to colonies of the Allied Powers, and a
number of secret treaties made between the Allied Powers or with
outside parties. These treaties concerned the division of the "spoils of
war," i.e., the colonies of Germany and the Ottoman Empire.20 Thus,
the mandate system arose as a compromise and reflected the condi-
tions established by the peace treaties for the administration of the
former overseas possessions of Germany and Turkey.2'
The mandate system was incorporated into the Covenant of the
League of Nations under the provisions of article 22,22 which set out
the governing principles and the mechanics of the League's supervi-
sory role. The mandate system included charter agreements for the
mandated territories obligating each mandatory nation to apply the
principles of article 22.23 The charters all contained a clause requiring
underlying the concept of the international sacred trust, with various writers attributing the con-
cept to British, American, or Spanish politicians and thinkers. Undoubtedly the concept devel-
oped with the contribution of many sources. See R. CHOWDHURI, supra note 15, at 13-20.
18. See id. at 13-20; C. TOUSSAINT, supra note 16, at 8-9.
19. See R. CHOWDHURI, supra note 15, at 23-24; A. MARGALITH, THE INTERNATIONAL
MANDATES 4 (1930). Margalith states:
The most important spokesmen for the Allies were David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of
England, and Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America. Through their
utterances, such phrases as 'no annexation', 'self-determination', 'consent of the governed',
were brought into use in all corners of the world and inspired the hope that the war would
be the last war.
Id. at 8.
20. A. MARGALITH, supra note 19, at 10-13.
21. See H.D. HALL, supra note 6, at 30-35.
22. Article 22 provides in part:
1. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to
be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhab-
ited by peoples not yet able to stand themselves under the strenuous conditions of the mod-
ern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such
peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this
trust should be embodied in this Covenant.
2. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such
peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their
experience or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and who
are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on
behalf of the League.
3. The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of
the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other
similar circumstances.
23. For a collection of the mandate charters,, see UNITED NATIONS, TERMS OF LEAGUE OF
NATIONS MANDATES, U.N. Doc. A/70 (1946). For a listing of the mandates, see J. CRAWFORD,
THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 426-28 (1979).
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the consent of the Council of the League of Nations for any modifica-
tion of the terms of the mandate. 24 The Permanent Mandates Com-
mission was established as an advisory body to assist the Council in
supervising the application of the Mandate Principles. 25
The essence of article 22 was that the mandatory system was a
temporary matter aimed to ensure the well-being and development of
the peoples inhabiting the subject territories. A "sacred trust" estab-
lished for each mandated territory would end when that territory
achieved independence. A League of Nations commentary describes
the mandatory nations as being "like guardians in civil law" who
"must exercise their authority in the interest of their wards . . . and
must maintain an entirely disinterested attitude in their dealings with
them."' 26  This principle was consistent with the view that the
mandatory nations held the trust for the world at large as well as the
indigenous people, acted on behalf of the League, and were therefore
accountable to the League for their administration. 27
Thirteen charters were concluded under the mandate system. 28
The dissolution of the League of Nations during World War II created
the possibility that the responsibility and obligations of the mandatory
nations might have lapsed for those territories which had not yet
gained independence. This possibility was precluded, however, by an
agreement at Yalta in February, 1945 that the "Five-Powers" would
consult on proposals for the United Nations Conference to deal with
the mandated territories and other dependent area problems. 29 Subse-
quently, provisions were made in the United Nations Charter for a
replacement system to be called the "Trusteeship System." These
agreements reflected the presumption that the Trusteeship System
would include existing mandated territories that had not achieved in-
dependence, territories of the defeated states in World War II, and any
territories voluntarily placed under the system.30 The territories that
24. See H.D. HALL, supra note 6, at 31.
25. See generally id. at 177-212.
26. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, THE MANDATES SYSTEM ORIGIN - PRINCIPLES - APPLICA-
TION 23 (1945).
27. COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS art. 22, para. 7. See S. DE SMITH, MICROS-
TATES AND MICRONESIA 20-21 (1970).
28. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, supra note 26. The "A" Mandates were Palestine, Transjordan,
Syria and Lebanon. The "B" Mandates were British Cameroons, French Cameroons, British
Togoland, French Togoland, Tanganyika, and Ruanda-Urundi. The "C" Mandates were Micro-
nesia, Nauru, New Guinea, Western Samoa, and South West Africa. IRAQ was also classified as
an "A" mandate although a formal charter was never executed. Id. at 21.
29. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, THE UNITED STATES AND NON-SELF-GOVERNING
TERRITORIES 10 (1947).
30. Id. at 10.
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were actually placed under the Trusteeship System were those which
had been mandated territories, including Micronesia, 3' but excepting
South West Africa and some of the former territories of Italy.32
B. From Sacred to Strategic Trust
The foregoing description of the origins of the Trusteeship System
reveals that its roots lay solidly in the mandate system and the princi-
ples upon which that system was founded. The Trusteeship System, as
might therefore be expected, embodied the essence of the mandate sys-
tem's "sacred trust" and placed the trustee states in a temporary
guardian relationship with the trust territories foi the purpose of fos-
tering the well-being and development of the territories into self-gov-
erning states.
The Trusteeship System is structured by the United Nations Char-
ter provisions found in chapters XI, XII and XIII,3 3 and supple-
mented by trusteeship agreements entered into by each administering
authority for a trust territory. 34 Chapter XI is a declaration that ap-
plies to all areas of the world that are not fully self-governing, includ-
ing trust territories. Article 73 of chapter XI provides in part that
"the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount. ' 35
Chapter XII outlines the purposes and goals of the Trusteeship
System, including the advancement of the territories and the further-
ance of international peace and security. Article 76 establishes the
31. The recorded history of Micronesia is one of domination by foreign powers. See gener-
ally S. DE SMITH, supra note 27, at 122-28 (1970); C. HEINE, MICRONESIA AT THE CROSSROADS
10-17 (1974). Beginning with the advent of the Spanish explorers in the sixteenth century, por-
tions of Micronesia have been continuously subjugated. Germany was the successor to Spain,
largely because of an agreement to purchase from Spain its Pacific Ocean territories, including
Micronesia. Japan took control of Micronesia in 1914 at the beginning of World War I and then
received effective control of the islands when they became a mandated territory under the Treaty
of Versailles at the end of the war. Japanese domination ended with the country's defeat in
World War II, at which point the United States became the administering authority for the
islands.
32. See J. CRAWFORD, supra note 23, at 426-28.
33. Chapters XI, XII and XIII are respectively titled: "Declaration Regarding Non-Self-
Governing Territories," "International Trusteeship System," and "The Trusteeship Council."
34. For a sampling of trusteeship agreements, see H.D. HALL, supra note 6, at 340-70.
35. Because chapter XI is titled as a "Declaration," some have suggested that it is no more
than a unilateral declaration and binding only in regard to the obligation of article 73(e) which is
to "transmit regularly to the Secretary General ... statistical and other information of a techni-
cal nature." Prevailing thought, however, has affirmed that because chapter XI is contained in a
treaty, it cannot possess a character different from the treaty. See A. KAMANDA, A STUDY OF
THE LEGAL STATUS OF PROTECTORATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 263-67 (1961) (cit-
ing I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 787-88 (7th ed. 1952)). Trust territories are ex-
empted from the requirements of article 73(e) by express langauge, strongly supporting the
conclusion that the rest of the article and Chapter XI does apply.
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guiding objectives of the Trusteeship System 36 including the promo-
tion of political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the
inhabitants and echoes the article 73 directive that the territory be
directed towards self-government or independence. 37
The general responsibility for overseeing the Trusteeship System is
placed in the General Assembly with the assistance of the Trusteeship
Council created by chapter XIII. In addition to setting up this normal
structure, however, chapter XIII goes further to provide that all or
part of a territory may be designated as a "strategic area." The respon-
sibility for supervising a strategic trust is placed in the Security Coun-
cil by article 83(1).38 Consequently, the Trusteeship Agreement for
Micronesia, the only strategic trust created, was subject to Security
Council approval and was so approved in 1947. 39 There was some
resistance to the idea of including the strategic trust concept. The
other states involved ultimately agreed to the idea, recognizing it as a
matter of essential importance to the United States delegation. 40
The concept of strategic areas or trusts stood in sharp contrast to
the mandate system which provided for the demilitarization of man-
36. Article 76 provides:
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the
United Nations laid down in Article I of the present charter, shall be:
a. to further international peace and security;
b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabit-
ants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government
or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory
and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be
provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the
interdependence of the peoples of the world; and
d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members
of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the
administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives
and subject to the provisions of Article 80.
U.N. CHARTER art. 76.
37. The addition of the goal of progression toward self-government or independence was an
addition beyond the goals of the mandate system. Sayre, supra note 14, at 279-81 (1948). The
language of article 76 was the result of debate about the goals of the trusteeship system as out-
lined by Sayre. Although article 73 does not actually mention "independence," the drafting
history reveals an understanding by the drafters that independence was one contemplated form
of self-government. See W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 110-13 (1977).
38. "All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas ... shall be exercised by
the Security Council." U.N. CHARTER art. 83, para. 1.
39. S.C. Res. 21, U.N. Doc. S/318, reprinted in Resolutions and Decisions of the Security
Council 1947, U.N. Doc. S/INF/2/Rev.I (II) at 16 (1947). Those voting in favor of the resolu-
tion included the Soviet Union. See S. DE SMITH, supra note 27, at 129 (citing R. EMERSON,
AMERICAN PACIFIC DEPENDENCIES 22 (1949)). Congress approved the Trusteeship Agreement
by joint resolution on July 18, 1947, 61 Stat. 397.
40. See R. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 833-34 (1958).
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dated territories. 4t Indeed, the strategic trust has been described as a
"somewhat bastard and contradictory" concept. 42 The innovative no-
tion of strategic areas was tailored by the United States specifically to
fit the situation of Micronesia. 43 More particularly, the proposal of
the strategic trust grew out of a dispute within the United States gov-
ernment between those who wanted to annex Micronesia outright be-
cause of security concerns, 44 and those who found the idea of
annexation inconsistent with the non-annexation movement which the
United States had supported. 45 Under the strategic trust concept, the
United States was able "to have its cake and eat it too," avoiding out-
right annexation while retaining the utmost in control of the islands.46
The fact that the Security Council has review powers is important be-
cause the United States is a permanent member with veto power over
Security Council proposals.47 While public statements of the United
States have advocated the importance of the Pacific Islands' adminis-
tration in a manner that contributes to the collective security of all the
members of the United Nations, 48 the degree of U.S. control has led to
41. See Sayre, supra note 14, at 266-67; see also LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22,
para. 5.
42. TRUSTEESHIP IN THE PACIFIC 54 (A. McDonald ed. 1949).
43. Clark, Self-Determination and Free Association: Should the United Nations Terminate
the Pacific Islands Trust?, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 3-5 (1980); Hills, Compact of Free Association
for Micronesia: Constitutional and International Law Issues, 18 INT'L LAW. 583, 589-92 (1984).
John Foster Dulles even warned the United Nations General Assembly that if it did not accept
the American proposals regarding Micronesia, the United States would simply ignore that inter-
national body and continue its de facto occupation. J. WEBB, MICRONESIA AND U.S. PACIFIC
STRATEGY 79 (1974).
44. Juda v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 667, 671 (1987); Adams, American Involvement in Per-
spective, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP IN THE PACIFIC 86 (W.
Louis ed. 1972). Adams states that Secretary of War Stimson viewed the Japanese mandated
islands as essential to the United States' security and thought no trusteeship system should be
devised until "the necessity of their [mandated islands] acquisition by the United States is estab-
lished and recognized." Stimson also asserted:
Acquisition of [the islands] by the United States does not represent an attempt at coloniza-
tion or exploitation. Instead, it is merely the acquisition by the United States of the neces-
sary bases for the defense of the Pacific for the future world. To serve such a purpose they
must belong to the United States with absolute power.
Adams, supra, at 86-87 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES: THE CONFERENCES AT MALTA AND YALTA 1945, 78-79 (1955)).
45. See Adams, supra note 44, at 83; H. NUFER, MICRONESIA UNDER RULE 26-28 (1978);
R. GALE, THE AMERICANIZATION OF MICRONESIA 51-60 (1979); R. CHOWDHURI, supra note
15, at 41-43; C. HEINE, supra note 31, at 4; Hills, supra note 43, at 591-92.
46. See R. CHOWDHURI, supra note 15, at 120.
47. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 23, para. 1, and art. 27, para. 3 (designating permanent mern-
bers of the Security Council and providing that non-procedural matters require the concurrence
of all permanent members). Notably, the Security Council veto structure provided the United
States with additional protection against changes in the Trusteeship Arrangement without
United States approval but now works against United States' interests because of fear that other
members possessing the veto power may use it against United States' interest in terminating the
Trusteeship Agreement. See H. NUFER, supra note 45, at 28.
48. See 2 U.N. SCOR (113th mtg.) at 410 (1947) (statement of United States Ambassador
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charges of de facto annexation. 49
The Charter does not provide in detail what the differences be-
tween a strategic and non-strategic trust should be, but the provisions
of the Trusteeship Agreement for Micronesia do establish some differ-
ences. Among some of the special provisions is article 5 which allows
the United States to set up military facilities in the Trust Territory.
Also, article 13 of the Agreement grants the United States the power
to close off certain areas of the Trust Territory from even Security
Council supervision.
Apart from the specialty provisions, the Trusteeship Agreement
provides that the administering authority will foster self-government
under the obligations imposed by article 76(b) of the Charter which
allows for independence of the people if appropriate to the particular
circumstances and in accordance with the expressed wishes of the peo-
ple. The Agreement also obligates the United States to promote polit-
ical, educational, social, and economic self-sufficiency for the
inhabitants of the territory.50 A fair reading of the Trusteeship Agree-
ment in light of Charter obligations leads to the conclusion that de-
spite the undeniable primacy accorded to its security concerns, the
United States ultimately made a binding commitment to make the ad-
vancement of the Micronesian peoples the basic or paramount objec-
tive in the administration of the Trust Territory.
C. Measures for Termination
Determining the proper method for termination of the trusteeship
for Micronesia becomes a matter of applying principles of treaty inter-
pretation to the Trusteeship Agreement and relevant portions of the
United Nations Charter. Not only are the Charter provisions relevant
by virtue of their express and implicit incorporation into the Trustee-
ship Agreement, but also article 103 of the Charter gives its provisions
priority over conflicting obligations under other international agree-
ments. Under article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 51 the meaning of a treaty should primarily be determined ac-
cording to "the terms of the treat[ies] in their context." The "context"
includes related agreements, subsequent practice under the treaties,
Warren Austin at presentation of draft Trusteeship Agreement for Micronesia); 1946-47
U.N.Y.B. 394, U.N. Sales No. 194.1. 18.
49. See D. McHENRY, MICRONESIA: TRUST BETRAYED 2 (1975); S. DE SMITH, supra note
27, at 128.
50. Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, supra note 2, art. 6.
51. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969) entered
into force Jan. 27, 1980.
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and any relevant rules of international law. Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention also allows for resort to the treaty's preparatory work and
the circumstances of its conclusion as a supplement to interpreting the
actual terms.
In addition to looking at the language of the Trusteeship Agree-
ment and the relevant parts of the United Nations Charter, the draft-
ing history of the Trusteeship Agreement and the history of the
Trusteeship System should help define the requirements for termina-
tion of the trust. The past practices of individual states and the United
Nations in bringing about the termination of other trusts is also re-
vealing. Notably, the writers who have studied these factors relevant
to the question of trust termination have concluded that approval of
the Security Council is essential.52
The United Nations Charter provisions relating to trust territories
in general require the approval of the General Assembly for "the
terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amend-
ment."'5 3 The Charter also provides that approval of strategic trust
agreement terms and any alteration or amendment to them should oc-
cur with the approval or assent of the Security Council. 54 The Charter
provisions, however, do not specifically include the term "termina-
tion." This omission may be attributable in part to a similar gap in the
League of Nations Covenant. During the drafting of article 22 of the
Covenant, a proposal was made that the League of Nations have the
right to redress or correct any breach of mandate obligations and re-
place a mandatory state. 55 This provision was excluded, however, on
the grounds that the mandatory states would be reluctant to make
investments in the mandated territories if the mandate could be
brought to an end by the League of Nations at any time.5 6
52. See D. McHENRY, supra note 49, at 49; S. DE SMITH, supra note 27, at 185; C. Tous-
SAINT, supra note 16, at 135; Clark, Letter to the Editor in Chief, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 927, 930-33
(1987); Macdonald, supra note 8, at 256-62; Marston, supra note 6, at 36-37; see also Hirayasu,
The Process of Self-Determination and Micronesia's Future Political Status Under International
Law, 9 U. HAW. L. R. 487, 488 (1987) (presuming without detailed discussion that the termina-
tion would be submitted to Security Council); Sayre, supra note 14, at 289 (assuming without
detailed discussion that Security Council approval would be required).
53. U.N. CHARTER art. 85 provides:
1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas
not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and
of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.
2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall
assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.
54. "All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including approval of the
terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by
the Security Council." U.N. CHARTER art. 83, para. 1.
55. See R. CHOWDHURI, supra note 15, at 62.
56. Id.
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The draft proposals for the Trusteeship System presented at San
Francisco also failed to address the process for termination." The
Chinese delegation suggested within the Five Power Consultative
Group18 that there be a provision addressing action which could be
taken by the General Assembly or Security Council in the event of a
breach of a trust agreement. The proposal was opposed by those states
which would hold trusts, and which therefore might be adversely af-
fected by such a provision. The Chinese proposal did not make it into
the drafts.59 Other written comments suggesting terms for termina-
tion apparently went unheeded as well. 60 When the topic was later
addressed in the general debate, a proposal was offered by Egypt that
the General Assembly be given the power to terminate a trust arrange-
ment.61 The amendment was opposed for two stated reasons. First,
some states argued that placing such power in the General Assembly
was inconsistent with that part of the Trusteeship System which al-
lowed for states to place territories voluntarily in the system. 62 Sec-
ond, the General Assembly and Security Council could address
specific problems existing with trustee states on a case by case basis,
including the possibility of treating such a problem as a threat to the
peace. 63 Yet another reason offered for the failure to include a specific
termination provision is that states believed that termination provi-
sions could be written into the separate Trusteeship Agreements, even
though only two of the subsequent Agreements eventually addressed
termination at all.64
The drafting history of the Trusteeship System, and collaterally the
mandate system, is not extremely helpful in deciding the proper mode
57. See Marston, supra note 6, at 3.
58. The four sponsoring nations of the 1945 United Nations Conference of International
Organization, the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union, continued a prior
practice of meeting as an informal consultative group. France was added as the "Fifth Power"
because it would be a permanent member of the Security Council. See R. RUSSELL, supra note
40, at 641-42.
59. See R. RUSSELL, supra note 40, at 836-37.
60. See Marston, supra note 6, at 3-4. Ecuador and Venezuela made relevant suggestions
concerning General Assembly power to terminate and the conditions necessary for
independence.
61. See R. RUSSELL, supra note 40, at 837-38 (the proposal was made by Egypt in response
to the lack of power that the League of Nations possessed to correct Japanese violations of its
mandate); R. CHOWDHURI, supra note 15, at 62-63; C. ToUSSAINT, supra note 16, at 134.
62. See D. McHENRY, supra note 49, at 46-47; R. CHOWDHURI, supra note 15, at 62-63; R.
RUSSELL, supra note 40, at 833-34.
63. See R. RUSSELL, supra note 40, at 833-34; see generally R. CHOWDHURI, supra note 15,
at 62-63.
64. See D. McHENRY, supra note 49, at 46; Marston, supra note 6, at 11-12. In addition to
the Trusteeship Agreement for Micronesia, the Somaliland agreement included a provision for
termination. See infra note 70.
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of termination, but it yields one important observation. The failure to
include specific language seems to result largely from the desire of cer-
tain drafting parties to favor the mandatory or administering authori-
ties by denying an express unilateral right of termination to the
League, General Assembly, or Security Council. There is nothing in
the language or drafting history, however, that specifically denies the
League or United Nations the right to participate in termination of a
trust in some manner other than unilateral termination. During the
debate on the Trusteeship Agreement for Micronesia, there were sev-
eral comments noting that the Charter did not provide for termina-
tion,65 but there is other evidence that the drafters considered the right
of the General Assembly or Security Council to participate in the pro-
cess of termination to be subsumed in the right to approve alterations
or amendments. 66 As stated by one scholar:
There is no mention in the Charter of termination of an agreement; but
in view of the inherently temporary nature of the trusteeship status, and
considering the goal of each trust territory is "self-government or inde-
pendence," it would be absurd to suppose that the drafters of the Charter
did not intend the agreements to be terminated. It would be more rea-
sonable to assume that they saw the problem in the wider context of
alteration, and considered that the same rules would apply for
termination. 67
Consistent with the foregoing proposition is the observation that
upon attainment of self-government or independence, the Trust Agree-
ments must be terminated. Under the United Nations trusteeship sys-
tem, the conclusion that a trust territory has achieved independent
status is one that requires the participation of the Security Council or
65. See 2 U.N. SCOR (124th mtg.) at 676-79 (1947).
66. See R. RUSSELL, supra note 40, at 836-37:
The Working Paper was also silent on the question of criteria or methods for terminating a
trust or transferring it from one administering authority to another. The general provision
that states directly concerned would have to agree, not only to the original trust arrange-
ments, but also to "any alteration or amendment" in them, meant of course that neither
termination nor transfer could occur without the consent of the original administering au-
thority. This situation was not overlooked in the committee discussions, where questions
were raised about amendment and termination procedures. The United States explained
that the states originally concerned would have to agree to any subsequent changes, which
would then be submitted for approval by the Organization as in the case of the earlier agree-
ment. Termination of a trust or a change in the administrator would constitute "altera-
tions" in this respect.
67. C. ToUSSAINT, supra note 16, at 134; see 2 U.N. SCOR (124th mtg.) at 678-79 (1947)
(comment of Syrian representative that "Charter does include provisions for the termination of a
mandate [sic]. The Charter does not provide for trusteeships being eternal. It says that trustee-
ships will be ended by self-government or independence. That means that when independence is
granted, the termination of the trusteeship becomes quite evident."); Juda v. United States, 13 Cl.
Ct. 667, 678-79 (1987); Clark, Letter to the Editor in Chief, supra note 52, at 930-31; Sayre, supra
note 14, at 289.
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General Assembly. 68 Because trusteeship agreements may be charac-
terized as contracts between the trustee or administering authority and
the United Nations for the benefit of the Trust Territory and its in-
habitants, one party cannot unilaterally terminate without the pres-
ence of some special circumstances. 69
The Trusteeship Agreement between the United States and the
United Nations, like all the other trusteeship agreements, 70 does not
expressly address the proper method of termination.7' The most rele-
vant part of the Trusteeship Agreement, article 15, as originally pro-
posed and finally adopted, provides simply: "The terms of the present
agreement shall not be altered, amended or terminated without the
consent of the administering authority." During discussion of the
Trusteeship Agreement before the Security Council, the Soviet repre-
sentative proposed that article 15 be redrafted to provide the Security
68. See C. TOUSSAINT, supra note 16, at 135-36; Sayre, supra note 14, at 288-90. But see
note 6, supra (possibility of recognition of statehood outside of United Nations).
69. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 51, Part V, a party may
unilaterally terminate an agreement, inter alia: under the provisions of the treaty or upon mutual
consent of the parties (article 54), based on an implicit unilateral right of denunciation with
twelve months notice (article 56), upon conclusion of a later treaty by all parties involved (article
59), upon material breach by the other party (article 60), or upon a fundamental change of
circumstances (article 62). While the United States could conceivably argue that there was an
express or implicit right to terminate unilaterally, the representatives seem not to have formally
phrased such an argument to date and such an argument would be susceptible to challenge. See
infra notes 71-92 and accompanying text.
70. See C. ToUSSAINT, supra note 16, at 135. The Trusteeship Agreement for Somaliland
did establish a time period for termination. Article 24 provided that Somaliland would receive
its independence after ten years. The reason for the inclusion was the unique circumstances of
the Trust Territory. Under the Peace Treaty of 1947, Italy renounced all claim and yielded to a
determination to be made by the Allied Powers. The failure of those states to agree lead to the
matter being resolved by the General Assembly, which placed a restrictive time limit to which an
administering authority as primary drafter probably would not have consented. See Marston,
supra note 6, at 9-10.
71. Interestingly, United Nations Charter article 79 provides that trusteeship agreements
"shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned." The meaning of the term "states di-
rectly concerned" was never ascertained during the establishment of the Trusteeship System. See
C. ToUSSAINT, supra note 16, at 80-87. There was no trusteeship agreement adopted that had
been concluded by the administering authority and "other states directly concerned." Marston,
supra note 6, at 7-8.
One explanation of the "states directly concerned" provision is that it was intended to apply
in those situations where more than one state had a claim to a non-self-governing territory and
would require that the contending states reach an agreement before a trust could be established.
See R. RUSSELL, supra note 40, at 833-34. Debate in the Security Council at the consideration of
the Trusteeship Agreement for Micronesia reveals, however, a genuine lack of consensus on the
meaning of the term "states directly concerned." See 2 U.N. SCOR (124th mtg.) at 677 (1947)
(comment of Australian representative that the issue had "been argued on for fifteen months"
and constituted an unhelpful "academic argument").
At least theoretically, any state that would qualify as a "state directly concerned" could
assert a right to participate in the approval of the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement for
Micronesia under the provisions of article 79 as a form of alteration or amendment. See C.
ToUSSAINT, supra note 16, at 125-27, 137-40.
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Council with the authority to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement.72
The United States rejected the proposal on the grounds that such a
term would be "inconsistent with the bilateral concept" of the trust
arrangement because it would grant unilateral power to change the
Trusteeship Agreement to the Security Council. 73  The United States
representatives went on to state that such a grant of unilateral termi-
nation powers would be inconsistent with the United Nations Charter
under which the Security Council could, at most, "approve or disap-
prove" a proposed termination but not originate any such action. 74
Significantly, during the course of the debate, the United States
proposed an alternative version of article 15 that provided for joint
approval of termination by the United States and the Security Coun-
cil. 75 While this proposal was later withdrawn, 76 it offers substantial
evidence of the United States' acceptance of a role for the Security
72. See 2 U.N. SCOR (113th mtg.) at 414-15 (1947). The Soviet Union originally proposed
that article 15 be re-drafted to read: "The terms of the present agreement may be altered, supple-
mented or terminated by decision of the Security Council." The Soviet proposal as later voted on
read: "The terms of the present agreement may be altered and amended, or the term of its
validity discontinued by the decision of the Security Council." See 2 U.N. SCOR (124th mtg) at
679 (1947).
The Polish representative also proposed that article 15 be amended to read: "The terms of the
present agreement shall not be altered, amended or terminated, except as provided by the Char-
ter." This proposal was defeated by a vote of four yeas, three nays, and four abstentions. Id.
73. 2 U.N. SCOR (116th mtg.) at 475-76 (1947). It does seem clear that the Soviet Union
representative was of the view that the Security Council held the right to unilateral termination
under the Charter. See 2 U.N. SCOR (124th mtg.) at 669 (1947).
74. Statement of Ambassador Austin:
Now let us look at Article 83. You will notice that the idea of approval contained in
Article 79 [with regard to the General Assembly] is expressed once more in Article 83,
paragraph 1, which states that: "All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic
areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their altera-
tion or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council."
In other words, obviously it is not the Security Council which originates the amendment;
certainly it cannot authorize the termination; the most it can do, under the Charter, is ap-
prove or disapprove. Moreover, the Charter is the guide and the law regarding the powers
of the Security Council; we cannot sit here and change them by an agreement between the
United States and the Security Council. We cannot grant to the Security Council powers
that the Charter does not grant. The only way in which the Security Council could be
granted the power to alter, amend and terminate this contract would be by amending the
Charter; no less authority than that would be necessary.
2 U.N. SCOR (116th mtg.) at 475 (1947).
75. See 2 U.N. SCOR (I16th mtg) at 476-77 (1947) (The United States proposal was that
article 15 read: "The terms of the present agreement shall not be altered, amended or terminated
except by agreement of the administering authority and the Security Council").
76. After the other proposals for amendment of article 15 had been voted upon and had
failed, Ambassador Austin withdrew his proposal for amending the article on the theory that it
was offered as a compromise that had not been accepted by the other parties proposing amend-
ments and therefore was not pending. Somewhat curiously, no other party tendered the United
States' compromise proposal as an amendment. Instead, the original text of article 15 was
quickly approved by a vote of eight in favor (Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia,
France, United Kingdom and United States) and three abstentions (Poland, Syria and Soviet
Union). 2 U.N. SCOR (124th mtg.) at 679-80 (1947).
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Council in the termination process. Moreover, United States Repre-
sentative Warren Austin stated at that time that the Trusteeship
Agreement was in the nature of a "bilateral contract between the
United States, on the one hand, and the Security Council on the
other" and therefore "no amendment or termination can take place
without the approval of the Security Council" as well as the United
States. 77 In light of this drafting history, it would be a distortion of
article 15 to construe that it was intended to mean that the United
States may unilaterally terminate the trusteeship or that the Security
Council was barred from a role in the process. 78  Furthermore, the
contents of Ambassador Austin's comments and his proposed alterna-
tive version of article 15 were before the Congress when the Trustee-
ship Agreement was considered and approved by joint resolution.79
Government officials in the United States have also acknowledged
at different times during the administration of the Trust Territory that
the approval of the Security Council would be required for termina-
77. See 2 U.N. SCOR (116th mtg.) at 476 (1947). For text of Ambassador Austin's com-
ments, see Appendix A, infra.
78. See Clark, Letter to the Editor in Chief, supra note 52, at 932. Cf Macdonald, supra note
8, at 258.
79. President Truman transmitted to the Congress along with his message recommending
approval of the Trusteeship Agreement a memorandum which analyzed the terms of the pro-
posed agreement. H.R. Doc. 378, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 3-6 (1947). The memorandum included
a somewhat detailed account of the Security Council debate on the Trusteeship Agreement, in-
cluding the debate on article 15. The alternative phrasing of article 15 proposed by the United
States and recognizing Security Council participation in termination is included in the memoran-
dum. Id. at 6. The memorandum was referred to in discussion of the Trusteeship Agreement in
both the House and Senate. See 93 CONG. REC. 8731-32 (1947) (statement of Rep. Fulton); H.R.
REP. No. 889, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1947); Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of the
Pacific Islands: Hearing on S.J. Res. 143 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1947) (statement of George C. Marshall, Secretary of State).
Note should also be taken that the phrasing of the approving congressional joint resolution
made very specific mention of the prior consent of the Security Council and the need for consen-
sual approval by the United States in order for the agreement to come into force. See 93 CONG.
REC. 8731 (1947) (H.J. Res. 233); Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of the Pacific Islands:
Hearing on S.J. Res. 143 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1947). The Resolution read in part:
Whereas the Security Council on April 2, 1947, approved unanimously the trusteeship
agreement with amendments acceptable to the United States; and
Whereas the said agreement, having been approved by the Security Council, will come
into force upon approval by the Government of the United States after due constitutional
process ....
The resolution is embodied in Pub. L. 204, 61 Stat. 397 (1947). Secretary of State Marshall
verified before the Senate that the Trusteeship Agreement was in fact an agreement between the
United States and the Security Council. See Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of the Pacific
Islands.- Hearing on S.J. Res. 143 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 8 (1947).
The Trusteeship Agreement was submitted to the Congress for approval by joint resolution
rather than the treaty process because of the role that the House of Representatives would play in
the future execution of the Trusteeship Agreement. H.R. Doc. No. 378, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. I-
2 (1947) (transmittal letter of President Truman).
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tion of the Trusteeship Agreement."" As recently as April 18, 1986, a
State Department official testified that the United States, plans were to
seek approval of the trust termination by first going to the Trusteeship
Council and afterwards:
to take up the question of Trusteeship termination with the Security
Council of the United Nations. Our goal here will be to achieve a degree
of support for Trusteeship termination that will assure international rec-
ognition of the sovereignty of the future freely associated states and will
recognize the Northern Mariana Islands as a Commonwealth of the
United States. Equally important in the Security Council is our goal of
preventing any nation or bloc of nations from disrupting the termination
of the Trusteeship Agreement and denying the peoples of the Trust Ter-
ritory their freely chosen political status desires.8'
Although in recent Trusteeship Council debates the United States
representatives have been reluctant to take the position that Security
Council approval is not required,8 2 other members of the executive
branch have taken a different tack. During the course of recent litiga-
tion over the claims of Marshall Islands residents based on the United
States nuclear testing done in the 1940s and 1950s, the attorneys for
the United States have attempted to discredit the comments of Ambas-
sador Austin by suggesting that he misspoke, or was, in fact, in error
about the role of the Security Council in trust termination.8 3 While it
may be possible that the representative of the United States Govern-
ment may have made an inaccurate statement of his own or of the
government's view of the law, or that he may have reached an inaccu-
rate conclusion about the law, the relevant circumstances make the
80. See Clark, Letter to the Editor in Chief, supra note 52, at 932 n. 16; Juda v. United States,
13 Cl. Ct. 667, 679 (1987). Judge Harkins stated in Juda, "Representatives of the United States,
since 1947 and until March 4, 1986, consistently have acknowledged an obligation to seek [Secur-
ity Council] approval of termination of the Trusteeship Agreement." Id.
81. Compact of Free Association: Hearings on The Proposed Compact of Free Association for
Palau Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 132-33 (1986) (statement of James R. Lilley, Deputy Asst. Secy. of State for
East Asia and Pacific Affairs). The debate on termination has indeed reached the Congress.
Compare 135 CONG. REC. S7955-56 (daily ed. July 13, 1989) (statement of Sen. McClure that
trusteeship has terminated despite assertions to contrary); and 135 CONG. REC. E2486-90 (daily
ed. July 12, 1989) (statement of Rep. Lagomarsino that trusteeship has terminated without Se-
curity Council approval; with 135 CONG. REC. H3223 (daily ed. June 27, 1989) (statement of
Rep. Lugo that trusteeship termination requires Security Council approval).
82. See 54 U.N. TCOR (1630th Mtg.) at 12-46, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1630 (1987) (lengthy de-
bate on United States' annual report to Trusteeship Council in which the United States refused to
answer directly the Soviet Union representative's question of whether Security Council approval
of termination is required).
83. See Brief for Plaintiffs at 18, Juda v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 667 (1987) (citing Defend-
ant's Jan. 27, 1987 Memorandum, at 13); Clark, Letter to the Editor in Chief, supra note 52, at
932 (citing Justice Department argument in Nitol v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 690 (1987); 54
U.N. TCOR (1626th Mtg.) at 13 U.N. Doc. T/PV. 1626 (1987) (statement of Jonathan Weisgall,
attorney for plaintiffs in Judo v. United States before Trusteeship Council).
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recent government attempt at disavowal quite disingenuous. First, ac-
knowledging that Ambassador Austin undoubtedly was assisted by a
very competent staff and acted upon instructions from the United
States government,84 the Soviet Union's proposal to amend article 15
was first presented on February 26, 1947, while Ambassador Austin's
statements were not rendered until March 7, 1947.85 The passage of
time, as well as the context of the statements, suggests that they were
deliberate. Ambassador Austin was making a clear, cogent argument
that the Security Council had a right to approve the alteration, amend-
ment, or termination of a strategic trust by virtue of the United Na-
tions Charter provisions, but held no right to terminate unilaterally as
suggested by the Soviet Union.8 6 Ambassador Austin also stated that
the purpose of the language in article 15 was to affirm that no changes
could be made without the additional assent of United States as Ad-
ministering Authority.8 7
During the 1947 Security Council debate, the representatives of
Belgium, China, Australia, and Syria offered comments that con-
curred with the view of Ambassador Austin that both parties to an
agreement would need to consent to termination,88 providing a
broader basis for establishing the intent of the drafters. Moreover, the
failure to amend article 15 to provide explicitly for a Security Council
role in termination should be considered in light of what appears to
have been general deference to the United States on this matter in light
of the "incomparably greater sacrifices" the United States had made in
84. Secretary of State George C. Marshall testified before the Senate that Ambassador Austin
acted upon the instructions of the United States Government in responding to proposed amend-
ments to the Trusteeship Agreement. Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of the Pacific Is-
lands, 1947. Hearings on S.J. Res. 143 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947). The weight to be accorded the statements of Ambassador Austin is
evidenced by the fact that he is quoted liberally in the public records of the congressional debate
on the Trusteeship Agreement. See supra note 79 and documents cited therein.
Moreover, the position of United States representative to the United Nations was an impor-
tant one and Ambassador Austin was a man of some stature. He had been an active figure in
Vermont politics and its United States Senator from 1931 to 1946 where in later years he built a
reputation as an internationalist. He resigned from the Senate to become United States Repre-
sentative to the United Nations. He served in this position until his retirement in 1953. See
generally BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774-1989, at 555
(1989); G. MAZUZAN, WARREN AUSTIN AT THE U.N.: 1946-1953 (1977).
85. The Soviet proposals are initially found in the record of the 113th Meeting, 2 U.N. SCOR
(1 13th mtg.) at 415 (1947), and the relevant statements of Ambassador Austin were made at the
116th Meeting, 2 U.N. SCOR (116th mtg.) at 475-77 (1947).
86. See 2 U.N. SCOR (124th mtg.) at 669 (1947) (remarks of Soviet representative Gromyko
asserting the Security Council's right under the Charter to terminate unilaterally).
87. See 2 U.N. SCOR (116th mtg.) at 476-77 (1947), reprinted in appendix A, infra; see also 2
U.N. SCOR (124th mtg.) at 670 (1947); see also Clark, Letter to the Editor in Chief, supra note
52, at 932.
88. See 2 U.N. SCOR (124th mtg.) at 671-75 (1947).
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the war with Japan and the struggle for the Pacific Islands. 89 The
United States also threatened to withdraw the Trusteeship Agreement
from Security Council consideration when undue criticism on this is-
sue was perceived. 90
Additional assistance in determining the proper means for ending
the trusteeship is found in the past practice of states terminating other
trust agreements and mandates. Although the other trusts did not fall
within the strategic trust category, the manner of termination is useful
because it is an aspect where there is almost no distinction between a
strategic trust and a nonstrategic trust, except that Security Council
approval is required for the strategic trust, while approval of the Gen-
eral Assembly was required for the nonstrategic trust. Likewise, the
Mandate System, while failing to specify any particular termination
terms, did grant general supervisory powers to the League Council. 9'
While a consistent pattern of formal termination under the Mandate
system cannot be identified, the limited practice that did occur reflects
a trend of League Assembly or General Assembly acquiesence in ter-
mination or other disposition. 92 For past Trusteeship System termina-
tions, approval of the United Nations through the General Assembly
was always obtained. 93
Additional arguments advanced on proper termination include the
position that the decision of the International Court of Justice in the
Advisory Opinion on the International Status of Southwest Africa94
renders the unilateral termination of a trust agreement ineffective
under international law. 95 The proposition has been considered that
89. See 2 U.N. SCOR (I13th mtg.) at 414-15 (1947) (statement of Soviet Union Mr. Gro-
myko at presentation of draft Trusteeship Agreement for Micronesia); R. CHOWDHURI, supra
note 15, at 16.
90. See 2 U.N. SCOR (124th mtg.) at 670 (1947): "As the United States is a party to the
agreement, all I can do is to state, with all due deference, that an amendment in the nature of the
one proposed by the representative of the Soviet Union would probably be unacceptable to the
United States as a party to the agreement. It would clearly be in violation of the Charter....
Our position is that we shall have to refrain from voting on this issue, and the whole matter may
result in the withdrawal of the principal party, the United States, from executing the trust."
91. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, paras. 7-9.
92. See J. CRAWFORD, supra note 23, at 337-41 and Appendix 2, at 426-28; Sayre, supra note
14, at 288-89; 1 WHITEMAN'S DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 697-98 (1963).
93. See Clark, Self-Determination and Free Association, supra note 43, at 6; J. CRAWFORD,
supra note 23, at 341, Appendix 2 at 426-28; Marston, supra note 8, at 12-13 and Appendix.
94. 1950 I.C.J. Reports 128, 141-43 (Advisory Opinion of July 11) (The Court unanimously
held that "the Union of South Africa acting alone does not possess the competence to modify the
international status of the territory of South West Africa, and the competence to determine and
modify the international status of the territory rests with the Union of South Africa acting with
the consent of the United Nations").
95. See S. DE SMITH, supra note 27, at 185. But see R. CHOWDHURI, supra note 15, at 170-
72 (indicating that the decision of the International Court of Justice left substantial problems
unanswered with regard to the South West Africa situation in particular).
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the emerging states of Micronesia might have the capacity to agree to
termination. 96 The argument is rather dubious because of the applica-
ble principle that the original contracting parties must consent to al-
teration of an agreement and the new states were not parties to the
Trusteeship Agreement. 97
One final issue to be addressed in assessing the proper process for
termination is the possibility that the approval of the Trusteeship
Council 98 might be deemed to be adequate in lieu of Security Council
approval. While it is true that the Security Council delegated some of
its responsibilities to the Trusteeship Council under the provisions of
Article 83(3) with respect to the monitoring of the United States ad-
ministration of the trust for Micronesia, there is no reason to conclude
that the delegation was a total abdication of Security Council responsi-
bility and authority.99 Indeed, the question of the proper roles of the
Security Council and Trusteeship Council with relation to Micronesia
was raised shortly after the execution of the Trusteeship Agreement.
In response to a request from the Secretary General, the two councils
conferred on the question and the Security Council ultimately adopted
a resolution which provided that the Security Council retained ulti-
mate responsibility for the strategic trust while delegating to the Trus-
teeship Council responsibility for all matters not involving issues of
security.' °° The Trusteeship Council acceded to this arrangement.' 10
This decision was consistent with the view that the provisions of Arti-
cle 83(1) make it impermissible for the Security Council to surrender
its ultimate responsibility for supervising strategic areas to the Trus-
teeship Council.' 0 2 The resolution merely reflected a decision of the
Security Council to avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship
Council as provided for in Article 83(3) of the Charter. 0 3 For these
96. See Macdonald, supra note 8, at 249-53. (Accepting the idea that while not possessing
full sovereignty, the emerging states hold sufficient personality to enter into valid agreements to
end the trust relationship).
97. C. TOUSSAINT, supra note 16, at 125. But see supra note 6 (on possibility of emerging
states achieving defacto termination of trusteeship status).
98. See supra note 4; infra appendix B.
99. See generally I WHITEMAN'S DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 766-68 (1963).
100. See R. CHOWDHURI, supra note 15, at 164-67 (citing 4 U.N. SCOR (415th Meeting) at
9 (1949)); yearbook of the United Nations, 1948-49, pp. 140-41.
101. R. CHOWDHURI, supra note 15, at 167 (citing T.C. Res. 46 (IV), 4 U.N. TCOR Supp.
(No. 1) at 1-2, U.N. Doc. T/328 (1949).
102. See Sayre, supra note 14, at 292. Sayre reads article 83 to require that the security
council utilize the assistance of the trusteeship council but not surrender ultimate responsibility.
Thi,: opinion is consistent with representations made by the United States representative to the
Comrlmittee of Experts in 1948. Id. at 293 n.88; see also R. CHOWDHURI, supra note 15, at 166-
67; C. TOUSSAINT, supra note 16, at 155-56; Macdonald, supra note 8, at 260-63 (concluding that
Trusteeship Council approval of termination is insufficient).
1 13. See Juda v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 667, 680 (1987).
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reasons, the approval of termination of the Trusteeship Agreement by
the Trusteeship Council' 04 will not substitute for the actual approval
of the Security Council. 0 5
Still, Trusteeship Council resolutions approving termination have
lent credence to the United States efforts to terminate the trusteeship
without Security Council participation.' 0 6 Even before the presiden-
tial proclamation on the matter, the United States Government had
informed the United Nations through the Secretary General that it
had entered into new relationships with most of the Trust Territory
with the approval of the Trusteeship Council. 10 7 Notwithstanding the
practical effect and the language in its Resolution 2183 approving ter-
mination of the Trusteeship Agreement for Micronesia, recent state-
ments by several members of the Trusteeship Council have seemed to
acknowledge that the Security Council must play a role in termination
and the records of the Trusteeship Council reveal that it has continued
to entertain petitions relating to parts of the Trust Territory other than
Palau'08
104. Macdonald also points out that the present constitution of the Trusteeship Council is
not in literal compliance with article 86 which requires that the council consist of those states
that are administering trusts, presently only the United States, the other members of the Security
Council, and a sufficient number of other states to make equal the number of administering and
non-administering states. See Macdonald, supra note 8, at 260-61.
105. While the Security Council has received the regular reports of the Trusteeship Council
and published them as official documents, see 41 U.N. SCOR Spec. Supp. (No. 1), U.N. Doc. S/
18238 (1986) (including T.C. Res. 2183), the Security Council appears never to have acted on the
reports. See e.g., Index to Proceedings of the Security Council, 41st year, 1986, pp. 41-42, U.N.
Doc. ST/Lib.Ser.B/S.23 (1987) (reflecting lack of discussion in response to T.C. Res. 2183).
106. Note the reliance placed upon the Trusteeship Council Resolution No. 2183 and its
other actions by the court in Juda, in reaching the conclusion that the Trusteeship Agreement
has been terminated in effect, although not de jure, and that the Compact of Free Association
between the United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands has come into effect. Juda v.
United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 667, 682-83 (1987).
107. See U.N. Doc. S/18424 (1986). At the time of the letter, and as now continues, the
United States has entered into agreements with all of the Trust Territory except Palau. See infra
notes 129-45 and accompanying text. The President's Proclamation was also included in the
1986 Annual Report of the United States to the United Nations on the Administration of the
Trust Territory. See 54 U.N. TCOR at 275, U.N. Doc. T/1909 (1987). The annual report in-
cluded a statement inside the cover of the 1986 report that it would be the final report of the
United States to the Trusteeship Council. The United States, however, has continued to submit
reports but has altered the format to treat Palau as the only remaining part of the Trust Terri-
tory. See, e.g., 56 U.N. TCOR, U.N. Doc. T/1934 (1989).
108. See, e.g., Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in
Palau, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, February 1986, 53 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No. 1), at 39
U.N. Doc. T/1885 (1986) (statement of United Kingdom representative that "It simply is not
true that there is any attempt to bypass the Security Council. The United Nations Mission has
made it clear both to political leaders and at public meetings that the termination of the trustee-
ship will have to be decided by the Security Council."); U.N. Doc. T/1884 (1986) (letter of Soviet
Union Permanent Representative asserting that "If we are to follow the Charter, the question of
the Trust Territory must be resolved in the Security Council."); 50 U.N. TCOR (1595th Mtg.) at
47, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1595 (1985) (Statement of French Representative in Trusteeship Council
proceedings that "Moreover, the process of self-determination in the Trust Territory of the Pa-
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PART II - SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION
Our contribution to the culture here has been Coca-Cola, cigarettes and
candy. 10 9
Nowhere in the Trusteeship Agreement is the United States called
upon to create a Utopian welfare state in the Trust Territory. 10
Assuming that the United States changes its course and seeks the
approval of the Security Council for the proposed trust termination,
the next task would be to determine the relevant subject matter for
such a review. The Security Council might well begin with the break
up of the Trust Territory into four political entities and whether the
form of relations between each of those entities and the United States
is consistent with the requirements of self-determination and self-gov-
ernment. Further, the Security Council should review the arrange-
ments between each new state and the United States to ensure that the
terms are fair and have been agreed upon freely. The Security Council
should be concerned with provisions affecting the general social and
economic conditions of Micronesia, particularly the area of economic
development which has been described as the weakest aspect of the
trust administration.1tI The United States' obligations should include
a duty to make proper reparations for any breach of duty or advantage
taken during the course of the trusteeship.
A. Fragmentation of the Trust Territory
A general consideration is the fragmentation of Micronesia during
cific Islands began in 1969, under strict Trusteeship Council supervision, and that process will
continue in the future under the ultimate supervision of the Security Council - which, surpris-
ingly, certain people seem to forget").
109. Earnshaw, Micronesia States Addicted to U.S. Funds Hope for Recognition, The Reuter
Business Report, Aug. 25, 1988 [Nexis] (quoting Salvation Army Major Benton Markham on
Majuro, Marshall Islands). The "Coca-Cola" problem was first noted some time ago. Witness
the exchange found in Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of the Pacific Islands: Hearing on
S.J. Res. 143 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1947):
Senator Hickenlooper. And within, say, 20 or 25 years the population of these islands is
going to be a tremendous factor; and, personally, I think we are going to have to be prepared
to meet it, and probably should be thinking about it now, because they are going around
with health measures, which are perfectly fine, and we have found some new kind of diets.
They do not like coconuts anymore. They like K rations and meat and a little something
besides fish, and I think it is one of the practical problems we are going to have to meet,
although not now. I hope we are thinking about meeting it eventually.
Secretary Marshall. You are really outlining an Americanization of the Pacific. How-
ever, you do not mention baseball, but I suppose that it is included, and I suppose Coca-
Cola has become a necessary drink down there, too.
Senator Hickenlooper. The whole point of my question is, we look at the fine benefits
which we get from security, but there are some human problems we are going to take on,
and they will be sizable 20 years from now.
110. 56 U.N. TCOR (1617th mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1670 (1989) (statement of Patricia
Byrne, U.S. Representative to Trusteeship Council).
I 1. See H. NUFER, supra note 45, at 229-31 (1978).
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the United States' administration. Initially, one should not presup-
pose that the people of Micronesia would necessarily choose to remain
as one political entity; Micronesians are not part of one identifiable
ethnic or political group."12 Rather, the islands have different groups
of peoples with different languages, cultures, and values. At least nine
different indigenous languages are spoken.' '3 As some writers have
observed:
The current political situation of the Trust Territory is a classic case of
ethnic pluralism created by colonial rule. From early Spanish rule to the
present, successive colonial governments have imposed unified rule over
the medley of peoples and cultures indigenous to the area.' 4
Much of the discussion about Micronesia treats the islands as one en-
tity. This tendency of characterization has portrayed "Micronesia as
far more integrated than the facts of anthropology, geography, or his-
tory will testify. The illusion of unity easily translates into the pre-
sumption of unity." ' I
While some have seemed to suggest that the United Nations prin-
ciple favoring preservation of territorial integrity should have applica-
tion in the case of Micronesia," t6 such application is not clearly
warranted. The argument can certainly be made that preserving colo-
nial boundaries has avoided problems of endless restructuring of terri-
tories, but prior United Nations practice has not always insisted on
such preservation.' '7 Moreover, the interest in preserving territorial
integrity must be balanced against the equally important ideal of pro-
tecting the right of peoples to self-determination, including at least
some limited right of choosing the territorial composition of the state.
As stated quite perceptively by Judge Dillard in his separate opinion in
the Western Sahara case, "[i]t is for the people to determine the
destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the
112. See Mason, Unity and Disunity in Micronesia: Internal Problems and Future Status, in
D. HUGHES & S. LINGENFELTER, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN MICRONESIA 203-62 (1974).
113. See A. RANNEY & H. PENNIMAN, DEMOCRACY IN THE ISLANDS 6 (1985); S. DE
SMITH, supra note 27, at 120-22. Feelings of rivalry and regionalism have been perceived to run
deep in the islands. See C. HEINE, supra note 31, at 110-17.
114. Mason, supra note 112, at 196.
115. Id. at 204.
116. See D. MCHENRY, supra note 49, at 42-45; 55 U.N. TCOR (1655th Mtg.) at 16, U.N.
Doc. T/PV. 1655 (1988) (statement of the Soviet Representative to the Trusteeship Council that
"the Trust Territory is to be viewed as a single, integral territory"). The basis for such assertions
is the principle included in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 that: "Any at-
tempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territory integrity of a
country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations."
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514
(XV), U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16 (1960), U.N. Doc. A/4684 at 66.
117. See M. POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE 18-20 (1982) (cit-
ing examples of Rwanda and Burundi, the British Cameroons, and Gilbert and Ellice Islands).
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people." 118
While recognizing the diversity of peoples and cultures in the
Trust Territory, the manner in which the partitioning of the Trust
Territory occurred still gives rise to some concern. The Navy retained
control over the islands of Saipan and Tinian in the Northern Mari-
anas in part, at least to train Chinese Nationalists while the rest of the
Trust Territory was turned over to Interior Department administra-
tion.119 Perhaps due to these circumstances, the 1961 Visiting Mission
to Micronesia found some indication that the United States Naval ad-
ministrators had encouraged the idea of separatism on Saipan.120
Although the Marshallese had previously proposed that each district
be entitled to negotiate its own future with the United States, t2 1 the
fragmentation of the Trust Territory is generally viewed as having be-
gun with the initiation of separate post-trust talks between the United
States representatives and the Northern Mariana Islands (NMI). As
early as 1951, the Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands denoted a strong desire of the
people of the Northern Mariana Islands to be incorporated into the
United States.122 When the United States introduced the possibility of
commonwealth status as a third alternative to independence or free
association during status negotiations in 1970, it met "profound"
resistance from the Micronesian representatives. The commonwealth
status would have included permanent control and sovereignty by the
United States and the right to exercise eminent domain. a2 3 The
118. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 10, 122 (Advisory Opinion of Oct. 16); see also J. DUGARD,
supra note 6, at 161-62 (the putative norm prohibiting fragmentation is limited by the right of the
people to freely consent to partition).
119. H. NUFER, supra note 45, at 49-50; S. DE SMITH, supra note 27, at 135; see also R.
GALE, supra note 45, at 101 (In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA's training
camp in Saipan was closed and security restrictions on Guam were also lifted).
120. See D. MCHENRY, supra note 49, at 13; Clark, Self-Determination and Free Association,
supra note 43, at 78-83.
121. See Mason, supra note 112, at 248. While the Marshallese supported their proposal
with the argument that each of the several distinct peoples of the Trust Territory should have its
own sovereign right to decide its political future, it is likely that the motivation was a desire by
the Marshallese to keep the proportionally larger tax revenues that their islands produced within
the district.
122. See Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands, U.N. Doc. T/897 at 3-4 (1951); U.N. Doc. T/Pet.10/5, at 2 (1950)).
123. See D. MCHENRY, supra note 49, at 98-102. McHenry describes in some detail the
exchange between the United States representatives and the Micronesian representatives who
came to the meeting with an outline of their own four basic principles that should govern negoti-
ations toward free association. Those four principles included the respect of Micronesian sover-
eignty; the right of Micronesian self-determination; the right of Micronesians to choose their own
form of constitutional government; and the right to unilaterally revoke a status of free association
by either party. See also Armstrong, The Emergence of the Micronesians into the International
Community: A Study of the Creation of a New International Entity, 5 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 207,
214 (1979) [hereinafter Armstrong, Emergence]. The Micronesians recognized that integration
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Northern Mariana Islands eventually became the only segment of the
Trust Territory to respond positively.' 24 The rest of the Trust Terri-
tory island groups continued to reject the permanent nature of the
commonwealth status which would require surrendering to the United
States ultimate authority over most areas of domestic and foreign
affairs. 125
For a number of possible reasons, the Northern Mariana Islands
found the prospect of separation from the rest of the Trust Territory
and the securing of a closer, commonwealth status with the United
States quite appealing. 126 The distinct ethnic and cultural origin of the
Marianas was a primary factor. The majority of its population is iden-
tified as being of Chamorro origin while the rest of Micronesia is prin-
cipally of Carolinian origin.' 27  The movement of the Northern
Mariana Islands toward separation and commonwealth status was fur-
thered by a very strongly worded resolution adopted by the Mariana
Islands District Legislature in 1971,' 28 and an overwhelming approval
of the Covenant for a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands. ' 29
Although the separate talks were criticized by the Visiting Mission
of the Trusteeship Council in 1973,130 the United States favorably re-
would bring more financial support but disliked the idea that United States citizens might come
to Micronesia and acquire land and take over businesses, and that government would be taken
over by Americans.
124. See H. NUFER, supra note 45, at 86.
125. See id.
126. See D. MCHENRY, supra note 49, at 130 (citing, in addition to the separate administra-
tion, differences in culture, geographic separation from other districts, and relatively greater eco-
nomic development.); S. DE SMITH, supra note 27, at 59-62; R. GALE, supra note 45, at 254-56.
The desire to separate from the rest of Micronesia is seen as resulting in part from an early
movement of many people in the Northern Mariana Islands to seek a union with Guam. The
movement for union with Guam was seen as motivated by a shared ethnic backgrounds as well as
a desire to share in the benefits that Guam enjoys because of its relatively close relationship with
the United States as an unincorporated territory. While 60% of voters in the Northern Mariana
Islands voted for reintegration with Guam in a 1969 plebiscite, the Guamanians voted in opposi-
tion to integration by a similar margin (58%) in a 1969 referendum. See H. NUFER, supra note
45, at 87. Although there was some support in Guam for reunification, the negative vote appar-
ently resulted in part from a fear that the Guamanians would have to share their resources with
the poorer people of the Marianas. R. GALE, supra note 45, at 255-56.
127. See Hirayasu, supra note 52, at 515.
128. See H. NUFER, supra note 45, at 89-90. The resolution was entitled "A Resolution
Relative to Advising the Security Council and Trusteeship Council of the United Nations that
the Mariana Islands District of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Will Secede from the
Trust Territory . . . by Force of Arms If Necessary, and with or without the Approval of the
United Nations."
129. See Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in the Mar-
ana Islands District, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, June 1975, 43 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No.
2) at 33, U.N. Doc. T/1771 (1976) (93% of the registered voters in the Northern Mariana Is-
lands voted in a special plebiscite and approved the Covenant by 78.8%).
130. See D. HUGHES & S. LINGENFELTER, supra note 112, at 247. As early as 1961 the
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ceived the request for separate status negotiations. The United States
response arose not simply out of a respect for the right of self-determi-
nation in the people of the Northern Mariana Islands but also because
of its military interest in controlling the islands.131 There is no doubt
that the United States has always held an interest in keeping the is-
lands of Micronesia in a permanent relationship and has schemed to
bring that end about. 132 Nonetheless, if one is satisfied that the prefer-
ence for incorporation into the United States is actually the freely ex-
pressed will of the people of the Northern Mariana Islands, then
insistence upon independence would be at the expense of the basic
right to choose a form of internal self-government. 133 Some questions
have been raised with regard to fairness of the plebiscite in which the
commonwealth status was approved. That criticism goes, in part, to
the lack of alternatives reflected in the ballot that was used.' 34 That
ballot offered the choice of voting for commonwealth status or being
thrust back into negotiations with the rest of the Trust Territory. 35
No specific mention was made of the options of free association or
complete independence. Still, independence and free association were
implicit in the alternative to commonwealth and that a large majority,
Visiting Mission to Micronesia had called on the United States to discourage the desire for sepa-
ration held by the Northern Mariana Islands. See D. McHENRY, supra note 49, at 13. The
Micronesian negotiating team appeared to acquiesce to the separate talks with the Marianas by
virtue of failing to object. Id. at 132-33.
131. See R. GALE, supra note 45, at 260-66. The United States offered many reasons for
consenting to the separate talks with the Marianas: the desire of the Marianas, the consent of
other Micronesians, the lack of any united Micronesia, respect for the right of self-determination.
"Separate negotiations resulted primarily from United States military considerations .... How-
ever, there is no evidence presently available that the Marianas broke away at the explicit urging
of the Pentagon." D. MCHENRY, supra note 49, at 136-37.
132. See D. McHENRY, supra note 49, at 16-20 (indicating that in the 1963 Solomon Report
the United States clearly placed a priority on keeping Micronesia in a permanent relationship
with the United States rather than seeking to fulfill its obligations to the islands under the Trus-
teeship Agreement).
133. See C. ToUSSAINT, supra note 16, at 58-59. Toussaint noted, with particular regard to
the Northern Marianas, that "one assumption upon which the Trusteeship System is founded,
namely that a self-government or independence is necessarily the wish of all non-self-governing
peoples, has proved in this instance to be false."
134. See R. GALE, supra note 45, at 270-71; D. McHENRY, supra note 49, at 166-67.
135. See Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in the Mari-
ana Islands District, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, June 1975, 43 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No.
2) at 24, U.N. Doc. T/1771 (1976). The ballot read:
Yes - I vote for Commonwealth as set forth in the Covenant to Establish
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the
United States of America.
No - I vote against Commonwealth in political union with the United States as set
forth in the Covenant recognizing that, if Commonwealth is rejected, the
Northern Mariana Islands will remain as a district of the Trust Territory with
the right to participate with the other districts in the determination of an
alternative future political status.
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78.8 percent of those voting, favored commonwealth status. 3 6 The
Trusteeship Council, with the exception of the Soviet Union delegate,
was satisfied that the breakaway of the Marianas was inevitable. 37
After the Northern Mariana Islands broke away from the rest of
the Trust Territory, further fragmentation occurred. By 1977, both
Palau138 and the Marshalls had requested negotiations for separate
status. 139 In 1978, a referendum on the creation of an all-Micronesia
federation was held in all of the Trust Territory except the Northern
Mariana Islands, but failed to receive the necessary approval of Palau
and the Marshall Islands. 140 The referendum resulted in the creation
of three separate political entities. In addition to the Northern Mari-
ana Islands, 141 the other three entities are the Republic of Palau, 42 the
Republic of the Marshall Islands, 43 and the Federated States of Mi-
cronesia, consisting of the remaining districts of the Trust Territory. '44
After the failure of the All-Micronesia referendum, the United
States proceeded to negotiate agreements for free association with the
latter three entities. The negotiations ended in 1982 with the signing
of Compacts of Free Association with each of the new governments. 45
136. See id. at 33.
137. See R. GALE, supra note 45, at 267.
138. In 1976, the Palauans voted 88.5% in favor of seeking separate status from the rest of
the Trust Territory., See A. RANNEY & H. PENNIMAN, supra note 113, at 25. The United States
initially rejected the request of Palau for separate negotiations. D. MCHENRY, supra note 49, at
134.
139. Dating from 1972, the Marshall Islands legislature and delegations made it clear that
separate negotiations were a preferred option. See Mason, supra note 112, at 248-49; D. MC-
HENRY, supra note 49, at 134.
140. See Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Referendum in the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1978, 46 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No. 2) at 57, U.N. Doc. T/1795
(1979). The vote tallies were: Kosrae - 1118 yes and 704 no; Ponape - 5970 yes and 2020 no;
Marshall Islands - 3888 yes and 6217 no; Truk - 9762 yes and 4239 no; Yap - 3359 yes and 186
no; and Palau - 2720 yes and 3339 no.
141. The Northern Mariana Islands consists of fourteen islands with a population of about
20,800. U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, COMMONWEALTH OF NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS, FACT
SHEET 2 (1989).
142. Palau consists of about 200 islands with an estimated population of about 14,000 inhab-
iting about eight of the islands. U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, REPUBLIC OF PALAU, FACT SHEET 2
(1989). Palau is also known as "Belau," particularly within the islands. See A. Boss, R. CLARK,
E. HAMMERICH, S. ROFF & D. WRIGHT, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER MISSION
- PALAU REFERENDUM - DECEMBER, 1986, at 1 (1987) [hereinafter A. Boss, REPORT OF
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER MISSION].
143. The Republic of the Marshall Islands consists of about 31 atolls with a population of
about 45,000. U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS, FACT SHEET
3 (1989).
144. The Federated States of Micronesia consists of four districts (Kosrae, Ponape, Truk,
and Yap) with a population of about 100,000. U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, FEDERATED STATES
OF MICRONESIA, FACT SHEET 2-3 (1989).
145. The Compact of Free Association was signed by the United States and the Federated
States of Micronesia on October 1, 1982, and by the United States and the Republic of the
Marshall Islands on June 25, 1983. See Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
[Vol. 11: 11
Micronesia
Each Compact of Free Association was subject to approval within the
states by processes which included popular approval through plebi-
scites. The Compacts have been approved in the Republic of the Mar-
shall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia, 46 but one has
yet to receive approval in Palau.147
Despite hopes that there might be a unified Micronesia, the parti-
san interests of the various island groups precluded any opportunity
for unification. Given the context of disparate peoples brought to-
gether by external forces, it seems fundamentally inconsistent with the
principle of self-determination to force some semblance of unity upon
the islands in the Trust Territory. A forced unity would also seem to
invite internal problems that would threaten the continued existence
of the state. One need not look very far to find secessionist struggles
that have been waged by minority groups who found themselves invol-
untarily included in conglomerate states.' 48 It would be inconsistent
with the doctrine of self-determination and acutely shortsighted not to
recognize the right of Micronesian people to form several states based
on the desires of the people. The United States may well take credit
for allowing the division of the Trust Territory as a reflection of its
commitment to democracy, thus allowing the Micronesians a large
voice in deciding their future political status. 149
99-239, 99 Stat. 1770 (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (1986)) [hereinafter Compact for
Micronesia and Marshall Islands]. The Republic of Palau initially signed the compact in 1982
but approval by popular vote was not obtained for reasons set out below. See infra notes 226-262
and accompanying text. Consequently, the Compact of Free Association between the United
States and Palau has undergone revisions and still is pending final approval. The most recent
version can be found at Pub. L. No. 99-658, 100 Stat. 3672 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (1986))
[hereinafter Compact for Palau]. The most recent proposal for implementation of the Compact
for Palau can be found in H.J. Res. 175, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The Compacts [when cited
together, hereinafter Compacts of Free Association] all contain similar terms but do have some
differences. See infra notes 200-212.
146. The Marshall Islands approved the compact in a plebiscite conducted in September,
1983 by a vote of 58% in favor. See Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the
Plebiscite in the Marshall Islands Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, September 1983, 51 U.N.
TCOR Supp. (No. 2), U.N. Doc. T/1865 (1984). The FSM approved of the compact in a plebi-
scite conducted in June, 1983, by a vote of 79% in favor. See Report of the United Nations
Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in the Federated States of Micronesia, Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands, June 1983, 51 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No. 1), U.N. Doc. T/1860 (1984).
147. See infra notes 226-262 and accompanying text.
148. One example recently discussed is the armed struggle of the Eritrean people against
Ethiopia. See Comment, Self-Determination: Its Evolution and Practice by the United Nations
and Its Application to the Case of Eritrea, 6 Wis. J. INT'L L. 75 (1987); see also A. JAMES,
SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 78-83 (1986) (discussing
examples of secessionist struggles found in Bangladesh, Eritrea, and Biafra).
149. See 56 U.N. TCOR (1669th mtg.) at 8, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1669 (1989) (statement of
United Kingdom Representative J. Stephen Smith in the Trusteeship Council).
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B. Achievement of Self-Government or Independence
As a result of negotiations that officially began in 1969,150 the
Northern Mariana Islands are assuming the status of Commonwealth
to the United States. Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Federated
States of Micronesia have all ostensibly agreed to a relationship of free
association with the United States.1 51 A critically important issue in
any Security Council review of the proposed termination will be
whether these forms of government satisfy the United Nations Charter
article 76(b) requirement that trust territories be advanced "towards
self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particu-
lar circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely ex-
pressed wishes of the people concerned."
The legitimacy of the forms of post-trust government, as specifi-
cally structured by the agreements with the United States, have re-
ceived differing evaluations in studies by several scholars.' 52 The
difference of opinions seems to rest in large part on whether emphasis
is placed on the right of Micronesian peoples to choose almost any
form of government, provided the choice reflects the "freely expressed
wishes" of the peoples, or alternatively, whether emphasis is placed on
the degree to which the chosen forms of government fit into one of the
three categories of self-government - independence, free association
or integration - as defined by the United Nations General Assembly
resolutions concerning self-determination set out below.
Any Security Council review of the Micronesian Compacts of Free
Association would undoubtedly take into account the General Assem-
bly resolutions concerning decolonization and self-determination. The
General Assembly pronouncements include Resolution 1514, the
"Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples."'' 53 Resolution 1514 makes several references to the
150. For a description of the negotiations, see Armstrong, Emergence, supra note 123, at
213-27.
151. The people of Palau have yet to approve the Compact by the required super-majority in
a plebiscite, but it appears inevitable that the Compact negotiated between the two governments
will be approved. See infra notes 243-257 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Hirayasu, supra note 52 (approving the post-trust relations); Rodriguez-Orel-
lana, In Contemplation of Micronesia: The Prospects for Decolonization of Puerto Rico Under
International Law, 18 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 457 (1987) (critical of Compacts of Free
Association); Hills, supra note 43 (writing in favor of the free association arrangements); Clark,
Self-Determination and Free Association, supra note 43 (writing critically of the proposed ar-
rangements); Armstrong, Emergence, supra note 123 (writing favorably on the post-trust
relations).
153. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A.
Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). Pomerance asserts
that Resolution 1514 is the most frequently cited resolution in United Nations history. See M.
POMERANCE, supra note 117, at 1.
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right of peoples to "independence" per se and is often interpreted as
requiring full independence as the appropriate form of self-govern-
ment for an emerging state. 154 One day after the adoption of Resolu-
tion 1514, the General Assembly also adopted Resolution 1541,'"-
concerning the obligation of states to transmit information on depen-
dent territories under United Nations Charter article 73. Principle VI
of the Annex to Resolution 1541 states that:
A Non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to have reached a full
measure of self-government by:
(a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State;
(b) Free association with an independent State; or
(c) Integration with an independent State.
Resolution 1541 also includes factors to be considered in deciding
whether free association is sufficient to establish self-government, in-
cluding the requirements that the free association involve "a free and
voluntary choice . . . through informed and democratic processes,"
that there be self-government in internal matters, and that the people
have the right to modify the status of the territory through democratic
means. 1
56
Resolution 1541 also allows for the possibility of integration as a
form of self-government within certain limits. Principle VIII provides
that integration should include complete equality between the people
of the non-self-governing territory and the state into which it is being
integrated, including equal rights of citizenship and of participation in
all levels of government. Principle IX states that a decision to inte-
grate must reflect the freely expressed wishes of the people, and should
come only after the territory has attained a sufficiently advanced stage
of self-government to allow for a responsible, knowledgeable choice
through an informed, democratic process.
The difference between Resolution 1514's emphasis on indepen-
dence and Resolution 1541's allowance for alternative forms of gov-
154. See M. POMERANCE, supra note 117, at 24-25. The preamble of Resolution 1514 states,
in part, that the General Assembly recognizes the yearning of dependent peoples for freedom and
their movement toward "independence." Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of the resolution all mention
independence to the exclusion of any other forms of government.
155. G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
156. G.A. Res. 1541, Annex Principle VII. Resolution 1541 has been interpreted to require
two additional elements in light of prior practice: the terms of the free association should be
clearly set down in a binding agreement, and the power of the associate state to intervene in
internal affairs should not involve great discretion. J. CRAWFORD, supra note 23, at 375-76. But
cf Clark, Free Association: Critical View 2, in UNIV. OF VIRGIN ISLANDS, PROCEEDINGS: CON-
FERENCE ON THE FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS, Feb.
26-27, 1988 (1989) (noting that the free association arrangements between New Zealand, the
Cook Islands and Niue are almost totally lacking any written agreement).
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ernment has been noted and discussed more fully in other writings. 157
To the extent that a contradiction is perceived, 58 Resolution 1541
should carry more weight because it reflects more of an attempt to
interpret United Nations Charter provisions, specifically article 73,
rather than an attempt to add substance to the Charter, as Resolution
1514 has been interpreted to do.159 Another answer to the possible
inconsistency between Resolutions 1541 and 1514 is the view that in-
dependence is presumed to be the proper mode of self-government, but
that the presumption against free association or integration, based on
the fact that those relationships contain more opportunities for ex-
ploitation, can be overcome.160 In any event, Resolution 1541 is con-
sistent with United Nations practice which has not always required
independence for a non-self-governing territory.' 6 1
The more flexible approach to acceptable forms of self-government
is buttressed by General Assembly Resolution 2625, the Declaration
Concerning Friendly Relations Among States. 162  Resolution 2625
reads, in part, "[t]he establishment of a sovereign and independent
157. See M. POMERANCE, supra note 117, at 9-13; W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 37, at
119-25; Clark, Free Association and Self-Determination, suora note 43, at 49-53.
158. See M. POMERANCE, supra note 117, at 10. The difference may be attributable to the
fact that Resolution 1514 came from the plenary session of the General Assembly while Resolu-
tion 1541 was drafted by a committee in which states administering non-self-governing territories
held significant numbers. See Clark, Self-Determination and Free Association, supra note 43, at
49-51; Armstrong, Emergence, supra note 123, at 236-37.
159. See M. POMERANCE, supra note 117, at 10-12. See also W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra
note 37, at 112-25. Ofuatey-Kodjoe makes four points in favoring Resolution 1541 over Resolu-
tion 1514: article 73 of the Charter allows for self-government without complete independence;
Resolution 1541 operates on the basis of continued acceptance of article 73; Resolution 1514 is
inconsistent with concepts embodied in article 73 and the trusteeship system, and practice of the
United Nations is more consistent with Resolution 1541.
160. See Macdonald, supra note 8, at 242-44.
161. See J. CRAWFORD, supra note 23, at 367-77; W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 37, at
121-22; Macdonald, supra note 8, at 241-43.
162. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States In Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625,
25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
Another General Assembly pronouncement, Resolution 742, also addressed similar topics to
those found in Resolutions 1514, 1541 and 2625. See G.A Res. 742, 8 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
17) at 21-23, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953). Resolution 742 addressed the question of when a terri-
tory had become self-governing and therefore beyond the scope of U.N. Charter, Chapter XI on
Non-Self-Governing Territories. In reference to the present debate on the adequacy of common-
wealth status or free association for the new states, Resolution 742 can be taken to offer support
to both sides. On the one hand, Resolution 742 emphasizes the need for peoples to reach a
decision that is "freely expressed by informed and democratic processes," allows for association
with an existing state, and states that each case should be judged by the particular circumstances.
More stringently, however, Resolution 742 dictates that association should be "on the basis of
absolute equality," and that limitations on sovereignty should be subject to modification at any
time by the former territory. The importance of Resolution 742 in the present debate is lessened
by the overall awkwardness of its provisions. See Clark, Self-Determination and Free Association,
supra note 43, at 42-49, and its succession by more definitive Resolution 1541; see also M.
POMERANCE, supra note 117, at 25-26.
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State, the free association or integration with an independent State or
emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people
constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by
that people." It is difficult to maintain the position that the option of
independence must always be chosen by a non-self-governing territory
when all relevant United Nations General Assembly resolutions and
prior practice are considered. 163 The stronger position is that the "es-
sence of self-determination is method, not result."' 164
C. The Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth
The establishment of a commonwealth relationship between the
United States and the Northern Mariana Islands is perhaps a fait ac-
compli. On February 15, 1975, representatives of the Northern Mari-
ana Islands and the United States completed negotiations and
executed the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States.' 65 The
Covenant was subsequently approved by the United States Congress 66
and the people of the Marianas. t67 It was largely given effect in 1978
by presidential proclamation t68 and fully given effect at the time of
President Reagan's proclamation of the termination of the Trusteeship
Agreement in 1986.169
The commonwealth relationship, as structured by the Covenant,
calls for the Northern Mariana Islands to join "in political union with
163. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 10, 123 (Advisory Opinion of Oct. 16) (separate opin-
ion of Judge Dillard):
At one point Spain asserted, principally in its written statement, that in the free exercise of
the population's right to self-determination allowance must be made for the independence of
the territory as a legal possibility. She drew this conclusion from an analysis of resolution
1541 (XV) and the broader options designated in resolution 2625 (XXV). She also intimated
that the General Assembly had committed itself to holding a referendum. I can find nothing
in these resolutions, however, or in the legal aspects of the "right" itself which compels such
conclusions. On the contrary it may be suggested that self-determination is satisfied by a
free choice not by a particular consequence of that choice or a particular method of exercis-
ing it.
164. M. POMERANCE, supra note 117, at 24-25. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 10, 33
(Advisory Opinion of Oct. 16) (defining the principle of self-determination as "the need to pay
regard to the freely expressed will of peoples"); id. at 81 (Declaration of Judge Singh) (ascertain-
ing the freely expressed will of the people is "the very sine qua non of all decolonization").
165. Pub. L. 94-241, 90 Stat. 263 (1976) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982)).
166. H.J. Res. 549, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S.J. Res. 107, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
167. See Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in the Mari-
ana Island District, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, June 1975, 43 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No.
2), U.N. Doc. T/1771 (1976).
168. Proclamation No. 4534, Oct. 24, 1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 56,593, reprinted in 48 U.S.C.
§'1681 (1982).
169. Supra note 2.
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and under the sovereignty of the United States"'170 with the islands
having the right of internal self-government' 7' and the United States
being granted the responsibility for external affairs.' 72 The right of
internal self-government is potentially limited by Covenant provisions
which make the existing laws and Constitution of the United States
partially applicable to the Northern Mariana Islands 173 and grant the
United States a limited ability to enact future laws that will be applica-
ble to the Northern Mariana Islands. 74 While United States laws are
thereby made applicable to the islands, the territory has received no
opportunity for representation in the United States Congress nor par-
ticipation in the election of the President. Instead, article IX grants
the right to have a "Resident Representative" with official recognition
by all departments and agencies of the United States government 175
and calls for regular consultation between the two governments. 176
While the division of responsibility between internal and foreign
affairs might seem rather straightforward, the Covenant has already
spawned a dispute as to the degree of internal autonomy to be ac-
corded the Northern Mariana Islands. While the dispute between the
United States and the Northern Marianas government is discussed
more fully below, 177 but it essentially is a dispute over the residual
powers of internal or local government for the islands. The construc-
tion advocated by the Northern Marianas government would provide
170. COVENANT TO ESTABLISH A COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA IS-
LANDS IN POLITICAL UNION WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA art. I, § 101 [hereinafter
COVENANT].
171. COVENANT, supra note 170, art. I, § 103 provides that: "[tlhe people of the Northern
Mariana Islands will have the right of local self-government and will govern themselves with
respect to internal affairs in accordance with a Constitution of their own adoption."
172. COVENANT, supra note 170, art. 1, § 104 provides that: "[t]he United States will have
complete responsibility for and authority with respect to matters relating to foreign affairs and
defense affecting the Northern Mariana Islands."
173. COVENANT, supra note 170, art. I, § 102 provides: "The relations between the North-
ern Mariana Islands and the United States will be governed by this Covenant which, together
with those provisions of the Constitution, treaties and the laws of the United States applicable to
the Northern Mariana Islands, will be the supreme law of the Northern Mariana Islands."
Article V of the Covenant goes on to state more specifically which parts of the United States
Constitution and federal laws apply to the Northern Mariana Islands and calls for the appoint-
ment of a presidential commission to make recommendations as to the extent and manner that
other United States laws should be made applicable to the Northern Mariana Islands. Id. art. V.
174. COVENANT, supra note 170, art. I, § 105. This section provides in part that "[t]he
United States may enact legislation in accordance with its constitutional processes which will be
applicable to the Northern Mariana Islands .... In order to respect the right of self-government
guaranteed by this Covenant the United States agrees to limit the exercise of that authority so
that the fundamental provisions of this Covenant ... may be modified only with the consent of
the Government of the United States and the Government of the Northern Mariana Islands."
175. COVENANT, supra note 170, art. IX, § 901.
176. COVENANT, supra note 170, art. IX, § 902.
177. See infra notes 188-199 and accompanying text.
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for a large degree of internal self-government, conceding to the United
States government the areas of defense, security and foreign affairs.
Under the construction presented by the United States government,
the Northern Marianas are ultimately a mere territory, largely subject
to laws enacted in the United States Congress without the benefit of
representation in Congress. The legitimacy of the commonwealth sta-
tus, as measured against United Nations precepts, may well depend on
the particular construction given to the Covenant. The construction
of the Covenant offered by the United States government is extremely
susceptible to criticism, not only because of the lack of a voice in the
Congress, but also because it raises a fundamental question of whether
the people of the Northern Mariana Islands have freely consented to
this form of commonwealth status. Moreover, even the more palat-
able construction of the Northern Marianas Government raises some
questions of legitimacy.
In his important 1980 writing on Micronesia, Professor Roger
Clark asserted that the commonwealth arrangement between the
United States and the Northern Mariana Islands does not fulfill all of
the requirements of Resolution 1541 for self-government by either free
association or integration for several reasons. He argued: (1) that the
people of the Marianas were probably not presented with a clear
choice of independence as a form of government during the 1975 pleb-
iscite; (2) that the Marianas are not free to modify their relationship
with the United States if they should so wish; (3) that the Marianas are
not entirely free to determine their internal constitution; and (4) that
the Marianas are not fully integrated into the United States' system of
federal government. 78 In a subsequent writing, Professor Clark has
suggested that the Northern Mariana Islands "appear to be consigned
to permanent colonial status."' 79
Professor Clark is certainly correct insofar as the Covenant struc-
ture does not fit into any of the three categories of self-government
established by Resolution 1541. The Northern Marianas Government
has reached the same conclusion:
The Northern Marianas Islands by this standard [Resolution 1541]
does not reach a full measure of self-government on termination of the
trusteeship. It certainly does not become a sovereign independent state.
It does not become freely associated with the United States because it
does not have the power under the Covenant to disassociate itself from
178. Clark, Self-Determination and Free Association, supra note 43, at 75-78. In his 1986
statement before the Trusteeship Council, Professor Clark stated that nothing had happened
since 1976 to change this assessment of the Commonwealth arrangement. 53 U.N. TCOR
(1604th mtg.) at 36, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1604 (1986).
179. Clark, Letter to the Editor in Chief, supra note 52, at 934.
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the sovereignty of the United States. See Principle VII of the [Resolu-
tion 1541] Annex.
Integration with an independent state, the United States, also is not
achieved, because such integration requires complete equality between
the peoples of the Northern Mariana Islands and the United States, in-
cluding "equal rights and opportunities for representation and participa-
tion at all levels in the executive, legislative and judicial organs of
government." See Principle VIII of the [Resolution 1541] Annex. 180
Nonetheless, an argument for the validity of the commonwealth rela-
tionship can be made. Reviewing the proposed arrangements in light
of the General Assembly resolutions, the emphasis should be on
whether a valid act of self-determination has occurred. 18 1 As set out
above, the people of the Northern Mariana Islands continually lobbied
for a close relationship with the United States for many years.'
8 2
While some questions have been raised about the phrasing of the plebi-
scite ballot and the timing of the referendum, it is difficult not to con-
clude that commonwealth status was the free choice of the people of
the Northern Mariana Islands. 8 3 Even during the recent dispute over
the issue of internal governance, the government has voiced a contin-
ued strong preference for commonwealth status. 84
Still, some might question whether commonwealth status is valid
even if one assumes that it accurately reflects the free choice of the
people of the Northern Marianas. Integration through common-
wealth status should be deemed within the realm of permissible forms
of self-government provided that the government is structured in such
a manner as to satisfy the requirements of article 76 of the United
Nations Charter that (1) the arrangement is appropriate to the partic-
ular circumstances of the territory and its peoples, and (2) the status
reflects the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned. The peo-
ple of the Northern Mariana Islands seem quite willing to accept a
180. Special Representatives of the Governor of the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas
Islands for the Section 902 Consultations, Position Paper on Self-Government 25 (Nov. 21, 1986)
[hereinafter Nov. 21 Position Paper] (Courtesy of MacMeekin & Woodworth, Washington, D.C.,
Counsel to the Special Representatives. Copy on file with Michigan Journal of International
Law).
181. See Hirayasu, supra note 52, at 515-17; see also D. MCHENRY, supra note 49, at 41
("Despite a clear preference for independence, United Nations members, even some of the most
avid proponents of independence, have suggested that a status short of independence is best for
Micronesia, particularly if that is their free choice. There has seemed to be an emphasis, how-
ever, on complete self-government and on the right of Micronesians to decide - a right even to
make the "wrong" choice").
182. See supra notes 126-137 and accompanying text.
183. See Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe Plebiscite in the Marianas
Island District, 43 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No. 2) at 36-42, U.N. Doc. T/1771 (1976). The Visiting
Mission concluded that the plebiscite was conducted without improper interference by the
United States and the poll was well-organized and well-attended.
184. See infra notes 194-199 and accompanying text.
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hybrid status that does not fit neatly into either free association or
integration as defined by Resolution 1541 as long as there is a substan-
tial degree of internal self-government. The Northern Marianas Gov-
ernment has explained its willingness to accept the partial integration
arrangement despite the failure to fit into any of the Resolution 1541
categories of self-government:
The Commonwealth, of course, has long recognized that the status
achieved under the Covenant did not comport with the standards for
self-government set out under General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV).
Given its isolated location, small population, and desire for a permanent
association with the United States, it nonetheless decided to proceed
with the Covenant arrangement with the United States .... the Com-
monwealth considered that its interests are protected, even though the
citizens of the Northern Mariana Islands do not fully participate in the
political processes of the United States, because of the mutually binding
nature of the Covenant. 8 5
The commonwealth status appears to be consistent with the circum-
stances and reflect the wishes of the people. Therefore, the status, at
least as construed by the Northern Marianas Government, is almost
certainly consistent with article 76.
The emphasis in Resolution 2625 on flexibility supports the view
that partial integration through the commonwealth status is permissi-
ble.' 86 Further, the lack of clear United Nations precedents in the
area of self-determination refutes the notion that such an arrangement
is prohibited or that independence is always required.1 87
Assuming that the Northern Marianas Islands and the United
States may legitimately decide to enter into a relationship of partial
integration, there remains the indispensible requirement that the peo-
ple of the Marianas freely consent to that form of government. In
recent years, the Northern Marianas Government has accused the
United States of imposing a form of partial integration to which it had
not agreed. More specifically, governmental officials of the Northern
Mariana Islands have presented petitions to the Trusteeship Council
to draw attention to concerns that the United States will not properly
respect the right of that government under the Covenant to control its
185. Nov. 21 Position Paper, supra note 180.
186. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
187. See D. MCHENRY, supra note 49, at 35-42. McHenry examines the United Nations
Charter requirements in light of subsequent General Assembly resolutions and concludes that
"[from the above discussion, it is possible to conclude that, although the world community has
indicated a preference for independence, it has not held that independence is the sole legitimate
expression of self-determination by a dependent territory. Such a conclusion would seem espe-
cially warranted with respect to Micronesia. Id. at 41; see also M. POMERANCE, supra note 117,
at 73-74 (concluding that flexibility is required in pursuing the right of self-determination).
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own internal affairs.' 88 Statements by officials during the course of
inter-governmental consultations reflect a distinct rift as to whether
the Northern Marianas government is supreme in internal matters or
if United States law is supreme because the Commonwealth is a terri-
tory of the United States. The Northern Marianas Government first
raised concerns about encroachment on its right of internal self-gov-
ernment in response to a number of actions by the Congress, the Presi-
dent and the Interior Department that were perceived to subject the
Northern Marianas to oversight by the Interior Department.8 9 These
acts convinced the Northern Marianas Government that it was still
being treated as a mere territory without a right of self-government,
whereas it held the view that it should have the right of internal self-
government "at least equal to that of a state of the United States."'' 90
The United States responded by taking the position that the Common-
wealth is indeed subject to the territorial clause of the Constitution,
article IV, section 3, clause 2, and therefore its "right to self-govern-
ment does not extend to the same level as the several states."' 19' The
188. See 56 U.N. TCOR (1663d mtg.) at 12-26, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1663 (1989) (representa-
tives included members of the legislative branch of the government.); 55 U.N. TCOR (1649th
mtg.) at 19-38, U.N. Doc. T/PV. 1649 (1988) (representatives included the Lieutenant Governor,
the President of the Senate, the Speaker and a fellow member of the House, and the elected
Northern Marianas Islands representative to the United States).
189. See Nov. 21 Position Paper, supra note 180. The Representatives noted that the Cove-
nant resulted in the Commonwealth being removed from Interior Department oversight as a
mere territory but that sections 203(a) and (b) of Public Law 97-357, 48 U.S.C. § 1692 (1982)
had reconferred on the Interior Department the right to receive an annual financial report from
the Governor of the islands and conferred on the Inspector General the right to audit all ac-
counts and expenditures of the Government. Id. at 15-16. The Northern Marianas Government
was also concerned by the issuance of Executive Order 12572 (Nov. 3, 1986) which was per-
ceived to treat the Commonwealth as a mere territory and the issuance of a notice by the Interior
Department, citing 50 Fed. Reg. 51,455, 51,456 (Dec. 17, 1985), assigning to an assistant secre-
tary responsibility for promoting development in the Commonwealth. Id. at 18-19.
190. See id. at 4, 11-12. The Northern Marianas' most recent statement on the issue has
proposed that the Covenant be construed to grant the Commonwealth absolute autonomy in
internal and local affairs, restricting the Congress' ability to legislate to those areas specifically
listed in the Covenant or subsequent agreements. See Special Representatives of the Governor of
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands for the Section 902 Consultations, Supple-
mental Position Paper on Self-Government 6-17 (May 1989), reprinted in, COMPILATION OF DOC-
UMENTS FROM THE SEVENTH ROUND OF THE COVENANT SECTION 902 CONSULTATIONS 27,
33-44 (MacMeekin & Woodworth, May 24, 1989) (Copy on file with Michigan Journal of Inter-
national Law).
191. See Department of Interior, Memorandum - Nature of United States Obligations of
Financial Assistance to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands 12 (Jan. 6, 1989),
reprinted in, COMPILATION OF DOCUMENTS FROM THE SIXTH ROUND OF THE COVENANT SEC-
TION 902 CONSULTATIONS 22, 33 (MacMeekin & Woodworth, Jan. 10-11, 1989) (Copy on file
with Michigan Journal ofInternational Law). The Memorandum went on to state that Congress
could enact any law affecting the Northern Mariana Islands, at least with regard to limitations
on funding, as long as there was a rational basis. Id. at 13 (citing Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651
(1980)).
The Interior Department had asserted in an earlier paper that, while the United States was
granted unlimited rights with regard to foreign affairs and defense powers under section 104 of
the Covenant, the right to local self-government for the Commonwealth under section 103 was
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dispute strikes at the very heart of both the Covenant and the quintes-
sential self-determination concern of self-government. For the people
of the Northern Marianas to be subject ultimately to government by a
process in which they have no representation, as the United States
would construe the Covenant, indeed smacks of colonialism, as Profes-
sor Clark has suggested. Such an arrangement is antithetical to pre-
vailing principles of self-determination.
Section 902 of the covenant calls for regular consultation "on all
matters affecting the relationship," and for special representatives of
the two governments to meet at the request of either party to engage in
good faith consideration of designated issues and to make a report and
recommendations with respect thereto. Since the consultation mecha-
nism was first invoked in 1985, it has been beset with delays caused by
failures to appoint United States Representatives and with charges
that the United States has refused to discuss important issues. 192
not similarly unlimited. Rather, the Interior Department took the position that the United
States Government could enact any law unless it was specifically limited by the Covenant. The
residual or plenary legislative power was viewed as being placed in the United States Govern-
ment. See Special Representatives of the President of the United States for the Section 902 Consul-
tations, Position Paper on The Relationship Between the United States and the Commonwealth of
the Northern Mariana Islands 9-10 (Mar. 28, 1987), reprinted in, COMPILATION OF DOCUMENTS
FROM THE THIRD ROUND OF THE COVENANT SECTION 902 CONSULTATIONS 74, 83-84
(MacMeekin, Cutler & Woodworth, Apr. 1, 1987) (Copy on file with Michigan Journal of Inter-
national Law).
192. The Northern Marianas first requested consultations in May, 1985. The United States
did not respond with the designation of a special representative until May, 1986 when an official
of the Interior Department was so designated. Three rounds of consultations took place, without
many accomplishments, before the resignation of the Special Representative, Richard Montoya,
in July, 1987. The process remained stalled for another year until a second representative was
named. The consultations resumed from August, 1988 to May, 1989 when the second represen-
tative, Becky Norton Dunlop, resigned. See Transcript of the Covenant Section 902 Consulta-
tions." Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Insular and International Affairs of the House Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (summary of section 902 consultations
contained in statement of Pedro A. Tenorio, Lieutenant Governor); McAllister, Interior Official
Resigns Under Fire, Wash. Post, May 27, 1989, at A7, col. I (reflecting Dunlop's resignation).
The recent statement of Special Representative Dunlop before a House Subcommittee cited sev-
eral successes of the section 902 talks: the resolution of a dispute between the IRS and the North-
ern Marianas about the tax status of housing bonds sold by a governmental authority; an
understanding concerning the recommendations of a presidential commission on the applicability
of U.S. laws to the Northern Marianas under section 504 of the Covenant; the agreement to
provide air service to some islands in the Northern Marianas; and an understanding concerning
the provision of non-governmental, third country assistance to the Northern Marianas. See
Transcript of the Covenant Section 902 Consultations.
The representatives of the Northern Marianas government have not been so positive in
describing the success of the consultations. Senate President Benjamin Manglona has asserted
that "not one single substantive agreement has come out of these discussions. The self-govern-
ment issue is as far from resolution as it has ever been; 902 discussons have proven to be all form
and no substance." See 56 U.N. TCOR (1663d mtg.) at 25, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1663 (1989). Sena-
tor Manglona has pointed out in a House Subcommittee hearing that even the housing bond issue
was resolved by a presidential dictate on the particular actions that refused to acknowledge the
non-taxability of Northern Marianas government bonds. See Transcript of the Covenant Section
902 Consultations. House Speaker Pedro Guerrero identified a pattern of circumvention of the
902 process and the failure to reply to designated issues in a timely manner, if at all. Such
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While the desire for full internal self-government remains the "central
issue" for the Northern Marianas, 193 the lack of substantial progress
through the consultation arrangements provided in section 902 has be-
come a sore point as well. The combination of the dispute over the
meaning of the Covenant and the ineffectiveness of the dispute resolu-
tion process has lead the people of the Northern Marianas to recon-
sider the commonwealth relationship.
During the testimony before the Trusteeship Council in 1988, the
Marianas representatives identified these issues and a number of other
concerns, described as "large and crucial," related to the Covenant's
division of matters for internal governance. 194  To underscore the
depth of the concern, the representatives presented an initiative that
had been voted upon and approved by more than 75% of voters on
November 7, 1987.195 The initiative was described as "reaffirm[ing]
our people's right to govern themselves with respect to internal affairs
in accordance with a Constitution of their own adoption."'' 96 The ini-
tiative included a provision that if negotiations left their concerns re-
lating to self-government or financial assistance unresolved as of July
1, 1989, the people of the Northern Marianas shall have the right to
reaffirm, reject, or renegotiate the Covenant. 197
The Marianas Government representatives have continued to re-
quest that the Trusteeship Agreement be terminated, but only with the
conduct has raised doubts about the United States' commitment to abide by the Covenant in
good faith and lead to consideration of terminating the commonwealth status. See Transcript of
the Covenant Section 902 Consultations.
193. See 56 U.N. TCOR (1663d mtg.) at 21, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1663 (1989) (statement of
Benjamin T. Manglona, President of the Senate of the Northern Marianas legislature).
194. For a recent statement of particular NMI concerns, see 56 U.N. TCOR (1663d mtg.) at
16-26, U.N. Doc. T/PV. 1663 (1989) (statement of Benjamin T. Manglona, President of the Sen-
ate). Among the concerns were the movement of the United States Government to apply laws
affecting internal affairs on the basis of the territorial clause of the U.S. Constitution (article IV,
§ 3), the failure of the United States to engage in negotiations over disputes under § 902 of the
Covenant, a perceived bias in U.S federal courts towards the positions of the U.S. Government,
unilateral amendments of the Covenant by the U.S. Congress, the failure of the United States
government to consult with the Northern Marianas Government before entering into interna-
tional agreements that affect the NMI in areas of trade, immigration policy and international
aviation, the control of fisheries and seaside resources in adjacent waters, and the appointment
and authority of members of the executive branch of the U.S. Government who have responsibili-
ties in the Northern Mariana islands.
195. The initiative is included in U.N. Doc. T/PET.10/702 (1988). For text of initiative see
infra Appendix C.
196. See 55 U.N. TCOR (1649th mtg.) at 21, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1649 (1988) (statement of
Lieutenant-Governor Pedro Tenorio). Other legislation was reported to have been introduced in
the Northern Mariana Islands to terminate the Covenant. Id. at 36.
197. See Commonwealth-Wide Initiative No. 1, § 2, infra Appendix C. Although the
problems remain largely unresolved, no referendum on the Covenant is presently scheduled. In-
terview with MacMeekin and Woodworth, Washington, D.C., Legal Counsel to Special Repre-
sentatives of the Northern Mariana Islands for section 902 consultations (Nov. 2, 1989). ,
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understanding and guarantee of the right to internal self-government
in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Trusteeship
Agreement. 98 Charges of bad faith raised by the Northern Marianas
and the disagreement between the two governments over the proper
interpretation of the Covenant underscore the positive role that could
be played by the Security Council in reviewing the proposed termina-
tion of the Trusteeship Agreement. The Security Council, if its mem-
bers largely resist any temptation to politicize the issues, could review
the Covenant not only to assure that it satisfies United Nations stan-
dards for self-determination through the free choice of the people, but
also to aid the parties in construing the agreement to achieve a truly
consensual agreement.' 99 If a structure of partial integration can be
mutually agreed upon by the Northern Marianas and the United
States, then the Security Council should be reluctant to withhold its
approval. But as long as the Northern Marianas continue to protest
on the basis of a lack of internal self-government, the United States
will be hard-put to defend the Commonwealth status as being consis-
tent with self-determination standards.
D. Compacts of Free Association
Under very similar Compacts of Free Association for Palau, the
Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Is-
lands, 200 each state is accorded a broad right of self-governance in
both domestic matters and foreign affairs,20 and is made responsible
for its foreign undertakings. 20 2 The United States, however, is allowed
a right of consultation in matters of foreign affairs 20 3 and receives "full
198. See 55 U.N. TCOR (1649th mtg.) at 21-22, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1649 (1988) (statement of
Lieutenant-Governor Pedro Tenorio). The charge has been made that the United States waited
until the Trusteeship Agreement was apparently terminated before stripping the Northern Mari-
anas of self-government. See 55 U.N. TCOR (1649th mtg.), U.N. Doc. T/PV.1649 (1988) (state-
ment of Pedro M. Atalig, Chairman of NMI Committee on Trusteeship Termination).
199. Unfortunately, the response of the Trusteeship Council has simply been to refer the
Marianas to the dispute resolution provisions found in section 902 of the Covenant. See Trustee-
ship Council Resolutions, U.N. Doc. T/L.1270 (1989); U.N. Doc. T/L.1266 (1988), ("The
Council considers that any difficulties over the interpretation of the new status agreements
should be resolved bilaterally by the parties concerned in accordance with the procedures mutu-
ally agreed upon and laid down in the relevant new status agreements").
200. See supra note 145.
201. Compacts of Free Association, supra note 145, §§ 111, 121. Section 11I provides that
-[t]he peoples of the [three states], acting through the Governments established under their re-
spective Constitutions, are self-governing;" and section 121 provides that the three states have
the capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their own names and rights.
202. Compact for Micronesia and Marshall Islands, supra note 145, §§ 124, 125; Compact
for Palau, supra note 145, §§ 126, 127.
203. Compacts of Free Association, supra note 145, § 123.
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authority and responsibility for security and defense matters. ' 20 4 The
right of "strategic denial" is also granted to the United States by pro-
visions which permit the United States to close the islands to the mili-
tary forces of any other nation. 20 5
Under Title Two of the Compacts, the United States also takes on
the obligation of providing the freely associated states with substantial
monetary and program assistance during the term of the Compacts.
The Compacts are supplemented by a number of separate agreements
such as those relating to the establishment and use of defense sites or
facilities.206
The provisions on termination found in Title Four are an impor-
tant aspect of the Compacts when considered against the General As-
sembly standards for self-determination because those provisions
ultimately limit the ability of the freely associated states to terminate
portions of the Compacts. The Compacts allow for termination both
by mutual agreement and by unilateral act.2 0 7 The continuation of
financial assistance largely depends upon how termination comes
about, 20 but the defense and security provisions are designed to con-
tinue for a minimum of fifteen years for the Federated States of Micro-
nesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. 20 9 For Palau, the
defense and security provisions will continue for a minimum of fifty
years.210 The right of "strategic denial" of use of the territories by the
military forces of any third states granted by section 311 of the Com-
204. Compact for Micronesia and Marshall Islands, supra note 145, § 311; Compact for Pa-
lau, supra note 145, § 312.
205. Compact for Micronesia and Marshall Islands, supra note 145, § 311 (b)(2); Compact
for Palau, supra note 145, § 311. The prohibition of other military forces is even more absolute
in the Palauan Compact.
206. See Compacts of Free Association, supra note 145, § 321. The initial separate agree-
ments for the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia can be
found at H.R. Doc. No. 192, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 115-391 (1984). The initial separate agree-
ments for Palau can be found at H.R. Doc. No. 193, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 154-405 (1986).
207. Compacts of Free Association, supra note 145, §§ 441-43.
208. In the event of mutual termination the economic assistance provided by the United
States will continue only on the basis of mutually agreed terms. Compacts of Free Association,
supra note 145, § 451. In the event of unilateral termination by the United States with respect to
the Federated States of Micronesia or the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the economic assist-
ance provisions would continue until the fifteenth anniversary of the Compact. Compact for
Micronesia and Marshall Islands, supra note 145, § 452. In the event of unilateral termination
by the Republic of the Marshall Islands or the Federated States of Micronesia, the general eco-
nomic assistance provisions would continue only as determined by the United States. Id. § 453.
With regard to Palau, the most recent version of the Compact of Free Association provides
that in the event of unilateral termination by either the United States or Palau, the economic
assistance and defense provisions would both continue for a minimum of fifty years. Compact for
Palau, supra note 145, art. V, § 452. It should be noted, however, that the economic assistance
provisions under Title Two provide funding only for a fifteen-year period.
209. Compact for Micronesia and Marshall Islands, supra note 145, §§ 452, 453.
210. Compact for Palau, supra note 145, § 452.
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pacts is structured to run in perpetuity by the most recent Palauan
Compact 21' and subsidiary agreements to the Federated States of Mi-
cronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands Compacts.21 2
Several writers have observed that any proposal for a continuing
close relationship between a trust territory and the former administer-
ing state is likely to be regarded with "great suspicion. '' 213 Moreover,
Professor Roger Clark has suggested in recent testimony before the
Trusteeship Council that the arrangements are not satisfactory be-
cause of the perpetual right of strategic denial granted to the United
States and the concomitant lack of ability by the associated states to
terminate unilaterally the entire Compact package at any time.214 In
his 1986 statement before the Trusteeship Council representing the In-
ternational League for Human Rights, Professor Clark stated:
We have concluded that the combined effect of the various 15, 30-and
50-year provisions coupled with permanent denial is to place too great a
fetter on the power of the three entities to opt out unilaterally. It will be
virtually impossible for one or more of the entities to escape from the
burdens of the military arrangements. Accordingly we do not believe
that the arrangements satisfy the United Nations' norms for a proper
exercise of self-determination. 2' 5
211. Id. § 453 ("Notwithstanding any other provision of this Compact: (a) The provisions of
Section 311, even if Title Three should terminate, are binding and shall remain in effect for a
period of 50 years and thereafter until terminated or otherwise amended by mutual consent
.).
212. See H.R. Doc. No. 192, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 348-51 (Marshall Islands), 382-87 (Feder-
ated States of Micronesia) (1984). The two agreements provide that the United States has "the
authority and responsibility to foreclose" military access by any third state, and that the terms of
the agreements will continue "in full force and effect until terminated or otherwise amended by
mutual agreement." The phrasing of these provisions may seem susceptible to an interpretation
that unilateral termination is possible but the congressional legislative history indicates that the
intent was for the arrangement of "strategic denial" to continue in perpetuity. See H.R. Doc.
No. 188, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2746,
2751.
213. See Clark, Self-Determination and Free Association, supra note 43, at 67-68; M. POMER-
ANCE, supra note 117, at 25; Armstrong, Emergence, supra note 123, at 207.
214. See 53 U.N. TCOR (1604th mtg.) at 39-42, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1604 (1986). The drafting
history of the Compacts reveals that the ability of the associated states to unilaterally terminate
the security and defense provisions steadily declined in succeeding versions of the Compacts from
1980 forward. For this reason, Professor Clark moved from his initial position of somewhat
reluctantly concluding that the early Compacts would satisfy United Nation Standards to ulti-
mately concluding that the final versions would not. See Clark, Free Association: Critical View,
supra note 156, at 2-3.
215. 53 U.N. TCOR (1604th mtg.) at 42, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1604 (1986). The 30-year refer-
ence is to the ability of the United States to lease facilities on Kwajalein Atoll for that period of
time under the subsidiary agreement with the Marshall Islands. See H.R. Doc. No. 192, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 307, 319 (1984).
Professor Clark went on to state that the Compacts might also be viewed as void either on the
basis of conflict with a peremptory norm of general international law under article 53 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that peremptory norm being the principle of self-
determination, or on the basis of the widely accepted rule in domestic systems that an agreement
is invalid because it is unconscionable or contrary to well-established public policy. 53 U.N.
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But not all writers have shared Professor Clark's disregard for the
Compacts. Reviewing the proposed arrangements in light of the Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions, these writers have emphasized the large de-
gree of governmental autonomy attained by the new states as well as
the free expression of choice in deciding upon status as associated
states. 216 The peoples of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Re-
public of the Marshall Islands, and even Palau, notwithstanding the
failure of the Compact to get the required super-majority in the latter
state, 217 have clearly spoken in favor of free association with the
United States. Both United Nations observers and independent par-
ties have concluded that the plebiscites were fairly conducted. 218 The
associated states have consciously rejected the option of integration, as
well as independence, based upon their revulsion to the idea of being
subject to complete United States authority, on the one hand, but yet
recognizing a need for continued financial relations with the United
States government. 21 9 While some specific provisions under the Com-
pacts do raise questions, 220 these decisions by the emerging states are
TCOR (1604th mtg.) at 42, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1604 (1986). But see M. POMERANCE, supra note
117, at 63-71 (concluding that the argument that self-determination is a peremptory norm is
unsound); I. BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 612-13 (questioning principle of unequal treaties be-
tween powerful and dependant states as grounds for invalidity).
216. See Hirayasu, supra note 52, at 515; Hills, supra note 43, at 603.
217. See infra notes 226-262 and accompanying text.
218. See Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in the Mar-
shall Islands, September 1983, 51 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No. 2) at 37, U.N. Doc. T/1865 (1984);
Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in the Federated States of
Micronesia, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, June 1983, 51 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 19,
U.N. Doc. T/1860 (1983); Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite
in Palau, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, February 1983, 50 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No. 3) at
37, U.N. Doc. T/1851 (1983); A. RANNEY & H. PENNIMAN, supra note 113, at 106-17 ("Ac-
cordingly we conclude that the Micronesian plebiscites satisfied the standards of fair voting and
full popular eligibility and participation as well as most Western democracies and better than
those that have made the heaviest use of referendums"); see also Hirayasu, supra note 152, at
507-11.
219. The position of the United Kingdom on the question of free expression was recently
stated by J. Stephen Smith, the Representative of the Trusteeship Council:
It is often claimed that the people of Micronesia have not been allowed to make a free choice
as to their political status. It seems to us that such claims are simply untrue. The new
status arrangements are the product of lengthy negotiations over the last 20 years. During
that time, the people of Micronesia could have chosen whatever status they wished - be it
independence, integration with the United States, or a relationship with some other state.
Yet of all the options open, they have chosen arrangements which strike a balance between
their wish to govern their own affairs and their desire for the assistance and protection of a
major power in areas such as security and defence, where they are ill-equipped to provide for
themselves. We should support their free choice, not seek to interfere with its fulfillment.
56 U.N. TCOR (1669th mtg.) at 7-8, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1669 (1989).
220. Particular concerns with substantive Compact provisions relating to Palau and the Mar-
shall Islands are discussed below. See infra notes 246-332 and accompanying text.
A primary distinction between the Federated States of Micronesia and the other states of
Palau and the Marshall Islands is that the United States' primary military interest is in "denial"
or the prevention of other states from having a presence in the area. See A. RANNEY & H.
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quite rational.
The practical circumstances of Micronesia cannot be ignored in
considering the propriety of its post-trust relationship with the United
States. Even one of the most incisive critics of the United States' ad-
ministration has noted that:
Notwithstanding [United Nations General Assembly] resolution 1514,
there is a case to be made against independence for Micronesia. One
must keep in mind the environment and surrounding circumstances.
The islands are widely dispersed; inter-island transportation is extremely
difficult; and, indeed in a very real sense, Micronesia is not yet a country,
only what one Micronesian has called "a potential country." The lack of
a common language, culture, or history for all of Micronesia makes de-
velopment, and even more basically, communications, very difficult. Fi-
nally, except for its strategic location, Micronesia is without known and
reliable economic resources. 221
The free association arrangements should be acceptable provided,
first and foremost, that there indeed has been a free, informed choice
by the electorate. The free association relationship should also include
respect for internal self-government with only minimal interference
PENNIMAN, supra note 113, at 53; Adams, supra note 44, at 94. Additionally, while article XIII,
section 2 of the the Federated States Constitution restricts the entry of nuclear material into the
territory, as does the Palauan Constitution, the Federated States Constitution grants the national
government the power to permit exceptions. Thus the Federated States did not encounter the
problems in approving the Compact experienced in Palau. See infra notes 226-245 and accompa-
nying text. Also, the particularly acute problems in the Marshall Islands (see infra notes 263-315
and accompanying text) are not duplicated in the Federated States because the United States did
not test nuclear weapons and does not have military bases in the Federated States except for a
Coast Guard facility. See Compact of Free Association: Hearing on the Proposed Compact of Free
Association: The Federated States of Micronesia Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1985) (statement of
Bailey Olter, Vice-President of the Federated States of Micronesia). Consequently, the approval
of the Compact of Free Association in the Federated States of Micronesia was not very contro-
versial. Id. at 53-54. 63.2% of the registered voters cast ballots and approved the Compact of
Free Association by a 79% majority despite the fact that the state of Ponape voted 5 1.1% against
approval. See Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in the Feder-
ated States of Micronesia, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, June 1983, 51 U.N. TCOR Supp.
(No. 1) at 14-15, U.N. Doc. T/1860 (1984). The negative vote in Ponape has been attributed to
several factors, including concerns about the future financial welfare of the Federation, feared
military plans of the United States, hopes for full independence, and separatist sentiments. See
A. RANNEY & H. PENNIMAN, supra note 113, at 65-67. The Compact of Free Association was
subsequently approved by the required number of Federated States of Micronesia state legisla-
tures and members of Congress. Id. at 76-77.
The concerns with regard to the post-trust status of the Federated States of Micronesia would
be the same general concerns stated below. Namely, the Security Council should be satisfied that
approval was freely arrived at and that the United States made proper arrangements in the Com-
pact of Free Association to address any shortcomings of its administration, particularly the need
to promote post-trust economic, educational, and medical care development. Recent reports give
rise to substantial concerns that the Federated States are woefully lacking in some of these areas.
See Dolan, Micronesia Suffers From Its 40 Years of U.S. Welfare, Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 1989, at I
(describing economic shortcomings); Ambrose, Picture of Health Improving on Yap, Honolulu
Star-Bulletin & Advisor, June 26, 1988, at Fl, col. 5.
221. D. McHENRY, supra note 49, at 49.
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based on the international security concerns. The argument that there
should be a meaningful right afforded the associated states to modify,
if not to terminate, the relationship unilaterally has a sound basis in
Resolution 1541. Nevertheless, one must recall that article 76, as the
most directly applicable United Nations Charter provision, supports
the view that flexibility is permitted as long as internal self-govern-
ment exists in a form freely chosen by the peoples concerned. Resolu-
tion 2625 and the lack of clear United Nations precedent also support
a flexible view with regard to the structuring of a free association
relationship.
Moreover, the long term or perpetual right of denial is not without
precedent. As Arthur Armstrong pointed out in his discussion of the
Compacts of Free Association, while such agreements are justifiably
controversial, the ability to enter into such an agreement has been rec-
ognized. 222 Any review of the Compacts should certainly include a
review of these provisions to ensure that the terms have been agreed
upon freely. The Federated States has taken the position that the
making of the Mutual Security Agreement is a proper exercise of its
sovereign rights to delegate authority with regard to its territory. This
position emphasizes that the Mutual Security Agreement not only
grants rights to the United States but also assigns a duty to prevent the
sort of unfriendly military occupation that has occurred in the past, a
task that the archipelagic states would find difficult to accomplish. 223
The refusal to recognize the ability of the new states to enter into such
a treaty arrangement by a free and informed decision might be consid-
ered overly paternalistic, even in the Trusteeship System context.
To the extent that the Security Council might find that the present
Compacts fall short of the applicable standards, the most effective res-
222. Armstrong, Strategic Underpinnings of the Legal Regime of Free Association: The Nego-
tiations for the Future Political Status of Micronesia, 7 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 179, 226 n.104
(1981), see also I. BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 116-17, 372-75 (recognizing as a general matter
that perpetual rights may be granted with residual sovereignty resting in the grantor state);
Isenberg, Reconciling Independence and Security The Long Term Status of the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands, 4 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 210, 230-35 (1985) (citing other examples of long-
term or perpetual treaties and concluding that such agreements do not preclude independence).
But cf Clark, Free Association: Critical View, supra note 156, at 3 (responding to Isenberg with
observation that precedents cited provide limited guidance because the treaties were either termi-
nable on notice or were questionable in origin or vitality and all pre-dated the 1960 General
Assembly declarations relating to self-determination).
223. See Compact of Free Association: Hearing on the Proposed Compact of Free Association:
The Federated States of Micronesia Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the House Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1985) (statement of Bailey Olter, Vice-
President of the Federated States of Micronesia); see also Memorandum: Federated States of
Micronesia - Perceptions of Sovereignty, supra note 6, at 4 ("In its self-governing capacity the
FSM chose, through the medium of the compact, to delegate certain authority in the United
States on agreed terms. It is well settled in international law that nations can make such delega-
tions without impact on their sovereignty or statehood").
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olution is not likely to be the total rejection of the free association
arrangements. Rather, the Security Council should call for adjust-
ments to be agreed upon by the United States and the new states in
light of any identified flaws. 224 The solution might be found in greater
availability of a unilateral right to modify or terminate the right of
denial, if the acquisition of a unilaterally perpetual right of denial was
deemed inconsistent with article 76. More specifically, this most
troublesome part of the Compact might be changed into simply a long-
term arrangement, subject to mutual renewal. 225
The nature of the issues surrounding the proposed forms of post-
trust governments and relations make a strong case for Security Coun-
cil review of the proposed termination. The United States took on the
trust as an agreement with the United Nations through the Security
Council. The Security Council should have the opportunity to partici-
pate in the resolution of the unique issues raised by the post-trust
arrangements.
E. Palauan Plebiscites and Nuclear Weapons
The principal question raised by the impending emergence of a
state of Palau is the legitimacy of the plebiscites, under international
law as well as the internal law of Palau, that may ultimately result in
approval of the Compact of Free Association. Approval of the Com-
pact would grant the United States permission to bring nuclear-pow-
ered or nuclear-capable vessels into Palau despite a provision in its
constitution that nuclear warfare materials should not be brought into
the territory without the special consent of the Palauan people. De-
bate in the Palauan plebiscite campaign also focused on the possibility
that the United States would build military bases on the island of
Babeldaop and on the question of the adequacy of the United States'
financial assistance to Palau under the Compact of Free Associa-
tion.226 The United States is generally perceived as viewing Palau as a
remote, contingent military base in the event that it might someday
lose its military bases in the Philippines, 227 as well as a likely site for
224. Complete rejection of the proposed arrangements would almost certainly result in the
sort of withdrawal from Security Council review that was witnessed when the United Kingdom
refused to continue before the United Nations after its proposal for free association for the West
Indies states was rejected by the General Assembly. See Clark, Self-Determination and Free
Association, supra note 43, at 60-64; J. CRAWFORD, supra note 23, at 374-75.
225. Such an agreement would place an obligation on the United States to negotiate for
renewal on an intermittent basis, perhaps every twenty-five years. While the financial leverage of
the United States makes it likely that renewal would occur, the opportunity to reconsider the
arrangement would offer more respect for the sovereignty of the new states.
226. See A. RANNEY & H. PENNIMAN, supra note 113, at 36-37.
227. See Compact of Free Association, 1988: Hearings on S.J Res. 231 Before the Senate
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military training or supply facilities.228 The most significant debate,
however, arose because of Palau's constitutional restrictions on the im-
portation of nuclear and other hazardous materials into its territory.
The Constitution of Palau provides in article II, section 3:
Major governmental powers including but not limited to defense, se-
curity, or foreign affairs may be delegated by treaty, compact or other
agreement between the sovereign Republic of Palau and another sover-
eign nation or international organization, provided such treaty, compact
or agreement shall be approved by not less than two/thirds (2/3) of the
members of each house of the Olbiil Era Kelulau and by a majority of
the votes cast in a nationwide referendum conducted for such purpose,
provided that any such agreement which authorizes use, testing, storage
or disposal of nuclear, toxic chemical, gas or biological weapons in-
tended for use in warfare shall require approval of not less than three
fourths (3/4) of the votes cast in such referendum.
Another provision of the Palauan constitution contains a more general
prohibition against the use, testing, storage or disposal of the prohib-
ited materials within the territory. 229 These two constitutional provi-
sions reflect a well-established view by Palauans opposing the presence
of military armaments and nuclear materials in their territory.230 The
first nuclear control provision appears quite prominently in the second
article of the Constitution along with two provisions reaffirming the
Constitution as the supreme law of the land.2 3' The restrictions on
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1988) (Statement of James
D. Berg, Director of Office of Freely Associated State Affairs, Department of State: "if ... we
were to leave the Philippines and to move to another area, those areas undoubtedly would be
Guam or the Northern Mariana Islands, which are north of Guam and which are U.S. soil.
Palau would play at best, from what I understand, a very tertiary role in any kind of fallback
from the Philippines"); Comment, The Compact of Free Association: An End to the Trust Terri-
tory of the Pacific Islands, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 213, 220 (1987).
228. See 55 U.N. TCOR (1655th mtg.) at 8, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1655 (1988) (Statement of U.S.
Representative Patricia Byrne before Trusteeship Council).
229. PALAU CONST. art. 13, § 6:
Harmful substances such as nuclear, chemical, gas or biological weapons intended for
use in warfare, nuclear power plants, and waste materials therefrom, shall not be used,
tested, stored, or disposed of within the territorial jurisdiction of Palau without the express
approval of not less than three-fourths (Y/4) of the votes cast in a referendum submitted on
this specific question.
Professor Clark has ascertained that art. 13, § 6 was drafted first as a general limit on the pro-
scribed activities by either Palauan authorities or the United States. Apparently, fears that the
section might be bypassed with regard to the United States through the approval of the Compact
by a simple majority vote lead to the more detailed provisions in art. 2, § 3. See 50 U.N. TCOR
(1590th mtg.) at 11, U.N. Doc. T/PV. 1590 (1986) (statement of Roger S. Clark).
230. See Gibbons v. Salii, Civ. Action No. 101-86, 1 Rep. of Palau Intrm. 333, 339-45 (App.
Div. Sept. 1986); Compact of Free Association, 1988: Hearings on S.J. Res. 231 Before the Senate
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 9-10 (1988) (statement of
Gabriela Ngirmang attributing attacks on Palau during world War 11 to the military presence of
Japanese); see also J. WEBB, supra note 43, at ch. 9 (the principal goal of the people of Palau
appears to be the prevention of the use of their lands by warring nations as occurred during
World War II).
231. PALAU CONST. art. II, § 1: "This Constitution is the supreme law of the land; § 2: Any
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nuclear materials are consistent with a later constitutional provision in
article VI which lists "conservation of a beautiful, healthful and re-
sourceful natural environment" as the first among several responsibili-
ties of the national government. The drafting history of the
Constitution reveals that the clauses prohibiting the harmful sub-
stances were adopted in part because the environment was viewed as
a "public trust of which all citizens, living and yet unborn, are
beneficiaries." 232
Attempts were made during the constitutional adoption process to
convince the people of Palau to alter the nuclear control provisions
because of the limitations thereby imposed on the United States' mili-
tary presence. A draft of the constitution which provided the govern-
ment of Palau with the power to authorize entry of United States
nuclear-capable or nuclear-powered vessels into the territory suffered a
large defeat, while two versions with the more restrictive nuclear con-
trol provisions received substantial majority approval. 23 3 The chair-
man of the Palauan commission, then negotiating the Compact of Free
Association with the United States, noted that, "[b]y rejecting the re-
vised Constitution, the people have spoken clearly in expressing their
support of a Constitution which prohibits transit of American war-
ships through Palauan waters and use of Palauan land by American
military units. '234
The Compact of Free Association originally contained provisions
which allowed the United States to bring nuclear weapons within
Palauan territory and to store other nuclear materials within Palau as
long as the storage did not endanger public health or safety. 235 As a
law, act of government, or agreement to which a government of Palau is a party, shall not con-
flict with this Constitution and shall be invalid to the extent of such conflict."
232. Gibbons v. Salii, Civ. Action No. 101-86, 1 Rep. of Palau Intrm. 333, 340 (App. Div.
Sept. 1986) (quoting Standing Committee Report No. 29, at 1-2 of the Palauan Constitutional
Convention (1979)); see also A. Boss, supra note 142, at 8-9.
233. Id. at 340-44. The first draft of the constitution with the more restrictive nuclear provi-
sions was approved by 92% of the voters but the plebiscite was rendered null by a prior act of the
Palauan legislature that withstood challenge in the courts. The second draft with the less restric-
tive nuclear prohibitions was defeated by receipt of only 31% approval. In the third plebiscite,
the original nuclear control provisions were reinstated and the constitution was approved by
78% of the voters on July 9, 1980.
234. Id. at 344 (quoting telex message of Roman Tmetuchl, Chairman of the Palau Political
Status Commission to United States Ambassador Peter Rosenblatt).
235. The original terms of the Compact were in the form of a multilateral agreement between
the United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia,
and Palau. The provision of sections 311, 312 and 314, along with a subsidiary agreement con-
cerning harmful substances, effectively granted the United States a right to bring nuclear weap-
ons and materials into Palau. See Compact for Micronesia and Marshall Islands, supra note 145;
Gibbons v. Remeliik, Civ. No. 67-83, 1 Rep. of Palau Intrm. 80, 81-83 (Palau Sup. Ct. Trial Div.
1983).
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consequence of the interaction of the Compact and the Constitutional
nuclear control provisions, the ballot in the February 1983 Palauan
plebiscite contained a question seeking a three-fourths' majority ap-
proval of section 314. Over 88% of the registered Palauans voted in
this first plebiscite2 36 with 61.4% of the voters approving the Compact
of Free Association but only 51.3% approving the section 314 grant of
permission to the United States to bring nuclear weapons into Pa-
lau.23 7 The Palauan Supreme Court subsequently ruled that Since sec-
tion 314 had not received the necessary approval, the Compact as a
whole had failed. 238
After the failure to approve the Compact in a second plebiscite on
September 4, 1984,239 the Compact was renegotiated and changed to
read in section 324:
In the exercise in Palau of its authority and responsibility under this
Title, the Government of the United States shall not use, test, store or
dispose of nuclear, toxic chemical, gas or biological weapons intended
for use in warfare and the Government of Palau assures the Government
of the United States that in carrying out its security and defense respon-
sibilities under this Title, the Government of United States has the right
to operate nuclear capable or nuclear propelled vessels and aircraft
within the jurisdiction of Palau without either confirming or denying the
presence or absence of such weapons within the jurisdiction of Palau.
The intent of the revised language was to draw a distinction between
the prohibitions on "using, testing, storage or disposal" and the "oper-
ation" of nuclear capable or powered vessels. 240 The revised Compact
received approval by 72% of voters in a plebiscite on February 21,
236. The observation has been made that the controversy over section 314 may have lead to
the very high voter turnout in Palau. A. RANNEY & H. PENNIMAN, supra note 113, at 48.
237. See Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in Palau,
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, February 1983, 50 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No. 3) at 38, U.N.
Doc. T/1851 (1983).
238. Gibbons v. Remeliik, Civ. No. 67-83, 1 Rep. of Palau Intrm. 80, 83 (Palau Sup. Ct.
Trial Div. 1983). See A. RANNEY & H. PENNIMAN, supra note 113, at 43.
239. After the failure of the Compact to receive approval in February of 1983, the United
States and Palau negotiated a bilateral agreement to eliminate section 314 and its reference to
nuclear weapons. The agreement was signed on May 23, 1984. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 99TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COMPACT OF FREE ASSOCIATION
WITH PALAU (As SIGNED MAY 23, 1984) (Comm. Print 1985). The United States took the
position that as a consequence of the general defense and security provisions in the Compact, it
would have the authority to bring nuclear materials into Palau so that the general approval of the
Compact would still require three-fourths approval. Only 66.9% of the voters approved the
Compact. See A. RANNEY & H. PENNIMAN, supra note 113, at 49-50.
240. See Compact of Free Association: Hearings on the Proposed Compact of Free Association
for Palau Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 128-30 (1986) (Statement of James R. Lilley, Deputy Asst. Secy. of
State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs).
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1986.241 Although the Palauan president certified that the Compact
had been approved based on the distinction in language, subsequent
litigation lead to a decision that since "operation" fell within the range
of restricted activity, 75% approval was still required, and the Com-
pact had therefore failed again. 242
To date, three additional plebiscites, for a total of six, have been
held in Palau in the effort to get the Palauans to grant the United
States permission to bring nuclear propelled and armed vessels into
the area.243 These additional plebiscites have taken place amid stead-
ily escalating controversy, including the violent deaths of two Palauan
presidents, 244 and a wave of violence aimed at those persons who op-
posed the Compact. 245  While a majority of Palauans have voted to
approve the Compact of Free Association in each case, the margin has
241. See Report of Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in Palau, Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, February 1986, 53 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No. 2), U.N. Doc. T/1885 (1986).
242. Gibbons v. Salii, Civ. App. No. 101-86, 1 Rep. of Palau Intrm. 333, 347-49 (App. Div.
1986).
243. In December 1986 the vote was 66% yes and 34% no. See Report of the United Nations
Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in Palau, December 1986, 54 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No. 1),
U.N. Doc. T/1906 (1987). In June 1987 the vote was 67.6% yes and 32.4% no. See Report of
the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in Palau, June 1987, 54 U.N. TCOR
Supp. (No. 2), U.N. Doc. T/1919 (1987). The August 1987 plebiscite resulted in an affirmative
vote of 73% and a negative vote of 27%. See Report of United Nations Visiting Mission to Ob-
serve the Plebiscite in Palau, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, August 1987, 54 U.N. TCOR
Supp. (No. 3) at 8, U.N. Doc. T/1920 (1987).
244. See Williams, Troubles Beset Palau, S.F. Examiner, Oct. 6, 1988, at A28, col. 1. The
first president, Hauo Remeliik, was murdered in his home, and the ensuing criminal prosecutions
were dubious in nature. The second president, Lazarus Salii, who played a leading role during
negotiations on the future of Micronesia, is reported, at least officially, to have committed sui-
cide. See Wypijewski, Broken Trust, THE NATION, Sept. 26, 1988, at 224. In the wake of the
slaying of President Remeliik, an investigation was conducted by American prosecutors and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that resulted in the conviction of three young Palauans.
The convictions were ultimately overturned by the Palauan appellate court on the basis that the
prosecution witnesses were "inherently incredible," and amid allegations that the defendants had
been framed. See Shenon, Convictions Reversed in Island Slaying, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1987, at
A16, col. 1; Malcomson, Stranger Than Paradise, 14 MOTHER JONES 19, 51-52 (1989).
245. See Compact of Free Association, 1988: Hearings on S.J. Res. 231 Before the Senate
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 10- 11 (1988) (statement of
Gabriela Ngirmang relating attacks in the form of murder of Mr. Bedor Bins, shots fired into a
home, firebombing and other intimidation); 55 U.N. TCOR (1649th mtg.) at 12-17, U.N. Doc.
T/PV.1649 (1988) (testimony of Sue Rabbitt Roff before Trusteeship Council). The incidents of
violence were verified in a report by the International Commission of Jurists which sent a mission
to Palau. The report was forwarded to the Trusteeship Council and is reprinted in U.N. Doc. T/
COM./L.396 (1988).
The accounts of violence are also summarized in a wide ranging United States General Ac-
counting Office report and its supplement that focus on Palau. See NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S.
TRUST TERRITORY: ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH PALAU'S TRANSITION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
67-70 (Report 89-182, 1989) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. TRUST
TERRITORY: ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH PALAU'S TRANSITION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 54-57
(Supplemental Report 89-1825, 1989) [hereinater GAO SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT].
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never reached the 75% majority required by the Palauan Constitu-
tion.246 The most recent effort of those parties favoring the Compact
of Free Association has been an attempt to amend the Palauan Consti-
tution to allow approval of the Compact, with its grant of permission
for the United States to operate nuclear capable or powered vessels, by
a simple majority rather than 75% of those voting. The proposed con-
stitutional amendment provided that the two constitutional nuclear
control provisions would not apply to the Compact, but would con-
tinue in full force for all other purposes. 247 On August 4, 1987, the
constitutional amendment received a majority approval from the
Palauan voters thus leading to the sixth referendum on the Compact
on August 21, 1987. The voting in that referendum produced a 73%
majority in favor of adoption. 248
The August, 1987 constitutional amendment and compact refer-
enda, however, were challenged in lawsuits by anti-Compact
groups. 249 The first lawsuit was settled by agreement of the parties250
and the second was dismissed through a combination of a motion to
dismiss by some plaintiffs and a lack of action by the other plain-
tiffs.25' Those plaintiffs who filed the motion to dismiss later charged
that they were pressured into withdrawing the lawsuit. 252 The plain-
tiffs later reinstated the second suit and it proceeded to a decision on
the merits. 253 The Supreme Court of Palau at the trial level ruled that
the August, 1987 constitutional amendment and compact referendum
were invalid for two reasons'.254 First, the amendment was conducted
under special transition provisions on the grounds that there was an
inconsistency between the Palauan Constitution and the Compact of
Free Association, and the court decided that no inconsistency existed.
Without the inconsistency and the availability of the special transition
provisions of the constitution, amendment could occur only during a
246. See supra notes 237-243 and accompanying text.
247. See Report of the United Notions Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in Palau,
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, August 1987, 54 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No. 3) at 13-21, U.N.
Doc. T/1920, (1987) (ballot included); GAO SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 245, at 52-53.
248. Report of United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in Palau, Trust Terri-
tory of the Pacific Islands, August 1987, 54 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No. 3) at 27, U.N. Doc. T/1920
(1987); GAO SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 245, at 53-59.
249. Merep v. Salii, Civ. Action No. 139-87, (Palau Sup. Ct. Trial Div. 1987); Ngirmang v.
Salii, Civ. Action No. 139-87 (1987).
250. See GAO SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 245, at 58.
251. See GAO SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 245, at 59-60.
252. See GAO SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 245, at 60.
253. Fritz v. Salii, Civ. Action No. 161-87 (Palau Sup. Ct. Trial Div. 1988), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, Civ. App. No. 8-88 (Palau Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1988). The lawsuit was recaptioned
because of a change in some plaintiffs.
254. Id. at 24-25, 27-28.
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regularly scheduled general election. The second basis for invalidation
was the fact that the amendment did not receive a three-fourths' ap-
proval in the Olbii Era Kelulau (Palauan National Congress) as re-
quired by the constitution. On appeal before the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court of Palau, the decision was affirmed in part and
reversed in part. The Appellate Division decided that the amendment
was null and void because of the failure to get the three-fourths' vote
in the Olbii Era Kelulau but that there was indeed a conflict or incon-
sistency between the constitution and the Compact. 255
The net result of the high court's decision is that the constitution
can be amended at any time under its transitional provisions, provided
that the Olbiil Era Kelulau follows the required procedure of approv-
ing by three-fourths' vote and that the amendment receives a simple
majority of popular vote, including approval in three-fourths of the 16
states.256 Since the Compact has always received more than 50% ap-
proval, one might expect that the pro-Compact forces would have pro-
ceeded to amend the constitution by proper procedural means and
then approved the Compact with a simple majority vote. The Olbiil
Era Kelulau, however, enacted a law on August 4, 1989 which reaf-
firmed the constitutional restrictions on the introduction of nuclear
materials into the territory, provided that another referendum on the
Compact shall be held between January 1 and June 30 of 1990, and
confirmed that the Compact must receive at least 75% approval to
become effective. 257
The recent referendum law reflects a resolve of the Palauan people
to respect their consitution and its commitment to protecting natural
resources. Yet the unquestioned dependency on United States eco-
nomic assistance presents the possibility that eventually the will of the
Palauan people may reluctantly, rather than freely, yield to United
States security interests. The executive and legislative branches of the
United States have continued to seek approval of the Compact, with
little indication of willingness to seek further accommodation of
Palauan constitutional dictates. 25 8
255. Id. at 14, 26.
256. Id. at 26.
257. Third Olbiil Era Kelulau, House Bill No. 3-56-3 (1989) (copy on file with Michigan
Journal of International Law).
258. The compact was essentially pre-approved by the United States Congress in Public Law
99-658 of November 4, 1986, supra note 145, subject to Approval by Palau in accordance with its
constitution and enactment of a joint resolution by the Congress. Id. at tit. 1, § 101 (d). In light
of the continued uncertainty arising of the multiple plebiscites, the House and Senate have con-
tinued to conduct hearings and consider legislation relating to the compact. The most recent
versions have added provisions that address a number of problems in Palau including the allega-
tions of improper practices in government expenditures and drug trafficking. See H.J. Res. 175,
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Regardless of how one weighs the arguments contesting the valid-
ity of the August, 1987 referenda on the constitutional amendment
and Compact of Free Association, it must be conceded that the pro-
cess leading to the nearly inevitable Palauan approval of the post-trust
relations with the United States is an item that the Security Council
should investigate while considering the termination of the Trustee-
ship Agreement. 259 Particularly relevant to such an inquiry is the fact
that the failure to approve the Compact of Free Association has re-
sulted in the United States withholding the large initial financial assist-
ance that would be due under the Compact. 26° The financial
circumstances are further complicated by the debt undertaken by the
Palauan Government in order to finance the construction of an electric
power plant that has been plagued with allegations of corrupt han-
dling.26' The default on the loan, which might have been avoided if
United States Compact funds were available, lead to litigation in
United States' courts in which Palau was held liable.262
The possibility of economic duress should be a prime matter of
Security Council consideration in reviewing the proposed termination
of the trust. Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties expressly prohibits the threat of force in procurement of a treaty;
it should follow that the improper use of economic leverage likewise
would invalidate a treaty. The issue in the case of Palauan approval of
the Compact would be whether the United States stepped across the
line from fair but hard bargaining to the use of economic coercion.
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The House approved the Resolution on June 27, 1989. See 135
CONG. REC. H3195, 3220 (daily ed. June 27, 1989).
259. The last compact referendum was deemed to have been fairly conducted by United
Nations observers but the General Accounting Office reported a number of challenges to its
validity, including the furloughing of workers just before the vote and the unequal allocation of
funding for voter education, as well as the charges of violence. See GAO SUPPLEMENTAL RE-
PORT, supra note 245, at 62-69. Previously, an independent observer mission concluded that the
pro-Compact administration had "overreached" in the December, 1986 referendum by commin-
gling of educational and propaganda efforts, uneven allocation of funds, and intimidation of some
voters. See A. Boss, supra note 142, at 100-01.
260. Upon entry into force of the Compact, Palau will receive in the first year an estimated
$148 million and a total of $478 million over the first fifteen years. In 1987, Palau received $16.7
million and in 1988 it received $27.4 million. See GAO REPORT, supra note 245, at 13, 45.
261. See GAO REPORT, supra note 245, Appendices I & II, at 74-105.
262. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 693 F.Supp. 1479 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
Through this decision and two prior opinions, the federal district court decided that the Compact
of Free Association effectively terminated the Trusteeship Agreement and rendered Palau a de
facto sovereign state despite the lack of United Nations approval, 639 F.Supp. 706, 716
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), that Palau was entitled to sovereign immunity as a basic matter but not in this
case because of waiver and the commercial activity exception, 657 F.Supp. 1475, 1477-80
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), and that although there was fraudulent misrepresentation in the transaction the
president of Palau did not rely upon the misrepresentation in proceeding with the contract. 693
F.Supp. at 1497-98.
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The question can only be resolved through a carefully conducted fac-
tual investigation.
F. Marshall Islands: Kwajalein and Nuclear Reparations
The review of the proposed termination with regard to the Repub-
lic of the Marshall Islands should focus principally on the settlement
of claims for loss of property and personal injury against the United
States government due to the nuclear tests conducted in the Marshall
Islands from 1946 to 1958. Careful consideration should also be given
to claims related to the living conditions and compensation of Mar-
shallese people displaced by the United States' acquisition of land for
the military missile testing range in the Kwajalein Atoll. The attempts
to resolve these problems in the Compact of Free Association raise a
number of concerns, including whether the United States has commit-
ted fundamental breaches of the Trusteeship Agreement through the
effective alienation of native land, whether there has been adequate
redress for any such breach, and whether the central government of
the emergent Marshall Islands state is in a position to espouse and
settle these claims.
Nuclear Tests
After the initial use of the atom bomb against Japan in the Second
World War, the United States was extremely interested in conducting
further tests to determine the potential uses for nuclear weapons. To
conduct the tests, the United States desired areas under its control
with small populations that could be relocated with some ease. The
Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands was determined to fit the needs of
the United States. 263 Resisting challenges in the United Nations Trus-
teeship Council,2 64 and asserting the propriety of using the Trust Ter-
ritory on the basis of Trusteeship Agreement provisions permitting the
closing of areas for security reasons, 265 the United States government
embarked on a program of nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands from
263. Weisgall, The Nuclear Nomads of Bikini, 39 FOREIGN POL'Y 74, 75-76 (1980).
264. See Adams, supra note 44, at 94 ("The Soviet Union and India, in particular, raised the
nuclear issue each year in the Trusteeship Council, but the United States defended its testing on
the grounds of military necessity.").
265. See 4 U.N. REV. (Sept. 1957), at 33-35 (United States at 1956 Trusteeship Council
asserting the right to test based on the Trusteeship Agreement while noting that tests had already
been conducted before execution of the agreement and that notice had been given to and accepted
by the Security Council on several occasions. The representatives of Syria, Burma, and the So-
viet Union all raised questions about the propriety of the tests. "Ivan I. Lobanov, of the USSR,
recalled his delegation's repeated warnings that nuclear tests were inadmissible in a trust terri-
tory. The warnings had gone unheeded, the tests had continued and had created many difficul-
ties for the island and adversely affected the health of the population. The USSR had
consistently maintained that a trustee must not use the possessions of his wards for his own
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1946-1958.266 The consent of the Marshallese people was at least
nominally given, but recent studies of the Bikinian problems have
raised tremendous doubt, if not certainty, that the Marshallese people
were unaware of what was happening to them.267
Nevertheless, the Marshallese people of Bikini began a forty year
sojourn as "nuclear nomads" whose homes even today are un-
habitable. 268 The people of Bikini were eventually relocated to the is-
land of Kili after suffering near starvation on Rongerik.269 Kili lacks
the natural resources to support the people who were placed there
since it has no lagoon and its violent waves prevent the fishing oppor-
tunities that were bountiful on Bikini. 270 As a result, there were peri-
ods of starvation and complete dependency on supplies of foodstuff
coming from the United States' military authorities. Recent portraits
of life on Kili describe a people virtually imprisoned on an island that
is incompatible with their traditional life style and also offers little sup-
port for a more modem life style.271 Some Bikinians were returned to
their island beginning in 1969, after assurances from the United States
government that the islands were safe, only to be evacuated again in
1978 after medical testing determined that the returnees "may have
ingested the largest amount of radiation of any known population.1 272
A fate similar to that of the Bikinians befell the people of
Enewetak who were moved to the island of Ujelang because of the
nuclear testing program. Ujelang has a land area of less than a
mile. 273 The nuclear testing program affected yet another group of
Marshallese when radioactive fallout from the Bravo test fell onto the
islands of Rongelap and Utirik on March 1, 1954.274 The inhabitants
purposes, since trusteeship is based upon the idea of unselfish aid ... Furthermore, no monetary
compensation could justify the alienation of land within a trust territory").
266. See generally Weisgall, supra note 263, at 74; see also Hills, supra note 43, at 585 n. 10.
The United States conducted 66 nuclear proving tests at Bikini and Enewetak. The takeover of
Bikini began in 1946 even before the Trusteeship Agreement became effective. See S. DE SMITH,
supra note 27, at 135.
267. See Weisgall, supra note 263, at 77-78; Radio Bikini (Crossroads Film Project Ltd.
1987); The Marshall Islands: Living with the Bomb (Film Australia 1983). The desire of the
Bikinians to return to their island was noted in the United States Congress at the time that the
Trusteeship Agreement was being considered. See 93 CONG. REC. 8732-33 (1947) (statement of
Rep. Mansfield).
268. See Weisgall, supra note 263, at 74.
269. See S. DE SMITH, supra note 27, at 135; D. MCHENRY, supra note 49, at 58.
270. See D. MCHENRY, supra note 49, at 58; see also Sager, Paradise Lost, Wash. Post, Aug.
23, 1987 (Post Magazine) at 1.
271. See Sager, supra note 270, at 12; Weisgall, supra note 263, at 82-83.
272. Weisgall, supra note 263, at 89-90.
273. See Peter v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 768, 770-71 (1984); S. DE SMITH, supra note 27, at
135.
274. See Weisgall, supra note 263, at 84; Hills, supra note 43, at 585.
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of those islands were thus exposed to the radiation and, while the
United States has made some attempts at redress, 275 the efforts at rep-
arations to the people of Rongelap and Utirik has been criticized as
inadequate and failing to ensure the well-being and long-term health
care of the exposed population. 276 The people of Rongelap were reset-
tled on their island only to evacuate again in May 1985 because of
continuing questions about the risks of exposure to radiation contami-
nants on the atoll. 277
An integral part of the Bravo testing was the taking of the land
from the people of Bikini and Enewetak for the purpose of conducting
the nuclear explosions. The propriety of an administering authority
effectively taking land from an area that was controlled under a trus-
teeship agreement is extremely questionable. 278  The taking seems in-
consistent with the tenor of the United Nations Charter provisions in
chapter XII. The taking is not provided for in any of the specific pro-
visions in the Trusteeship Agreement. Additionally, the conduct of
extremely hazardous activity in the Trust Territory also seems to be
absolutely inconsistent with the duty to "promote social advance-
ment" under article 76(b). The nuclear testing should be deemed a per
se violation of the Trusteeship Agreement and United Nations Char-
ter, similar to the determination by the International Court of Justice
that the application of apartheid in Namibia constituted an indefen-
sible, flagrant violation of the Charter. 279
Acknowledging the inability to undo any breaches of the Trustee-
ship Agreement in this regard, the reasonable course of conduct would
be for the United States to make proper reparations to those people
275. See Hills, supra note 43, at 585-86.
276. See D. MCHENRY, supra note 49, at 59-60. While McHenry suggests that the medical
treatment has been adequate, he observes that the people of Rongelap received more than
$10,000 per person while some Japanese fishermen who were caught in the same incident war-
ranted a settlement of $2.3 million or about $100,000 each; see also Malcomson, supra note 244,
at 52-53 ("From that day to this, the Rongelapese have been regularly tested by doctors .... The
Rongelapese have been afflicted with leukemia and miscarriages, given birth to malformed and
retarded children, and had their thyroids removed because of tumors.").
277. See 55 U.N. TCOR (1650th mtg.) at 4-6, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1650 (1988) (statement of
Glenn Alcalay).
278. See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO, & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS
467-69 (3d ed. 1969). While testing and alienation of land began before the formal execution of
the Trusteeship Agreement, the obligation of the United States to make reparations for the entire
course of conduct can be justified on the grounds that the United States was effectively acting as
trustee prior to formal execution. Moreover, the United States acknowledged the duty to make
reparations for the entire testing period in section 177 of the Compact of Free Association for
Micronesia and Marshall Islands, supra note 145.
279. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 15, 56-57
(Advisory Opinion of June 21).
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who have suffered physical injury and whose land has been harmed,
probably irreversibly. The United States has made some efforts at re-
dressing the harm suffered by the inhabitants of the affected islands, 280
and the Compact of Free Association, in a subsidiary agreement under
section 177, does provide for the establishment of a $150 million fund
for further payment of claims arising out of the nuclear testing.28'
This amount would grow by approximately $18 million per year for
fifteen years to a total of approximately $270 million. The settlement
agreement is designed to settle all claims arising from the testing
program.
Despite the negotiations toward this settlement, cases were filed in
United States District Courts and the Court of Claims on behalf of
8000 Marshallese residents for damages that allegedly resulted from
the United States' nuclear testing.282 Those claims that were pending
in the United States courts were said to total more than. $5 billion.283
Predictably those who held claims based upon the nuclear testing were
heard to complain that the settlement amount was too small and that
they had been denied their day in court by representatives of the Mar-
shall Islands government who had not suffered from the nuclear
testing.284
The claimants in these lawsuits have mounted an attack upon the
validity of the Compact of Free Association and section 177. The
Claims Court, however, ruled against the plaintiffs in a group of three
decisions in 1987.285 The Court addressed several issues in the lead
case of Juda v. United States, where it dismissed the action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. First, the Juda court decided that
although Security Council approval is required to terminate the Trus-
teeship Agreement dejure or formally, 286 the Trusteeship Agreement
280. See Hills, supra note 43, at 586 n.1 1.
281. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE Gov-
ERNMENT OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 177 OF THE
COMPACT OF FREE ASSOCIATION, H.R. DOC. No. 192, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 307 (1984).
282. See Antolok v. United States, 873 F.2d 369, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Juda v. United States,
13 Cl. Ct. 667, 668-69 (1987). The 14 petitions filed in the Court of Claims evolved into action
under three case names. The claims of the residents of Bikini Atoll were pursued in the case of
Juda v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 441 (1984); the claims of the people of Enewetak were handled in
the case of Peter v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 768 (1984); and all the other claims of people whose
islands were not actual test sites were consolidated in Nitol v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 405 (1985).
Separate cases were filed in the District Courts in California and the District of Columbia.
Antolok v. United States, 873 F.2d at 372.
283. See Antolok v. United States, 873 F.2d at 392 n.12 (Wald, C.J., concurring).
284. See id. at 392-93.
285. Juda v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 667 (1987); Nitol v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 690
(1987); Peter v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 691 (1987).
286. Juda v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 667, 678-82 (1987).
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has been terminated de facto with regard to the Marshall Islands. 287
In arriving at this conclusion, the court acknowledged that "[t]here
may be doubt as to the significance at international law in the Novem-
ber 3, 1986, Proclamation that the Trusteeship Agreement" had been
terminated, 28 8 but conceded its effectiveness under domestic law.
The Juda court, while noting that it was the unquestionable intent
of both parties to the Compact and the subsidiary Section 177 Agree-
ment to achieve a complete settlement of all claims, 289 also addressed
the argument that the Marshall Islands government was not in a posi-
tion to espouse the nuclear testing claims because of the rule of con-
tinuity of nationality in espousing claims. The argument asserts that
because there was no state of the Marshall Islands at the time the
injury occurred, the new state could not espouse the claims. The court
made two important observations about that issue. First, the court
reasoned that the rationale underlying the continuity principle did not
apply to the particular circumstances of the emerging state of the RMI
because there was no risk of a claimant changing nationality in an
opportunistic fashion. The Court went on to state, moreover, that the
international law in this area is "unresolved. '290 The court was cor-
rect in assessing the continuity of nationality principle as being
questionable. 29'
The Juda court found the lack of clarity surrounding the interna-
tional law to be indeterminative in the case because it ultimately con-
cluded that the effect of the Compact and the subsidiary Section 177
Agreement was to withdraw the Government's consent to be sued. 292
The only reservation within the court's decision was the possibility
that if the alternative forum provided for the plaintiffs' claims under
the Section 177 Agreement does not, in fact, yield adequate compensa-
tion, then a Fifth Amendment takings claim under the United States
287. Id. at 682-83. The court stated:
The fact that the Trusteeship Agreement has not been terminated de jure does not resolve
the issue of whether the Compact with the RMI is in effect. Actions by the RMI, the
UNTC, and the United States determine that issue. As to the RMI, the Trusteeship Agree-
ment is terminated in fact. De facto termination of the Trusteeship Agreement may be
accomplished piecemeal, with termination de jure to be deferred until all four parts of the
trust territory are brought to a status where the capacity for self-government is recognized.
See Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 639 F.Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
288. See Juda v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. at 683.
289. Id. at 684.
290. Id. at 685-86.
291. See Antolok v. United States, 873 F.2d 369, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Wald, C.J., concur-
ring); I. BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 481-82.
292. Juda v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 667, 690 (1987); accord Antolok v. United States, 873
F.2d 369, 375 (D.C. Cir. 1989) The court opinion of Judge Sentelle went on to reason in dictum
that the court would also lack jurisdiction on grounds of the political question doctrine. Id. at
379-84.
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Constitution might be had. 293 Subsequently, the Bikini plaintiffs have
agreed to a dismissal with prejudice of their appeal based upon the
creation of a $90 million Resettlement Trust Fund by act of Con-
gress.294 The other Marshall Islands nuclear injury claimants appear
to have come near to the end of the road in the United States courts by
virtue of a decision in the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals affirming
the Juda Court decisions.295
There was some sentiment in the pro-Compact groups that section
177 reflected as much as the Marshall Islands could hope for in the
way of a settlement. 296 One can guess that the people of Bikini may
have accepted the latest settlement offer based upon a similar feeling
that it was as much as could be hoped for under the domestic law of
the United States. This view ignores the fact that the termination of
the Trusteeship Agreement, and thereby the settlement agreement as
well, should be subject to the approval of the Security Council and
therefore the Marshall Islands need not settle for anything less than
adequate compensation.
In addition to the fund created by the Juda settlement, the Com-
pact includes provisions for the potential rehabilitation of Bikini,
Rongelap, and the Enewetak island of Enjebi. 297 There have been
some signs, however, that the United States' settlement efforts are in-
tended to allow the United States government to wash its hands of the
situation under the theory that the Marshallese must now accept re-
sponsibility for the nuclear cleanup. 298 More troubling is the proposal
offered by Amata Kabua, President of the Republic of the Marshall
Islands, that the Bikini Atoll be considered as a possible nuclear waste
storage site for the United States and Japan. 299 The proposal has the
293. Id. at 687-89.
294. People of Bikini v. United States, 859 F.2d 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
295. People of Enewetak v. United States, 864 F.2d 134 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied 109 S.
Ct. 3198 (1989). Accord Antolok v. United States, 873 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
296. See A. RANNEY & H. PENNIMAN, supra note 113, at 91.
297. See Compact for Micronesia and Marshall Islands, supra note 145, tit. 1, § 103; see also
Wilford, Destiny of Bikini Is Again at the Mercy of Technology, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1988, at C 1,
col. 2. Congress has continued its assessments through the Bikini Atoll Rehabilitation Commit-
tee which has studied the feasibility and cost of cleaning and resettling the islands. The Commit-
tee has identified three methods which vary in cost and predicted effectiveness: removal of
topsoil, salt water drenching of the soil, and potassium treatment of the soil.
298. See Wilford, For Pacific's Atomic Nomads, A Symbolic Ground-Breaking, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 10, 1988, at 1, col. 1 (quoting Howard Hills, Navy and State Department lawyer, and Larry
Morgan of the Department of Interior as stating that it is now time for a "once and for all"
settlement and for the Bikinians to become "self-reliant").
299. See Wilford, Atom Waste: Worth Money to Bikinians?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1988, at
A21, col. 1. The proposal found some positive reception in the United States Congress. See id.
Representative Barbara F. Vucanovich of Nevada urged the Reagan Administration to open
negotiations with the Republic of the Marshall Islands as an alternative to considering storage
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attractive feature of generating even greater income for the central
Marshallese government at the sacrifice of the hope of the Bikinians
for a return to the atoll. The possibility of the permanent loss of land
as a result of a chain of events set in motion by the administering
authority of a trust should cause some concern in the context of a
Security Council review.
Missile Testing on the, Kwajalein Atoll
A substantial parallel exists between the treatment of the people on
Kwajalein and those of Bikini and Enewetak. The United States mili-
tary chose the Kwajalein Atoll as the target site for test missiles
launched from military bases in the continental United States. In or-
der to conduct the tests, the people of Kwajalein had their land taken
and were relocated to the island of Ebeye. As with the people of Bi-
kini and Enewetak, there is the basic question of whether the taking of
land is consistent with United States' obligations under the United Na-
tions Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement. 300
The Kwajalein Atoll has been described as the largest atoll in the
world and the chief pride of the people of the Marshall Islands. 301 The
people of Kwajalein, like the people of Bikini and Enewetak, were
relocated to a place that had inadequate natural resources to support
the new inhabitants - the island of Ebeye. Ebeye is widely known as
"the slum of the Pacific" and the worst eyesore in the Trust Terri-
tory.30 2 A recent visitor described Ebeye as having a population of
about 10,000, in an area where perhaps twenty people had once lived,
and under conditions such as "ten people to a one-room house, fre-
quent suicides, rampant alcoholism, derisory health care and worse
education, gangs, teen pregnancies, and so forth .... ,,303
sites in the state of Nevada and the Congress had previously adopted legislation voicing similar
sentiment.
300. See supra notes 278-279 and accompanying text.
301. See W. PRICE, AMERICA'S PARADISE LOST 55 (1956).
302. See D. McHENRY, supra note 49 (asserting that "all agree that Ebeye is an overcrowded
and disgusting slum right in the middle of 'paradise.' Lamented one American official 'The
stench is so bad you can hardly walk the street.' "); Hollis, S.F. Examiner, June 21, 1987, at A13,
col. 3; Mather, 'Star Wars'Atoll: Slum in the Pacific, S.F. Examiner, Nov. 9, 1986, at A 17, col. I
("Ebeye consists of some 76 acres of disease-ridden dirt with hardly any open space. Many hovels
are constructed out of packing cases, with rusty corrugated metal roofs held in place by old tires
and timber collected from the beach .... Although there is no high school in Ebeye, Marshal-
lese children are barred from the American High School at Kwajalein. On Ebeye, classes of up
to sixty are common in the island's public school."); Patterson, At the Birth of Nations, 170
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC 460, 467, 470 (1986) (contrasting Ebeye's squalor, pocked asphalt lane,
wall-to-wall sheetmetal and cinder block houses without space for grass or trees, children roam-
ing in streets as playgrounds and lack of grocery stock with Kwajalein's golfing condominium
appearance).
303. Malcomson, supra note 244, at 19, 52-53.
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While 2000 acres of Kwajalein Atoll is devoted to missile activity
and the 2600 Americans who work there, 9000 Marshallese are left to
live on sixty-five acres of Ebeye. Thus, the Marshallese population
density is 100 times greater than the American. 30 4 There has been an
acute lack of fresh water, the medical facilities have been grossly inad-
equate, and the housing has been insufficient to satisfy the needs of the
Kwajalein people. 30 5 In 1962, a polio epidemic in Ebeye lead to reve-
lations about the primitive state of health services and spurred Presi-
dent Kennedy to take corrective action. 30 6
During the United States' administration of the Trust Territory, it
has invested billions of dollars in the Kwajalein Missile Range testing
area. The Kwajalein facility has also become an important test facility
for the Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars" program, that was
begun during the Reagan Administration. 30 7  The importance of the
Kwajalein testing range to the United States military is such that the
islanders from Kwajalein should be well paid for the surrender of their
land .308
With the prospect of the Trusteeship's end in sight, the United
States has held a great interest in assuring the continued use of the
facility under favorable conditions. Not surprisingly, then, the Com-
pact between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the United
States provides for long-term continued rental of the Kwajalein facil-
ity. The 1983 plebiscite featured debate on whether the rental ar-
rangements were proper in the amount of the rental fee, the length of
the lease and the contracting parties. 30 9 Some Marshallese also op-
posed the Compact on the grounds that these provisions abridged the
basic land rights of the Kwajalein natives who had been relocated to
304. See 53 U.N. TCOR (1605th mtg.) at 6-7, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1605 (1986) (statement of
Mr. Balos before the Trusteeship Council).
305. See id. at 6-10 (statement of Mr. Balos before the Trusteeship Council).
306. R. GALE, supra note 45, at 102 (citing Don Oberdorfer, America's Neglected Colonial
Paradise, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Feb. 29, 1964, at 31-32).
307. See 55 U.N. TCOR (1650th mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1650 (1988) (statement of
Glenn Alcalay citing statements of Colonel Richard Chapman in public hearings in March 1988
explaining plans to expand Kwajalein to conduct SDI testing); Hollis, supra note 302; Mather,
supra note 302; Patterson, supra note 302, at 467, 470.
308. See D. MCHENRY, supra note 49, at 73. "The military considers Kwajalein a 'must' for
the United States due to the expense of the equipment already there. The facilities are seen as
'unique' and 'extremely difficult to duplicate.' "
309. The Land Use Agreement concluded under Title One, section 103(d) of the Compact
for the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands provides for
annual payments of $9 million for an initial thirty year period. This reflects an increase from $7
million per year and change from two or three year leases. The Compact also changes the parties
to the rental agreement, making it a contract between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and
the United States as opposed to previous lease agreements with the land owners. See H.R. Doc.
192, 99th Cong., 2d Sess, 349 (1984); A. RANNEY & H. PENNIMAN, supra note 113, at 92.
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Ebeye. 310
The Compact of Free Association provides for improvement of
conditions on Ebeye 31t and there are presently projects underway that
will help. 31 2 Nonetheless, there have been assertions that the present
levels of funding will never adequately address the social problems. 31 3
There have also been reports that rent money intended by the United
States government for land owners from Kwajalein has been diverted
by the central government leaders.31 4
The Compact, including these post-trust arrangements, was put to
vote in a September, 1983 plebiscite. 83.5% of registered voters par-
ticipated with 58% of the voters approving the Compact of Free Asso-
ciation. It is noteworthy that there was strong sentiment for free
association even among those opposing the Compact, but with better
terms on nuclear claims settlement and the rental of the Kwajalein
military facility. 315
In reviewing the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement with
particular regard to the Marshall Islands, the concern of the Security
Council should be to ensure that the post-trust arrangement does jus-
tice to the inhabitants of the Marshall Islands as a whole, with due
respect for the minority comprised of the Bikini, Enewetak, Utirik and
Rongelap residents and Kwajalein landowners. The claims of the is-
landers that proved unsuccessful in United States courts should be
considered anew in the international forum where there is no preemp-
tion by the acts of the executive and legislative branches of the United
States government. The espousal issue should also be addressed, but
one would suppose that the academic aspect of the question is not
particularly important to the landowners. What is more important to
310. See A. RANNEY & H. PENNIMAN, supra note 113, at 88.
311. Section 103(d) of the Compact authorizes the President to make loans and grants to the
Kwajelein Atoll Development Authority for improvement of Ebeye and the rest of the atoll.
312. Hollis, supra note 302, col. 3 (reporting recent completion of huge electrical power plant
and water desalination plant that will provide every home on Ebeye with running water and
improve sanitation conditions); Malcomson, supra note 244, at 52-53 (citing progress toward
making Ebeye into a modern city by building sidewalks and asphalt roads, housing and commu-
nity health center, and with a power plant and water system already in place); see also Compact
of Free Association: Hearings on National Security Implications of the Compact of Free Associa-
tion Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands and National Parks of the House Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 242-52, 308-30 (1984) (memoranda describing origins
and capital improvement plans of the Kwajelein Atoll Development Authority).
313. See 53 U.N. TCOR (1605th mtg.) U.N. Doc. T/PV.1605 (1986) (statement of Mr.
Balos before the Trusteeship Council).
314. See Hollis, supra note 302 (citing congressional staff report issued by House Public
Lands Subcommittee); Malcomson, supra note 244, at 54; 53 U.N. TCOR (1605th mtg.) at 16-
17, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1605 (1986) (statement of Mr. Balos before the Trusteeship Council).
315. See A. RANNEY & H. PENNIMAN, supra note 113, at 93-94.
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the claimants is that the amount of settlement and method of disburse-
ment be fair and equitable.
The strategic trust concededly gave the United States greater dis-
cretion with regard to the administration of the Trust Territory. At
the end of the trust, one cannot simply accept that the United States
had greater discretion. Instead, one must insure that the rights of the
Micronesian people under the United Nations Charter and other inter-
national law obligations are properly respected. When the matter is
considered by the Security Council, particular care should be taken to
insure that past shortcomings are fully addressed and that payments
for future use of lands are more than minimally adequate.
Economic, Social and Educational Conditions
Article 76 provides that a basic objective of the Trusteeship System
is the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the
inhabitants of the trust territories.3 16 In practice, the General Assem-
bly and Trusteeship Council have examined other trust territories to
determine not only the degree of political advancement toward self-
government or independence but also to evaluate the achievement of
the other objectives. 31 7 Recent visiting missions of the Trusteeship
Council have generally approved the United States' administration of
the Trust Territory, 318 but it will yet fall to the Security Council to
concur or disagree with that judgment. A very difficult aspect of mak-
ing such an assessment is the lack of clear standards by which to assess
the level of achievement. The United States representative to the
Trusteeship Council recently stated that neither the Trusteeship
Agreement nor the United Nations Charter provides a "yardstick" by
which economic development can be measured.319 Nonetheless, the
316. Supra note 36.
317. See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 278, 467-69 (3d ed. 1969)
(stating that the General Assemby and Trusteeship Council have shown particular interest in
protecting land rights, economic development, labor conditions, promotion of human rights and
improvement in medical and health services). But see Macdonald, supra note 8, at 253-55 (as-
serting that consistent with General Assemby Resolution 1514 provision that lack of political,
economic, social or educational development should not be "pretext for delaying independence"
those factors have not been important in trust termination).
318. See Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Palau, Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands, 1988, 56 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 24-26, U.N. Doec. T/1935 (1989); Report of the
United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1985, 53 U.N. TCOR
Supp. (No. I) at 3-5 U.N. Doc. T/1878 (1986); Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1982, 50 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No. 2) U.N. Doc. T/1850
(1983). The 1989 mission limited its visit to Palau in accordance with the Council's and United
States' position that the Trusteeship Agreement has been fulfilled with respect to other parts of
the Trust Territory.
319. See 56 U.N. TCOR (1670th mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1670, at 7 (1989) (statement of
U.S. Representative Patricia Byrne). Byrne was speaking with particular reference to economic
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Security Council would be seized with making an assessment of eco-
nomic and other development during the Trusteeship. The effect of
such a review is not likely to be determinative of whether free associa-
tion or commonwealth arrangements should be approved, as a general
matter, but may warrant some modification in post-trust agreements
to address any failure in these areas during the period of the trust.
The observation has been advanced that the United States' interest
in Micronesia has been entirely for security reasons:
[Sihe has unilaterally transformed the Pacific Islands Mandate she had
taken over from Japan into a "strategic Trust Territory.". . . [I]n prac-
tice, the territory has provided naval and military bases for the adminis-
tering authority, as well as a field for the testing of nuclear weapons.
More of a national strategic area than this trust territory would be hard
to imagine.320
In fact, United States leaders were quite candid in stating that the
islands were desired only for security reasons. 32' The acknowledg-
ment of United States motives is usually accompanied by charges that
the United States has failed in its obligation to promote the economic,
educational and social advancement of the Micronesian people. The
fact that the United States had no interest in exploiting any economic
interest in the Trust Territory may have indeed worked against eco-
nomic development.
During the first two decades of its administration, the primary
United States policy emphasis was to avoid disturbance of the indige-
nous culture and thereby allow the native culture to develop on its
own.322 Both the failure to cause new development and the crumbling
of the existing infrastructure contributed to the nicknaming of Micro-
nesia as the "Rust Territory. ' 323 The 1961 visiting mission of the
Trusteeship Council was highly critical of the American administra-
development in Palau but her statement also has relevance to judging all areas of development
throughout the Trust Territory.
320. C. TOUSSAINT, supra note 16, at 250.
321. See 93 CONG. REC. 8733 (1947) (statement of Rep. Mansfield: "We have no concealed
motives because we want these islands for one purpose only and that is national security. Eco-
nomically they will be a liability, socially they will present problems, and politically we will have
to work out a policy of administration."); Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of the Pacific
Islands.- Hearing on S.J. Res. 143 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 18 (1947) (statement of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of Staff: "They are of very
little economic value. Our sole interest in them is security.").
322. See D. MCHENRY, supra note 49, at 8; Macdonald, supra note 8, at 236-37.
323. See H. NUFER, supra note 45, at 121-22; S. DE SMITH, supra note 27, at 136-37. The
"rust territory" nickname may also have resulted from the importation into Micronesia of corru-
gated iron roofs for use on American built buildings. The iron roofs were expected to have a life
of eight years but began to rust after only one year so that throughout the Trust Territory one
could find "a symphony of different shades of brown according to the degree of rust." W. PRICE,
supra note 301, at 98-100.
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tion, including complaints that the economy had been "allowed to re-
main static for too long" and that there never had been a "coordinated
plan for economic development. ' 324 The extreme nature of the eco-
nomic dependency is reflected in the fact that the aid from the United
States has often made up more than 90% of the revenues received by
the Micronesian governments and never less than 80%.325
While Micronesia has the agricultural and marine natural re-
sources to sustain a subsistence economy, the islands do not lend
themselves to easy economic development. 326 A primary difficulty is
that Micronesia consists of small, sparsely populated islands that are
widely dispersed. 327 The natural resources that might be used for eco-
nomic development are quite limited, except for marine resources
which are believed to contain large amounts of commercially valuable
fish. 328 The fishery resources and the licensing of foreign fishing ves-
sels are even more valuable in light of the emergence of a standard 200
mile exclusive economic zone that can be claimed by the states in Mi-
cronesia. 329 The marine resources may also yield valuable minerals
324. R. GALE, supra note 45, at 100-01; Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1961, 27 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No. 2), U.N. Doc. T/1582
(1961). The 1956 visiting mission offered similar criticism of the failure of the Administering
Authority "to provide sufficient funds for essential economic and social development." See The
Challenge in the Pacific Islands, 3 U.N. REV. 46, 47-48 (1956).
325. See A. RANNEY & H. PENNIMAN, supra note 113, at 2; see also D. NEVIN, THE AMERI-
CAN TOUCH IN MICRONESIA 30 (1977) ("The money [United States contribution to the Trust
Territory budget] accounts for more than 90% of the Trust Territory budget [of about $72 mil-
lion]. While the total budget figure includes some $5 million raised locally, the source for most
of that $5 million is income taxes paid on salaries which are paid from the [United States contri-
bution], and business taxes that come largely from the same source. Thus, directly and indi-
rectly, the United States not only supports Micronesia-in effect, it is Micronesia's fiscal life.
There are estimates - and no one really knows - that in real terms the United States supplies
about 98% of Micronesia's funding.").
326. United Nations Visiting Missions have concluded that "complete self-sufficiency for Mi-
cronesia, except at a standard of living which would be unacceptable to most of its people, [is]
doubtless unobtainable ...." Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands, 1976, 43 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No. 3) at 41, U.N. Doc. T/1774 (1976). See
D. MCHENRY, supra note 49, at 7-8.
Economic advancement was experienced during the period of Japanese administration be-
tween the wars and was ceased only by the advent of World War II. The Japanese-led economic
development has been described as artificial because it relied upon alien rather than native labor.
Severe economic problems existed at the time that the United States assumed trust responsibili-
ties at the end of World War 11. The Japanese efforts had been negated by the deportation of the
Japanese, Koreans, Okinawans, and Formosans who had come to outnumber the native islanders
in some parts of Micronesia. See S. DE SMITH, supra note 27, at 133-34; Louis, supra note 44, at
83; H. NUFER, supra note 45, at 119-20.
327. See S. DE SMITH, supra note 27, at 134. In this respect, Micronesia is quite similar to
other island states in the South Pacific, none of which may ever truly arrive at economic indepen-
dence. See Kristof, Pacific Isles: Paradise Lost In Economics, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1987, at 15,
col. 1.
328. See C. HEINE, supra note 31, at 4; see Dolan, supra note 220. Federated States of Mi-
cronesia now earns about $4 million per year from foreign commercial fishing licensing.
329. See R. GALE, supra note 45, at 189-91.
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when deep-sea mining becomes feasible. 330 Other economic alterna-
tives include tourism, 33 ' handicrafts, agriculture and shipping services.
Also, the islands may become involved in the delivery of energy re-
sources to Japan and other industrial nations, serving either as a place
for oil storage and processing plants along the route from the Middle
East, or as a place to produce energy through the absorption of hydro-
gen from sea water. 332
During the United States administration of Micronesia, the failure
to encourage economic development looms as the biggest United
States failure. 333 Not only did the United States not invest effectively
into the economic development of Micronesia, but it also excluded
other foreign investment. 334 The lack of a real effort to develop the
economy has fostered the view that the United States has engaged in a
"conspiracy to create a situation in which Micronesia could never
stand alone and thus would be bound to the patron nation's strategic
needs. ' ' 335 Whether dependency was the design or not, it has been the
effect. Recent reports indicate that unemployment is incredibly high
in most of the Trust Territory, 336 while United States aid continues to
constitute a disproportionate share of budgets with no prospect for
financial independence during the terms of the Compacts.337
Reviews of the general social conditions have noted the appearance
330. See id. at 191.
331. Most of the tourism business goes to the Northern Mariana Islands with only about
25% of tourists traveling to other areas. See H. NUFER, supra note 45, at 140. Generally speak-
ing, however, tourism may not be as great a potential as is generally thought due to the remote
location and the lack of hotel development and things for tourists to do. See D. NEVIN, supra
note 325, at 195; Dolan, supra note 220.
332. See R. GALE, supra note 45, at 182-89. The somewhat desperate search for revenue
sources has lead the Marshall Islands to consider not only storing nuclear waste, see supra note
299, but also the storage of non-toxic waste. See Clark, Marshall Isles Home for U.S. Waste,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 4, 1989, at 4.
333. See D. HUGHES & S. LINGENFELTER, supra note 112, at 200.
334. See J. WEBB, supra note 43, at ch. 10.
335. D. NEVIN, supra note 325, at 26.
336. Although the value of unemployment statistics should not be overvalued in light of the
basic subsistence society structure, see Report of U.N. Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands, 1985, U.N. Doc. T/1978, at 3 (1985), the rates are still troubling. The unem-
ployment rate at Kwajalein in the Republic of the Marshall Islands has been reported to be as
high as 88%, see Hollis, supra note 302 (citing congressional staff report issued by House Public
Lands Subcommittee); the unemployment rate in the Federated States of Micronesia is esti-
mated to be at 80% with two-thirds of those employed working for the government. Dolan,
supra note 220. In contrast, the unemployment rate in the Northern Marianas has been reported
to be almost 10%, with the government employing about one-half of the resident population. See
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS,
FACT SHEET 3 (1989).
337. In the Federated States of Micronesia, the United States aid constitutes 90% of the
budget and the optimistic projection is that at the end of the 15 years under the Compact the
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of a substantial suicide rate338 along with other drastic changes in the
culture, including alcohol abuse and violent crimes such as robbery,
assault, and rape as Micronesia has been subjected to greater amounts
of western cultural influence or dislocation. 339
On a more positive note a native Micronesian writer has observed
that:
American education has been the most revolutionary of all the influences
operative in Micronesia since the end of World War II, and indeed since
the imposition of Western rule. It has been the chief instrument in the
creation of a class destined to rule the future of Micronesia. Western
education has created this new Micronesian elite.340
This education program has been spread throughout the islands
over the past twenty years and stands in stark contrast to intentional
programs of previous eras that were designed to restrict the political
and social advance of the Micronesian people. It has been estimated
that about 50% of Micronesian young people eventually graduate
dependency may be reduced to 70% or 80%. Dolan, supra note 220 (quoting Michael Wygant,
the United States representative to FSM).
In contrast, consider the statement of Benjamin Manglona, President of the NMI Senate,
before the Trusteeship Council:
We have also enjoyed many material benefits from our association with the United States.
Our gross island product is up 100 per cent over the last decade. Our local internal revenues
over that same period are up from $5 million to $72.4 million. A stable investment climate
has spurred development in our islands. We see the possibility of economic self-sufficiency
on the horizon."
56 U.N. TCOR (1663d mtg.) at 23, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1663 (1989). To the extent that Senator
Manglona's optimistic report and forecast is accurate, one may wonder if what has been done in
the Northern Marianas might not be achieved to some degree in the rest of the Trust Territory.
338. See 55 U.N. TCOR (1650th mtg.) at 6-7, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1650 (1988) (statement of
Glenn Alcalay, citing the work of Professor Donald Rubenstein of the University of Hawaii who
has identified a "suicide subculture" among young Micronesian males with the rate among the
general population among the highest to be found in the world); Micronesia's Male Suicide Rate
Defies Solution, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1983, at A24, col. I ("Suicides among males between the
ages of 15 and 30 are so prevalent that they have become an accepted method of problem-solving
in the island societies where harmony is highly prized, according to the Rev. Francis Hezel and
Dr. Don Rubinstein ... [tiheir figures indicated annual suicides in the United States-adminis-
tered Trust Territory of the Pacific, where about 120,000 people live, are averaging about 27 for
100,000 people. That rate is twice as high as the suicide rate in the United States, they said.
When broken down by geographical regions and age group, some figures are even more dramatic.
'The general suicide rate for Truk is 40 per 100,000,' Father Hezel said. 'The rate for Trukese
males between 15 and 25 is a startling 250 per 100,000. This is 20 times the youth rate in the
United States.").
339. See, e.g., 55 U.N. TCOR (1650th mtg.) at 6-7, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1650 (1988) (statement
of Glenn Alcalay that the great majority of social scientists place blame for advent of violence in
Micronesia on the Administering Authority); D. NEVIN, supra note 325, at 34-35, 189-91; Do-
lan, supra note 220 ("Health care has improved [in Federated States of Micronesia] but rates of
alcoholism, suicide and stress-related diseases have risen."); Patterson, supra note 302, at 471:
[d]espite an immense flow of American money, effort, and goodwill, many islands still suffer
from a shortage of water and power, poor to nonexistent goods, struggling educational sys-
tems, meager public services, few job opportunities, limited natural resources, and, at the
top of the list, inadequate health care. Much blame must be laid to the region's geography,
especially difficult when it comes to delivering adequate health services.
340. C. HEINE, supra note 31, at 37-38.
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from high school. 341 Unfortunately, the education program appears to
have been poorly adapted to suiting the Micronesians with the skills
that build local economies. 342 Still, the efforts at education must be
considered a positive aspect of the United States administration that
has paid particular dividends by preparing the indigenous people to
engage in the political process by which their future will be
determined.
The United States fostered movement toward self-government
through the establishment of a system of local municipalities which
built upon the remnants of traditional social structures of the is-
lands. 343 The promotion of self-governance constituted a distinct im-
provement over prior foreign administrations which had largely
denied such opportunities.344 The creation of the Congress of Micro-
nesia in 1964 was a significant development because it afforded the
people of Micronesia their first forum in which progress toward post-
trust relations could be considered, and where the United States could
be questioned with regard to its administration of the Trust Terri-
tory.345 During the course of the establishment of the post-trust gov-
ernments, all four of the political entities have adopted constitutional
structures. These constitutions have incorporated traditional social
structures into western-styled governments. 346
On balance the United States can claim some success in fostering
educational advancement and thereby the ability of Micronesians to
effectuate self-government and can place some blame for the lack of
economic development and social advancement on the geographic and
other immutable circumstances of Micronesia. Indeed, the United
States is likely to argue, with supporting statistics, that the level of
economic development and the standard of living in the Trust Terri-
tory is higher than in other former trusteeships at the time of termina-
tion. 347 Still, the lack of a coherent economic plan throughout the
341. See H. NUFER, supra note 45, at 210-11.
342. See Hirayasu, supra note 52, at 498.
343. See H. NUFER, supra note 45, at 47-48; C. HEINE, supra note 31, at 6-7.
344. See Hirayasu, supra note 52, at 497-98.
345. See C. HEINE, supra note 31, at 6-9; Macdonald, supra note 8, at 236-37 (citing Depart-
ment of Interior Order No. 2882, Sept. 28, 1964). For a thorough treatment of the origins and
evolution of the Congress of Micronesia, see N. MELLER, THE CONGRESS OF MICRONESIA
(1969).
346. See A. RANNEY & H. PENNIMAN, supra note 113, at 3-4.
347. Patricia Byrne, U.S. Representative to the Trusteeship Council, recently made such a
statement with regard to Palau and the same could certainly be said about the other new states.
The available statistics indicate that the standard of living is higher in Micronesia than in former
Trust Territories such as Somalia, Rwanda, or Burundi. The United States Government publica-
tion, The World Factbook 1988, provides the following data: Republic of Marshall Islands -
1981 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was $1000 per capita; Federated States of Micronesia -
Fall 1989]
Michigan Journal of International Law
trusteeship should be considered a breach of trusteeship obligations.
As with other problems related to administration or termination of the
Trusteeship, the proper response to such a breach is not to delay the
emergence of the new states into self-governance. Rather, the solution
readily available is to require that post-trust arrangements include
provisions to correct the deficiencies, to the extent possible. Security
Council approval of termination should be conditioned upon the inclu-
sion of such corrective provisions.
CONCLUSION
"The United States Representatives took a leading part in the Gen-
eral Assembly in bringing about the establishment of the Trusteeship
System in the face of sharp disagreements and other major difficulties
that might have caused indefinite delay. The United States will support
further steps during the coming year toward strengthening the Trustee-
ship System.
"America has long been a symbol of freedom and democratic pro-
gress to peoples less favored than we have been. We must maintain their
belief in us by our policies and our acts."-34 8
"I actually think we should be independent but that's not a popular
idea here. Where would our money come from?" 349
Several writers anticipated that the United States might attempt to
terminate the Trusteeship Agreement unilaterally if Security Council
approval did not appear to be forthcoming. 3 0 The recent conduct by
the United States in this matter appears to have proven those predic-
tions to be correct. This approach to termination is unfortunate for
several reasons. First, the circumvention of the Security Council is
clearly a breach of Trusteeship System procedure designed to protect
1983 Gross National Product (GNP) was $1300 per capita; the Republic of Palau - 1986 GDP
was $2257 per capita; and the Northern Mariana Islands - 1982 GNP was $9170 per capita. In
contrast, the book reports the following data: Burundi - 1986 GDP was $240 per capita; Came-
roon - 1987 GDP was $1230 per capita; Rwanda - 1985 GDP was $780 per capita; Somalia -
1982 GDP was $200 per capita; Papua-New Guinea - 1985 GDP was $700 per capita; Togo -
1985 GNP was $240 per capita. One might also compare other Pacific island statistics: Kiribati
- 1985 GDP was $310 per capita; Vanuata - 1986 GDP was $580 per capita; and the Cook
Islands - 1983 GDP was $1170 per capita. The Europa Year Book for 1987 offers similar
estimates.
Two related observations should be made before overvaluing these statistics. First, the statis-
tics for the Trust Territory are undoubtedly inflated by U.S. assistance; without U.S. assistance
the standards would fall. Second, the statistics should not be the only measure of "fostering"
economic development; an artifically high GNP may indeed conceal failure to foster economic
development.
348. H. Truman, Message to the Congress Transmitting First Annual Report on U.S. Partici-
pation in the United Nations (Feb. 5, 1947), reprinted in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES: HARRY S. TRUMAN 118, 121.
349. Malcomson, supra note 244, at 19 (quoting Mitch Pangelian, Marianas politician.).
350. See Macdonald, supra note 8, at 258-60; Clark, Self-Determination and Free Association,
supra note 43, at 83-86; D. McHENRY, supra note 49, at 50.
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the welfare of non-self-governing peoples. Second, it reflects a contin-
ued lack of confidence and a breach of faith in the United Nations
system by the United States.351 Considering the role of the United
States in the founding of the United Nations and its status as a preemi-
nent leader in the conduct of nations, this lack of faith can only dimin-
ish the efficacy of the international body.
A third and most unfortunate aspect of the attempt at unilateral
termination is that it may be unnecessary for the accomplishment of
United States objectives. If the United States presents to the Security
Council a proposal for termination that is substantively fair and has
the unanimous support of the Administering Authority and the gov-
ernments of each of the emerging states, it would be difficult for the
Security Council, or particularly any single member, to withhold ap-
proval and thwart the exercise of the right of self-determination by the
Micronesian peoples. Still, the United States would need to take steps
to correct current difficulties with the Northern Marianas and Palau
before any such united front could be put before the Security Council.
The United States must concede greater right to internal self-govern-
ment before the Northern Marianas Covenant can satisfy relevant
United Nations standards and must be willing to offer further accom-
modations of Palauan nuclear restrictions if the Compact does not
gain approval of the people. Further, the United States might be re-
quired to make some adjustments in the general nature of the compact
arrangements, such as foregoing a perpetual right of strategic denial in
the associated states and increasing its commitment to long-term
assistance programs designed to effectively develop the entire Trust
Territory in areas of economic self-sufficiency, medical services, and
similar concerns.
A central purpose of the United Nations Charter provisions relat-
ing to non-self-governing territories is the prevention of exploitation
by powerful nations. 35 2 The line between the proper use of bargaining
power and exploitation, however, is often difficult to define. In the case
of the United States and the emerging states of the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands, there are indications that the line may have been
crossed on some issues, particularly in light of the fiduciary duty on
351. Supra note 9.
352. See Comment, International Law and Dependent Territories. The Case of Micronesia, 50
TEMP. L.Q. 58, 80 (1976) (citing 0. ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARA-
TION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 166-67 (1966): "The interests or
concerns which have provided the foundation for the law of dependent territories may be
grouped into two general categories: first, the concern over the proper international status for
dependent territories; and second, the concern that people within the territories be protected
from exploitation by larger, more powerful nations.").
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the part of the United States as trustee of the Micronesians. 353
The principles of non-exploitation and respect for the freely ex-
pressed wishes of non-self-governing people should guide the Security
Council in reviewing the proposed termination of the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands. Perhaps through a change of conscience on the
part of the United States Government or a response by the Trusteeship
Council or Security Council to the many petitions of the people of
Micronesia for assistance, the United States can be brought to follow
the proper legal procedure and submit its proposed termination of the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to international review. The
present and future welfare of the people of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands is at stake and warrants the honoring of the "sacred
trust" taken by the United States in an act of faith some forty years
ago.
353. See 54 U.N. TCOR (1629th mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doe. T/PV.1629 (1987) (statement of
Ibedul Yutaka Gibbons, traditional Palauan high chief: "I believe that the United States of
America, the Administering Authority, and possibly the most powerful nation in the world
should maintain the highest level of integrity as a Trustee. It should not even allow any appear-
ance of impropriety that an effort is being made to subvert the Constitution of the Republic of
Palau which was promoted by the Administering Authority in an effort to end the
Trusteeship.").
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APPENDIX A
Statement of Ambassador Warren Austin before Security Council
116th Meeting, March 7, 1947
The United States wishes to record its view that the draft trustee-
ship agreement is in the nature of a bilateral contract between the
United States, on the one hand, and the Security Council on the other.
The agreement confines itself to provisions for the powers, duties, and
responsibilities of the administering authority. Note the difference: it
is the Charter that defines the duties, the powers, and the responsibili-
ties of the Security Council, which is one party to this agreement; but
it is this agreement which is necessary in order to define the powers
that the United States may have if it becomes the trustee under the
agreement. That is what we are dealing with: what power shall the
mandatary [sic] have: what power shall the trustee exercise?
Thus Article 15 of the draft agreement defines the action which
would be required of the administering authority with respect to
changes in the agreement, and does not attempt to define the responsi-
bilities of the Security Council in this respect. The latter are already
defined; they are in the Charter; and no amendment or termination
can take place without the approval of the Security Council. There is
no need to repeat them here, though there would be no harm in doing
so. If you want to make a change just for the sake of making a change,
the United States would see no harm at all in saying that alterations in
the terms of trusteeship can only be taken by agreement between the
United States and the Security Council ....
I have already indicated that we are not arbitrary insofar as word-
ing is concerned. Any wording that will preserve and protect the rela-
tionship between these two parties under this trusteeship agreement
will be satisfactory to the United States Government. Therefore we
suggest that if this must be changed -which we consider wholly un-
necessary - some such language as the following should be used: The
terms of the present agreement shall not be altered, amended or termi-
nated, except by agreement of the administering authority and the Se-
curity Council.
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APPENDIX B
Trusteeship Council Resolution 2183 (LII) (1986)
53 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No.3) at 14-15, U.N. Doc. T/1901
The resolution read:
The future of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
The Trusteeship Council,
Recalling the Trusteeship Agreement for the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands approved by the Security Council on 2 April 1947,
Noting that Articles 73 and 76 of the Charter of the United Nations
call upon the Administering Authorities of Trust Territories to assist
their peoples in the progressive development of their free political in-
stitutions and towards self-government or independence,
Mindful that the peoples of the Federated States of Micronesia, the
Marshall Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands and Palau have estab-
lished constitutions and democratic political institutions providing the
instruments of self-government,
Aware that political status negotiations between the Administering
Authority and the representatives of the Trust Territory began in 1969
with the aim of facilitating the progressive development of the peoples
of Micronesia towards self-government or independence as was
deemed appropriate,
Aware also that this process has been successfully completed,
Noting further the recommendation of the Visiting Mission to Trust
Territory in 1985 that termination of the trusteeship should be
achieved as soon as possible,
Having heard the statements by the elected representatives of the
Trust Territory Governments requesting early termination of the
Trusteeship Agreement, and believing this to reflect the freely ex-
pressed wishes of the people of the Trust Territory,
Conscious of the responsibility of the Security Council in respect of the
strategic areas as set out in Article 83, paragraph 1, of the Charter,
1. Notes that the peoples of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Mar-
shall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau have freely
exercised their right to self-determination in plebiscites observed by
the visiting missions of the Trusteeship Council and have chosen free
association with the United States of America in the case of the Mar-
shall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau and Com-
monwealth status in the case of the Northern Mariana Islands;
2. Requests the Government of the United States, in consultation
with the Governments of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Mar-
shall Islands, Palau and the Northern Mariana Islands, to agree on a
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date not later than 30 September 1986 for the full entry into force of
the Compact of Free Association and the Commonwealth Covenant,
and to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of that
date;
3. Considers that the Government of the United States, as the Ad-
ministering Authority, has satisfactorily discharged its obligations
under the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement and that it is appropri-
ate for that Agreement to be terminated with effect from the date re-
ferred to in paragraph 2 above;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to circulate as official documents
of the Security Council the present resolution and all material received
from the Administering Authority pursuant to this resolution.
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APPENDIX C
COMMONWEAL TH- WIDE INITIATIVE NO. 1
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
TO REAFFIRM THE COVENANT GUARANTEEING SOVER-
EIGNTY TO THE PEOPLE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS COVERING ALL IN-
TERNAL AND LOCAL AFFAIRS.
WHEREAS the purpose of Section 2 of the Congressional resolution
(Public Law 94-241) approving the executive agreement known as the
Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Is-
lands in Political Union with the United States of America (hereinaf-
ter referred to as the Covenant) was according to its sponsor United
States Senator Jacob Javits, to give the people of the Commonwealth
of the Northern Mariana Islands the opportunity to review their vote
on the Covenant because that agreement "might not give the Mari-
anans participation in the United States Government which they may
later desire and also to neutralize any argument that this was a step
toward American "colonization" of part of its "trust."
Section 1. The Covenant is hereby reaffirmed with the clear and un-
ambiguous understanding that the people of the Commonwealth in
granting sovereignty over foreign affairs and defense in Section 104
clearly reserved and did not grant sovereignty over internal and local
affairs (Section 103 of the Covenant). And it is clear that the only
provisions of the United States Constitution applicable in the CNMI
are those specifically listed in Section 501 of the Covenant. Section 501
was effective in January 1978 when the Commonwealth was part of
the Trust Territory and not a territory of the United States; therefore
neither the so-called Territorial Clause nor the Interstate Commerce
Clause apply of their own force and can only upon the specific consent
of the people be made applicable in the Commonwealth and used as a
basis for legislation in the Commonwealth.
Section 2. Should the covenant's Section 902 discussions leave any
substantial matters regarding self government or financial assistance
unresolved as of July 1, 1989, the people of the Commonwealth by
Initiative (Article IX, Section 1) shall have the right to reaffirm, reject,
or renegotiate the Covenant.
Section 3. The People of the Commonwealth respectfully request and
strongly urge the United Nations Security Council and Trusteeship
Council in any resolution terminating the "Trusteeship Agreement for
the formerly Japanese mandated islands" to include the following lan-
guage or its equivalent:
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"In terminating the 'Trusteeship Agreement for the formerly Japanese
mandated islands' the United Nations Security Council and Trustee-
ship Council specifically recognize that the People of the Common-
wealth granted sovereignty only over foreign affairs and defense
(Section 104 of the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands) and reserved and did not grant sovereignty
over local and internal matters (Section 103 of the Covenant), and
neither the Territorial Clause nor the Interstate Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution are applicable in the Commonwealth
(Section 501 of the Covenant)".
